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Abstract
The vast amount of personal data being collected and analyzed through
internet connected devices is vulnerable to theft and misuse. Modern cryptography
presents several powerful techniques that can help to solve the puzzle of how to
harness data for use while at the same time protecting it—one such technique is
homomorphic encryption that allows computations to be done on data while it is
still encrypted. The question of security for homomorphic encryption relates to the
broader field of lattice cryptography. Lattice cryptography is one of the main areas
of cryptography that promises to be secure even against quantum computing.
In this dissertation, we will touch on several aspects of homomorphic en-
cryption and its security based on lattice cryptography. Our main contributions
are:
1. proving some heuristics that are used in major results in the literature for
controlling the error size in bootstrapping for fully homomorphic encryption,
2. presenting a new fully homomorphic encryption scheme that supports k-bit
arbitrary operations and achieves an asymptotic ciphertext expansion of one,
3. thoroughly studying certain attacks against the Ring Learning with Errors
problem,
4. precisely characterizing the performance of an algorithm for solving the Ap-
proximate Common Divisor problem.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In the last decades, we have seen an explosion of digital data and high con-
nectivity through the internet. Powered by the convergence of advances in Artificial
Intelligence (AI), Internet of Things (IoT), and 5G, we are only going to continue
seeing an explosion in the collection (IoT), transmissions (5G), and analysis (AI) of
data. While this has the potential for great good in helping people harness their
data to its fullest potential, it also comes with increased risks. We have also seen
the rise in the misuse and abuse of data. The collection of fine grained personal data
which can give insights into a person’s tastes and views has motivated the sale and
aggregation of personal data. While harnessing this data to connect potential buy-
ers and sellers through advertising may largely be an acceptable application, this
same data can be used for more troubling applications such as targeted political
advertising in democracies and targeted suppression in authoritarian countries.
All of this leaves us with the problem of how to responsibly harness the
power of data in our modern world while keeping it out of the hands of those
who would use it for harm. Cryptography plays an essential role in this answer.
For years cryptography has been used successfully to protect data by encrypting it
for storage and by allowing parties that have never met to communicate securely
through the internet. But in this age where we want to collect data and harness
1
it through analysis, we need to ask even more of cryptography to develop methods
of protecting data at all times even throughout its analysis and computation. This
dissertation will focus mainly on the technical details of one secure computation
technique, homomorphic encryption, but it is important to situate this research
within the broader context of Secure Computation which is a major theme in modern
cryptography. We will discuss this area of secure computation more below in Section
1.1.
Another challenge to cryptography that is on the horizon is the need for it
to be secure against adversaries that may soon have access to large-scale quantum
computers; we will discuss this area of Post-Quantum Cryptography more below in
Section 1.2.
1.1 Secure Computation
Classically, cryptography has offered solutions for protecting data at rest
such as while stored on a server with symmetric key encryption solutions such as
the Advanced Encryption Standard(AES). Additionally, cryptography has been able
to protect data in transit, such as across the Internet, using public key cryptogra-
phy for authentication and key exchange as in the Transport Layer Security (TLS)
protocol. Secure computation refers to the general problem in modern cryptog-
raphy of how to keep data protected during computation. Many areas of modern
cryptography seek to offer different solutions to this general problem including ho-
momorphic encryption, multi-party computation, zero-knowledge proofs, differential
privacy, and trusted execution environments. Each of these techniques has its own
strengths and weaknesses, and different applications may be more suited towards
some techniques over others.
2
1.1.1 Homomorphic Encryption (HE)
Homomorphic encryption allows for computations to be done on data while
it is encrypted by operating on the ciphertexts. For example, a user could encrypt
data and send it to an untrusted cloud server. The cloud could run computations
on the data, and the result which is still encrypted could be sent back to the user
for decryption. The security guarantee is that the cloud does not learn the actual
plaintext data at any point in the computation. However, HE does not guarantee
that the cloud will perform the expected computation. Also, if the cloud is able
to learn the decryption of the ciphertext sent back to the user, it is possible for
the encryption to be broken. This is because in order to do the computation the
cloud must have special public keys which themselves encrypt the secret key, and
the cloud could cause the user to be decrypting information about the secret key.
HE is well suited to applications such as private information retrieval or private set
intersection where a user wants to maintain the privacy of queries made to a cloud.
There are two main styles of HE schemes. One allows for additions and
multiplications to be done on large plaintexts (e.g. 32-bit integers) and enables
efficient vectorized additions and multiplications. These schemes are most efficient
when the multiplicative depth of the circuit is fixed in advanced and is not too
large and when the circuit allows for highly parallel operations. A different style of
HE schemes allows for computations to be done on arbitrary binary circuits; these
schemes can better support non-polynomial operations on the data, but they do not
support as much throughput as the schemes with large plaintexts.
Performance varies by the nature of the computation being performed with
slowdowns ranging from 100 to 100,000 times slower depending on how much the
computation can take advantage of the parallelism native in the HE scheme. We
will give a more thorough overview of the development of HE in later sections. For
information on the HE standards process, see the website [1].
3
1.1.2 Multi-party computation (MPC)
Multi-party computation allows for multiple distrusting parties to compute
some agreed upon function while not revealing anything about their individual pri-
vate inputs, and then all would receive the correct output. An adversary is assumed
to control a certain proportion of the parties; generally, the two cases of an honest
majority or dishonest majority are considered. The main desired properties for an
MPC protocol are:
 Input privacy, meaning individual private inputs are not learned by the other
parties.
 Output correctness, meaning that for all parties that receive an output that
output is correct.
 Fairness, meaning either all the parties receive their intended outputs or none
of them do.
 Guaranteed output, meaning that regardless of the adversary’s actions all the
honest parties will complete the computation correctly.
The first two properties can be guaranteed even in the dishonest majority
setting, while an honest majority is required to achieve all four properties. MPC
protocols generally require many rounds of communications among the parties, and
it is this communication cost that dominates the running time of the protocols with
the local computations being mostly negligible. This communication requirement
also means the parties must remain online during the computation. Performance
varies by the nature of the computation being performed with slowdowns ranging
from 10 to 100,000 times slower than performing the same computation without
MPC. For more on MPC, see the following surveys [5, 19] which are also the main
sources for the information above.
4
1.1.3 Differential Privacy (DP)
Differential privacy seeks to address the issue of the outputs of a computation
revealing too much information about the sensitive input data. For example, DP ad-
dresses the problem of statistics published about a database being used to uniquely
identify a particular person in the database. DP seeks to provide an information-
theoretic notion of how much information is leaked about individual data records
as the result of releasing certain computations involving that data. The main idea
behind DP is to introduce a certain amount of noise in the data. DP is formalized by
comparing the probability distributions of the outputs in the case a record is present
or not in the dataset. One goal of DP is to convince participants to contribute more
data knowing that their individual data will not substantially change the outputs.
There are two main threat models. In the first called local DP, the noise is added
to the data by the data owner before it is collected. In the second called curator
DP, the data is collected by a curator, and the output released is computed using
differentially private analysis algorithms. The main cost of DP is the resulting loss
of accuracy in the outputs compared to computing them without DP. An inherent
limitation to DP is that quarrying a database indefinitly will eventually leak out the
sensitive information. Thus, limits on queries need to be established ahead of time.
There is also a tradeoff between revealing limited queries such as basic statistics with
higher accuracy and revealing more complicated queries such as a machine learning
model with necessarily lower accuracy to prevent leakage. For more information, see
the surveys [5, 101], the first of which is the main source for the information above.
For more technical surveys, see [59, 121].
1.1.4 Zero-Knowledge (ZK) Proofs
Zero-knowledge proofs are cryptography constructions that allow one party,
called the prover, to prove to another party, called the verifier, that a particular
statement involving secret data known only to the prover is true, and in this process
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the verifier learns nothing about the prover’s secret data. This is formalized by
saying ZK proofs have the following properties:
 Completeness, meaning that if both parties follow the protocol correctly the
verifier will be convinced the statement is true.
 Soundness, meaning that if the statement is false (perhaps in that the prover
does not actually know the claimed secret data) and the verifier follows the
protocol, the prover will not be able to convince the verifier the statement is
true.
 Zero-knowledge, meaning that if the statement is true and the prover follows
the protocol, the verifier will not learn anything about the prover’s secret data
other than that it makes the statement true.
There are a wide variety of zero-knowledge constructions. Many differ in the types
of statements they can prove with some being able to prove arbitrary statements,
such as any computation done with the secret data or being tailored to efficiently
prove specific mathematical relationships. ZK proof schemes also differ in the degree
to which they require interaction between the prover and verifier, though most can
be made non-interactive using the Fiat-Shamir heuristic. Different constructions
also give widely varying tradeoffs in the costs (prover time, verifier time, and proof
length). For example zk-SNARKS (succinct non-interactive arguments of knowl-
edge) place the burden of the costs on the prover while allowing very short proofs
and fast verification. Other constructions make the prover time to be short while
requiring longer proofs and verification times. Zero-knowledge proofs have seen fast
adoption in many blockchain applications by being able to keep data or transactions
private while allowing them to be verified on the public ledger. Zero-knowledge
proofs also lend themselves to applications where a party must prove to an auditor
or the public that some process has been done correctly without revealing sensitive
data. For more information, see the survey [5] which has been the main source for
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the above description and also the following websites which provide information on
the standards process and state of the art for zero-knowledge proofs [4, 3].
1.1.5 Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs)
A discussion of secure computation should also include mention of TEEs.
We should note that they differ from most other solutions for secure computation in
that their security does not fundamentally rely on any cryptographic or mathemati-
cal basis. Rather, TEEs rely on special-purpose hardware to create an environment
where sensitive data can be decrypted and processed in plaintext, and then en-
crypted or unencrypted results from this computation can be passed out of the
secure environment. Also, TEEs can provide attestations using digital signatures
that the code being executed within is being done correctly. The security model
is that privileged processes running on the same systems as the TEE cannot ex-
tract any data from within the TEE or alter its computations. In comparison to
other methods for secure computation, TEEs have the best efficiency with the cost
of computations done in the TEE increasing by at most one order of magnitude.
However, there have been substantial side-channel attacks against TEEs often due
to speculative execution techniques used in modern processors, see [87]. For more
on TEEs, see [5] which has been a source for some of the information above.
1.2 Post-Quantum Cryptography
Quantum computing poses a challenge to cryptography in that it has the
potential to solve certain mathematical problems much faster than classical com-
puters. In particular, Peter Shor in 1994 developed algorithms that can solve the
factoring and the discrete log problems very efficiently using quantum computation.
If there were a quantum computer large enough to run Shor’s algorithm on problems
of cryptographic size, it would be possible to break the major public key encryption
algorithms used today, such as RSA, ECDSA, and the Diffie-Hellman key exchange.
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It is important to note that no one knows how to use quantum algorithms
to break most symmetric cryptography. The most relevant quantum algorithm to
consider here is Grover’s search algorithm which allows for a brute-force search of
a space of size n in time O(
√
n). Thus, simply doubling the key lengths and hash
output sizes is sufficient to maintain the same level of security against a quantum ad-
versary as you would have against a classical adversary. Therefore, it is the two main
tools of public key cryptography, key-exchange and digital signatures, that need con-
structions that are secure against quantum adversaries. NIST is currently in the
middle of a multi-year process to develop new post-quantum standards. There are
several areas of cryptography that are being considered for post-quantum security;
they include lattice-based, code-based, multivariate, hash-based and isogeny-based.
See the survey paper [27] for more on these different areas and the NIST website
for the current standards process [2].
1.3 Structure of Thesis
The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows:
Chapter 2 Background. This chapter collects some of the mathematical back-
ground needed in later chapters of the dissertation.
Chapter 3 Learning with Errors. This chapter introduces the main cryptog-
raphy primitivies that are used in both homomorphic encryption and lattice-based
cryptography. These are the Learning with Errors (LWE) problem, the Ring Learn-
ing with Errors (RLWE) problem, and the Module Learning with Errors (MLWE)
problem. We give a short survey of the hardness results for these problems. We
also give a short survey of the main attacks against them that are used to estimate
concrete security for parameter selection.
Chapter 4 Techniques in Homomorphic Encryption. This chapter surveys
many techniques that have been developed over the last decade to make HE more
efficient and powerful. We will focus on the two major lines of bootstrapping tech-
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niques currently used—these being BGV/BFV and GSW/FHEW/TFHE.
Chapter 5 Removing Heuristic Assumptions in Bootstrapping Error Growth.
In the HE literature for bootstrapping, there is the need to rely on certain heuristic
assumptions for the bound on the error size. We prove new statistical results and
show how they can be used to remove (by proving) these heuristic assumptions in
several HE schemes.
Chapter 6 Fully Homomorphic Encryption with k-bit Arithmetic Opera-
tions. This chapter presents a new FHE scheme in the line of GSW/FHEW/TFHE.
We prove its correctness thoroughly and describe the operations it supports. We
also show how to select parameters for security and evaluate the scheme’s efficiency.
Chapter 7 Cryptanalysis of RLWE using Homomorphism Attacks. In this
chapter, we collect some of our work that analyzes a particular line of attacks against
the RLWE problem.
Chapter 8 High-Speed Modular Multiplier for Lattice-Based Cryptosys-
tems. In this chapter, we introduce an optimized algorithm for modular multipli-
cations for hardware implementations.
Chapter 9 Another Algorithm for the Partial Approximate Common Di-
visor Problem. In this chapter, we consider the Partial Approximate Common
Divisor (PACD) problem, which was an early primitive used for building FHE,
and analyze a previously less understood algorithm for solving it. This algorithm
appeared in the PhD dissertation by Nathaniel Black [30]; and through extensive
experimental results, we are able to precisely determine when the algorithm is suc-
cessful.
Appendix. In the appendix, we give more details on how we built the tools used
in Chapter 8 for computing sums of independent probability distributions on finite
rings.
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Chapter 2
Background
2.1 Notation Summary
In lattice cryptography and homomorphic encryption there are several dif-
ferent conventions for using column or row notation for vectors or for writing lattice
basis in matrix form. There are also differences in the order in which components of
LWE ciphers are written. We summarize our usage below with the understanding
that not all of these terms have been defined yet.
1. By Rm×n we denote m×n matrices (m rows and n columns) with entries from
R.
2. By Rm we denote m× 1 column vectors, so Rm = Rm×1.
3. By R1×m we denote 1×m row vectors.
4. For a single LWE sample, we will write its coordinates in the order (a,b =
〈a, s〉+ e) ∈ Znq × Zq.
5. For m ≥ 2 LWE samples, we will denote them in matrix notation as
(A,b) ≡ (A,As + e) ∈ Zm×nq × Zmq .
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6. For an RLWE sample, we will write its coordinates in the order (a, b = as+e) ∈
Rn,q ×Rn,q = R1×2n,q .
7. An RLWE sample flattened into base B where B` > q will be in R1×2`n,q .
8. A GSW cipher will be in R2`×2n,q .
9. A GSW error vector is in R2`.
10. A flattened GSW cipher is in R2`×2`n,q .
2.2 Rings and Norms
For q a positive integer, we denote the ring of integers modulo q as Zq :=
Z/qZ. In order to speak of the norms of elements in Zq, we must fix a set of
representatives, which we choose to be [−b q2c, ..., b q2c] for q odd and (− q2 , ..., q2 ] for
q even, and we call these the norm representatives. We then define the norm of
a ∈ Zq as the absolute value of its equivalent norm representative, e.g. for 7, 4 ∈ Z5,
||7|| = |2| and ||4|| = | − 1|.
For any polynomial f(x) =
∑d
i=0 fix
i ∈ R[x] and for ` ≥ 1, we define the
∞-norm as ‖f(x)‖∞ := max0≤i≤d |fi|. For an integer n, q ≥ 1, and fn(x) ∈ Z[x] of
degree n let
Rn := Z[x]/(fn(x)) Rn,q := Z[x]/(fn(x), q)
where (fn(x), q) denotes the ideal of Z[x] generated by fn(x) and q, namely
(fn(x), q) = {u(x)fn(x) + v(x)q : u(x), v(x) ∈ Z[x]}.
Observe that there are qn elements in Rq that are of the form
d0 + d1x+ d2x
2 + · · ·+ dn−1xn−1 + 〈fn(x)〉
where di ∈ Zq 0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1.
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Example 2.2.1. Consider
Rn,q =
Z[x]
(x4 + 1, 7)
.
An example of the multiplication modulo x4 + 1 and 7 for 2x, x3 + 7x2 + 1 in Rn,q
is
2x(x3 + 7x2 + 1) = 2x4 + 14x3 + 2x
≡ 2(−1) + 0x3 + 2x
≡ 2x− 2.
If q is prime and fn(x) is irreducible modulo q, then Rn,q is a finite field, Fqn .
Otherwise, Rn,q is a commutative ring with identity (CRW1) but is not an integral
domain, since it has zero divisors.
Example 2.2.2. An example of Rn,q with zero divisors is
Rn,q =
Z[x]
(x3 + 1, 4)
.
Some zero divisors are:
2 · 2 ≡ 0
2(2x+ 2) ≡ 0
(x+ 1)(x2 + 3x+ 1) ≡ x3 + 1 ≡ 0.
Exercise 2.2.3. Prove the following isomorphism of rings
Z/qZ[x]
(fn(x))
' Z[x]
(fn(x), q)
Exercise 2.2.4. Let α be a root of fn(x) modulo q, i.e. (x−α)|fn(x) (mod q), find
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a ring homomorphism from
φ :
Z[x]
(fn(x), q)
→ Z/qZ
and prove that it is a ring homomorphism.
For f(x) =
∑d
i=0 fix
i in Rn,q we define its norm as follows. First find the
unique h(x) ∈ Zq[x] so that deg h(x) < n and f(x) ≡ h(x) mod (xn + 1) (i.e. h(x)
is the remainder of f(x) modulo xn + 1), then fix each coefficient of h(x) to be a
norm representative of Zq and then ||f(x)||∞ := ||h(x)||∞.
For m ≥ 1, elements in Rmn,q are viewed as m × 1 column vectors. For
u = (u1(x), . . . , um(x))
> ∈ Rmn , the norm of such a vector is defined as ‖u‖∞ =
max1≤i≤m ‖ui(x)‖∞. By Rk×mn,q we mean k ×m matrices with entries from Rn,q.
Also, for any real number z, the function bze denotes the integer closest to
z. For example, b1.6e = 2, b−0.4e = 0, however, b−1.5e = −2 or −1, either is fine.
For any vector v ∈ Rn (or any polynomial v ∈ Rn with degree < n), bve is the
vector (or the polynomial) when b·e is applied to each entry (or each coefficient) of
v.
2.3 Chinese Remainder Theorem and Discrete FFTs
If one considers a monic polynomial f(x) of degree n and an integer q, it is
a broad question to ask how f(x) factors into irreducible elements modulo q. This
factorization by the Chinese Remainder Theorem determines the structure of the
ring Rn,q = Z[x]/〈f(x, q)〉. Under certain conditions, this structure will be useful for
performing operations in parallel or allowing implementations with efficient FFTs.
2.3.1 Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT)
General CRT. We recall the general form of the Chinese remainder theorem
(CRT) from Dummit and Foote Section 7.6. Let R be a commutative ring with
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identity 1 6= 0. Recall two ideals I and J are comaximal if I + J = R, i.e. for every
r ∈ R there exists x ∈ I, y ∈ J such that x+ y = r. Also, recall the product of two
ideals IJ consists of all finite sums of the form xy where x ∈ I, y ∈ J and is itself
an ideal in R.
Theorem 2.3.1. [58, page 265] Let I1, I2, ..., Ik be ideals in R. The map
R→ R/I1 ×R/I2 × · · · ×R/Ik
defined by r 7→ (r + I1, r + I2, ..., r + I3) is a ring homomorphism with kernel I1 ∩
I2 ∩ · · · ∩ Ik. If all I1, ..., Ik are pairwise comaximal, the map is surjective and
I1 ∩ · · · ∩ Ik = I1I2 · · · Ik so
R/(I1I2 · · · Ik) = R/(I1 ∩ I2 ∩ · · · ∩ Ik) ∼= R/I1 ×R/I2 × · · · ×R/Ik.
where R/I1 ×R/I2 × · · · ×R/Ik is a direct product of rings.
We will be particularly interested in the case of the Chinese Remainder
Theorem for integers and polynomials.
Theorem 2.3.2 (CRT for integers). Let q1, ..., qt be positive integers which are
pairwise coprime (implying the ideals they generate in Z are comaximal). Let q =
q1q2 · · · qt. Then
Z/qZ ∼= Z/q1Z× Z/q2Z× · · · × Z/qtZ.
The map from left to right is r 7→ (r (mod q1), r (mod q2), . . . , r (mod qt). The
map from right to left is also efficiently computable. For any integers r1, ..., rt there
is a unique integer x (mod q) such that
x ≡ ri (mod qi) 1 ≤ i ≤ t.
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Furthermore, any such x is of the form
x ≡ r1e1 + · · ·+ rtet (mod q)
where
ei =
q
qi
·
((
q
qi
)−1
mod qi
)
, 1 ≤ i ≤ t.
Note that even though Z/qiZ is not necessarily a Euclidean domain, since qqi is
coprime to qi as gcd(qi, qj) = 1 for i 6= j, the inverse of qqi exists modulo qi and can
be computed using the extended Euclidean algorithm.
Theorem 2.3.3 (CRT for polynomials). Let q be an integer and f1, ..., ft ∈ Z/qZ[x]
be nonconstant polynomials, pairwise coprime, and let f = f1f2 · · · ft. Then
Z/qZ[x]
〈f(x)〉
∼= Z/qZ[x]〈f1(x)〉 × · · · ×
Z/qZ[x]
〈ft(x)〉 .
The map from left to right can be computed as h 7→ (h (mod f1), ..., h (mod ft)).
The map from right to left is also efficiently computable. For any polynomials
r1, ..., rt ∈ Z/qZ[x], there is a unique polynomial g (mod f) such that
g ≡ ri (mod fi), 1 ≤ i ≤ t.
Furthermore, any such solution g is of the form
g ≡ r1e1 + · · · rtet (mod f)
where
ei =
f
fi
((
f
fi
)−1
mod fi
)
, 1 ≤ i ≤ t.
Computed straightforwardly, the maps above in both directions have quadratic
running time, O(t2). In certain cases, these maps will be able to be computed using
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an FFT and inverse FFT in O(t log(t)) time. The above CRTs for integers and
polynomials can be combined in what is called double CRT form.
Theorem 2.3.4 (Double CRT form). Let q1, ..., qt be pairwise coprime positive in-
tegers and q = q1 · · · qt. Let f1, ..., fn ∈ Z/qZ[x] be pairwise coprime polynomials
and f = f1 · · · fn. Then
Z/qZ[x]
〈f(x)〉
∼=
t⊗
i=1
(
Z/qiZ[x]
〈f1(x)〉 × · · · ×
Z/qiZ
〈fn(x)〉
)
.
To map h(x) ∈ Z/qZ[x]〈f(x)〉 into double CRT form, the above integer CRT map
can be applied to each coefficient of h(x) then modulo each qi the polynomial CRT
map can be applied to h(x). The inverses of these maps as discussed above can be
applied to map in the other direction.
2.3.2 Discrete FFTs
The polynomial CRT maps described above have quadratic running time
in the degree of f , but under certain conditions a discrete Fast Fourier Transform
(FFT) can be used to improve this running time.
Let us consider the special case of f(x) = xn + 1 for n a power of 2 and q
prime. Then if we choose q such that 2n|(q−1) then we have that x2n ≡ 1 (mod q).
In other words, the roots of x2n + 1 are in Z/piZ, which are the 2nth roots of unity.
These can be used to compute an FFT in time O(n log n).
To use this with double CRT form for f(x) = xn + 1 for n a power of 2 and
q = p1p2 · · · pt the product of distinct odd primes, if we choose the primes such that
2n|(pi−1) then we have that x2n ≡ 1 (mod pi). We can implement the double CRT
form map by first mapping modulo the different primes and then performing FFTs
within each ring Z/piZ[x]〈f1(x)〉 . For more details on these FFTs see [65].
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2.4 Probability Distributions
We shall use several probabilistic distributions. A random variable on a
finite ring R is uniform random if it takes each element of R with equal probability,
namely 1/|R|. A random variable X on Znq or Rn,q is uniform random if and only
if all the components (or coefficients) are independent and uniform random on Zq.
For any real number τ > 0, by τ -bounded random variable X on Z, we mean X is
random according to some distribution on the integers i with |i| ≤ τ , and X never
takes any other value. A random variable X on R is called Gaussian with parameter
α > 0 if its density function is
ρα(x) =
1
α
exp(−pi(x/α)2), x ∈ R.
A Gaussian random variable with parameter α has expected value 0 and standard
deviation α/
√
2pi.
2.4.1 Discretized and Discrete Gaussian Distributions
The precise definition of a discretized Gaussian on Zq [108] is as follows:
Definition 2.4.1. For β ∈ R+ the continuous distribution Ψβ on [0, 1) is obtained
by sampling from a normal distribution with mean 0 and standard deviation β√
2pi
and reducing the result mod 1. This probability distribution is given as
∀r ∈ [0, 1), Ψβ(r) :=
∞∑
k=−∞
1
β
· exp
(
−pi
(
r − k
β
)2)
.
Now using Ψβ, the discretized Gaussian distribution on Zq is defined as follows:
Definition 2.4.2. The discretization of a Gaussian distribution on Zq (we denote
as Gq,β) is obtained by sampling from Ψβ and multiplying by q and rounding to the
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nearest integer. This probability distribution is give by
Gq,β(i) =
∫ (i+ 1
2
)/q
(i− 1
2
)/q
Ψβ(x)dx.
Note that one can easily generate random values from Gq,β and one can also
numerically approximate the probability distribution of Gq,β by using approxima-
tions for the infinite sum and the integral.
Definition 2.4.3. The discrete Guassian distribution on Z of parameter α is defined
as follows:
Dα(x) =
ρα(x)∑
k∈Z ρα(k)
,
where ρα is a Gaussian on R of parameter α.
2.4.2 Sub-Gaussian Distributions
In this work, the analysis of sub-Gaussian random variables will be critical,
and from [112] we recall several useful properties. A random variable X over R
is called sub-Gaussian with variance proxy σ2, or parameter σ, and we write X ∼
subG(σ2) if E(X) = 0 and its moment generating function is bounded by the MGF
of N(0, σ2),
E[exp(tX)] ≤ exp(σ2t2/2), ∀ t ∈ R.
Lemma 2.4.4 (sub-Gaussian Properties).
1. X is subG(σ2) if and only if has mean of zero and its tails are dominated as
Prob(|X| ≥ t) ≤ 2 exp(−(t/2σ)2), for all t ≥ 0.
2. A sum of independent sub-Gaussian random variables on R is still sub-Gaussian;
in particular, [112, Cor1.7] if X1, ..., Xn are n independent sub-Gaussians of
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parameter σ, Xi ∼ subG(α2), then for any a ∈ Rn
Prob
(∣∣∣∣∣
n∑
i=1
aiXi)
∣∣∣∣∣ > t
)
≤ 2 exp
( −t2
2σ2||a||22
)
,
or equivalently
n∑
i=1
aiXi ∼ subG((σ||a||2)2).
3. A max bound over several sub-Gaussians is given by [112, Thm 1.14] as, if
X1, ..., XN are Xi ∼ subG(σ2) (not necessarily independent), then for any
t > 0
Prob
(
max
0≤i≤N
Xi > t
)
≤ N exp(−t2/2σ2).
4. A τ -bounded random variable with mean 0 is always sub-Gaussian with pa-
rameter τ [78].
We should note that a sum of independent sub-Gaussian random variables
on Zq will be nearly uniform random when the number of variables is large enough
and the width of the sub-Gaussians are large enough relative to the size of q; see
[46].
2.4.3 Basic Lemmas
Lemma 2.4.5. If X is uniform random on a finite ring R and w is invertible in
R, then the distribution Y := wX is uniform random on R.
Proof. The map φw : R → R, φw(x) = wx is bijective since w is invertible. Thus,
for any W = w, Y = φw(X) is also uniform random since Prob[Y = y] = Prob[X =
x = w−1y].
Lemma 2.4.6. If X is uniform random on a finite ring R and W is any distribution
on the invertible elements in R, then the distribution Y := WX is independent of
W .
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Proof. To show the distributions are independent, we want to show that Prob[Y ] =
Prob[Y |W ].
For any W = w, Prob[Y |W = w] = Prob[wX] If Y = y, then x = w−1y and
Prob[wX = y] = Prob[x = w−1y] = 1/|R| since X is uniform random.
By the previous lemma Y is uniform random, so Prob[Y = y] = 1/|R|.
2.5 Lattice Basics
With potential quantum computers able to solve the factoring and discrete
log problems efficiently, there is currently a need for other cryptosystems that are
secure against even quantum algorithms. Certain lattice problems are among the
few problems currently not solvable using quantum algorithms, making it a prime
area for research in post-quantum cryptosystems.
Definition 2.5.1. A lattice V ⊆ Rn is a discrete additive subgroup, i.e.
1. V is a group under addition, and
2. for each point v ∈ V there exists  > 0 such that
V ∩ {x ∈ Rn : ||x− v||2 < } = {v}
There is an equivalent way to define a lattice in terms of a basis.
Definition 2.5.2. For any linearly independent set of vectors B = {b1, ..., bk} ∈ Rn
(which we will treat as column vectors) let
L(B) =
{
k∑
i=1
xibi | xi ∈ Z
}
called the lattice generated by B.
Lemma 2.5.3. L(B) is a lattice.
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Proving that L(B) is an additive group is easy. The key to proving that L
is discrete is the independence of the b′is. If the b
′
is are not independent L may not
be discrete. For example, if
L = {x1, x2
√
2 | x1, x2 ∈ Z} ⊂ R
there exists a sequence ai, bi ∈ Z so that ai
√
2 + bi → 0 when i→∞, so 0 is not an
isolated point in the lattice. Before proving that L(B) is discrete, we will need to
introduce some more material.
Gram-Schmidt Orthogonalization Given b1, ..., bk ∈ Rn define
b∗1 = b1
b∗i = bi −
i−1∑
j=1
rijb
∗
j
rij =
〈bi, b∗j 〉
〈b∗j , b∗j 〉
1 ≤ j ≤ i− 1
In matrix notation this can be written as B = B∗M where M has entries
rij . This process gives the following properties.
Lemma 2.5.4. Properties of GSO Basis
 b∗1, ..., b∗k are pairwise orthogonal
 〈b1, ..., bi〉R = 〈b∗1, ..., b∗i 〉R for each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ k
 ||b∗i ||2 ≤ ||bi||2, 1 ≤ i ≤ k
Theorem 2.5.5. For any nonzero v ∈ L(B) = 〈b1, ..., bk〉Z,
||v||2 ≥ min
1≤i≤k
||b∗i ||2
where b∗1, b∗2, ..., b∗k is the Gram-Schmidt orthogonalization of B.
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Proof. Suppose v =
∑k
i=1 xibi, xi ∈ Z. Let m be the largest index such that xi 6= 0.
So by a previous property of GSO basis
v ∈ 〈b1, ..., bm〉R = 〈b∗1, ..., b∗m〉R.
We know b∗m is orthogonal to 〈b1, ..., bm−1〉R so
〈v, b∗m〉 = 〈xmbm, b∗m〉
= xm〈b∗m, b∗m〉
= xm||b∗m||2
and by the Cauchy-Schwartz Inequality
|〈v, b∗m〉| ≤ ||v||||b∗m||
|〈v, b∗m〉|
||b∗m||
≤ ||v|| since ||b∗m|| 6= 0
||b∗m|| ≤ |xm|||b∗m|| =
|xm|||b∗m||2
||b∗m||
≤ ||v||.
Since the zero vector does not have points in the lattice arbitrarily close
by this theorem, and all other points in the lattice can be shifted to zero, this
immediately implies that L(B) is discrete and therefore a lattice. This completes
the proof of Lemma 2.5.3.
Definition 2.5.6. The dimension k of L(B) is called the rank of L(B). If k = n,
then L(B) is called a full rank lattice in Rn.
Definition 2.5.7. For any lattice L ⊆ Rn define
λ(L) = inf{||v|| : v ∈ L, v 6= 0}
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Such a vector is called a shortest vector in L.
By the previous theorem one can prove that there exists v ∈ L such that
λ(L) = ||v||.
Theorem 2.5.8. There exists v ∈ L such that λ(L) = ||v||.
Corollary 2.5.9. For any lattice L = L(B),
λ(L) ≥ min
1≤i≤k
||b∗i ||
This gives a lower bound on the shortest vector in lattice. We would also
like an upper bound, but for this we will need the following definitions first.
Definition 2.5.10. For any basis B = {b1, ..., bk} ⊆ Rn, the fundamental paral-
lelepiped of L(B) is defined as
P (B) =
{
k∑
i=1
xibi | 0 ≤ xi < 1
}
⊆ Rn
Note: The span(B) = 〈B〉R is partitioned into disjoint sets v + P (B) for
v ∈ L(B) where v + P (B) shifts every point in P (B) by v.
Definition 2.5.11. The determinant of L(B) is defined to be the k-dimensional
volume of P (B)
det(L(B)) = vol(P (B))
Exercise 2.5.12. Show the definition of the determinant of a lattice is well-defined
in that it is independent of the lattice basis chosen. (Hint: A unimodular matrix has
determinant ±1.)
Lemma 2.5.13. To compute the determinate of a lattice we can use that
det(L(B)) =
k∏
i=1
||b∗i ||
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where b∗1, ..., b∗k is the GSO of B.
Theorem 2.5.14. For any lattice basis {b1, ..., bk} ⊆ Rn we let B be the matrix
with columns b1, ..., bn, then
det(L(B)) =
√
det(BB>)
Proof. Recall that for B = (b1, ..., bk), B
∗ = (b∗1, ..., b∗k) where the bi and b
∗
i ’s are
column vectors and for M as the k × k matrix of GSO coefficients, we can write
B = B∗M
from this we can get that
BT = MT (B∗)T
which we can multiply as
BTB = MT (B∗)TB∗M
to get that
det(BTB) = (det(M))2det((B∗)TB∗)
=
k∏
i=1
||b∗i ||2
√
det(BTB) =
k∏
i=1
||b∗i ||.
Theorem 2.5.15. Blichfeldt’s Theorem
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For any lattice L ⊆ Rn of rank n, and any set S ⊂ Rn if
vol(S) > det(L)
then S contains two different vectors z1, z2 so that z1 − z2 ∈ L.
Proof. Suppose L = L(B). Then we know that Rn is partitioned into v + P (B),
v ∈ L. Hence, S is partitioned into
Sv := S ∩ (v + P (B)), v ∈ L
and
vol(S) =
∑
v∈L
vol(Sv).
Note that
Sv − v ⊆ P (B) v ∈ L
and
vol(Sv − v) = vol(Sv).
The total volume of Sv−v, v ∈ L is bigger than det(L), which is equal to the volume
of P (B). So the sets Sv−v, v ∈ L cannot be disjoint. Thus, there exists two different
v1, v2 ∈ L so that
(Sv1 − v1) ∩ (Sv2 − v2) 6= ∅,
that is, there exist z1, z2 ∈ S so that
z1 − v1 = z2 − v2.
Hence, z1 − z2 = v1 − v2 ∈ L.
Theorem 2.5.16. Minkowski’s Theorem
For any lattice L in Rn of rank n and any convex symmetric set S ⊆ Rn ( symmetric
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meaning that if v ∈ S, then −v ∈ S), if vol(S) > 2n det(L), then S contains a
nonzero point in L.
Proof. Apply Blichfeldt’s Theorem to the set S2 = {v2 |v ∈ S}
Corollary 2.5.17. Every lattice L(B) ⊂ Rn of rank n contains a nonzero lattice
point v ∈ L(B) with
||v||∞ ≤ |det(B)| 1n
hence
||v||2 ≤
√
n||v||∞ ≤
√
n|det(B)| 1n
Proof. Let t be any real number with t > (det(B))
1
n . Consider the n-dimensional
cube:
S = {x ∈ Rn : |xi| ≤ t, 1 ≤ i ≤ n}.
Note that S is convex and symmetric about 0 and
vol(S) = (2t)n > 2n|det(B)|.
By Minkowski’s Theorem there exists v ∈ L(B) \ {0}} so that v ∈ S, i.e. ||v||∞ ≤ t.
Since L(B) is discrete, when t → |det(B)| 1n , we see that there exists v ∈ L(B) so
that
||v||∞ ≤ |det(B)| 1n
holds.
Combining what we have proven about the bounds on the shortest vector in
a lattice, we see that
min
1≤i≤n
||b∗i ||2 ≤ λ(L(B)) ≤
√
n(det(L(B))))
1
n .
Open Problem 1. These are theoretical bounds about the existence of the shortest
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vector. It is still an open problem to find an algorithm that will find vectors in this
range in polynomial time.
The lattice reduction algorithm LLL can find a sort vector that is at most
exponentially longer (in the dimension of the lattice) than the shortest vector and
runs in polynomial time (in the dimension). There are algorithms that can solve the
shortest vector problem, but they run in exponential time in the lattice dimension;
these are often called SVP oracles. The BKZ algorithm combines these algorithms
to get better approximations on the shortest vector by running SVP oracles on many
low dimensional sub-lattices interspersed with runs of LLL. For more background
on lattices, see Regev’s lecture notes [107].
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Chapter 3
Learning with Errors Problems
3.1 Learning with Errors (LWE)
Regev (2005 [108, 109]) introduced the learning with errors (LWE) problem
over Zq. Let χ be a probabilistic distribution on Z that strongly favors values with
small absolute value, and let s ∈ Znq be an arbitrary vector (corresponding to a
secret key of a user). An LWE sample is of the form (a, b) where a ∈ Znq is uniform
random and
b = 〈a, s〉+ e mod q
with e ∈ Z being randomly chosen according to the error distribution χ. The LWE
problem over Zq is to find s given LWE samples in Znq × Zq where the number of
samples can be as large as one desires, but should be bounded by a polynomial in
n log(q). The decision version of the LWE problem is to distinguish LWE samples
from samples with uniform distribution on Znq × Zq. The matrix notation for m
LWE samples is written as
(A,b) ≡ (A,As + e) ∈ Zm×nq × Zmq
where A ∈ Zm×nq .
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LWE ciphers. Regev [108, 109] also introduced a cryptosystem based on
the LWE problem. Let s ∈ Znq be a secret key, Dq = bq/2c (this Dq is different from
the one used later) and 1 ≤ τ < Dq/2. To encrypt a message bit x ∈ {0, 1}, pick
a ∈ Znq uniform randomly and compute
b := 〈a, s〉+ e+ xDq mod q,
where e ∈ [−τ, τ ] is uniform random or truncated Gaussian. Then (a, b) is a cipher-
text for x, denoted as
Es(x) = (a, b) ∈ Znq × Zq,
called an LWE cipher of x. To decrypt a ciphertext Es(x) = (a, b), compute
b1 := b− 〈s,a〉 mod q,
where −q/2 < b1 ≤ q/2, and x1 := bb1/Dqe. Then x = x1. The reason is that
b1 ≡ b− 〈s,a〉 ≡ e+ xDq mod q,
and |e| ≤ τ < Dq/2 implies that −q/2 < e + xDq ≤ q/2, hence b1 = e + xDq (as
real numbers) and b1/Dq = e/Dq + x with |e/Dq| < 1/2.
3.2 Ring Learning with Errors (RLWE)
Lyubashevsky, Peikert, and Regev (2010 [91]) introduced the Ring Learning
with Errors (RLWE) problem in order to get more efficient encryption schemes.
Let s(x) ∈ Rn,q be any secret key. An RLWE sample is of the form
(a(x), b(x)) ∈ R2n,q where a(x) ∈ Rn,q is uniform random and
b(x) := s(x)a(x) + e(x) mod (xn + 1, q),
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where e(x) ∈ Rn with each coefficient small and random (according to the error
distribution). An RLWE sample v ∈ R2n,q is said to have error size τ if
v(−s(x), 1)t ≡ e(x) (mod (xn + 1, q)), (3.1)
where e(x) ∈ Rn and ||e(x)||∞ ≤ τ . The RLWE problem over Zq is to find s(x)
given many RLWE samples where each sample is random and independent.
RLWE ciphers. Let m(x) =
∑n−1
i=0 mix
i where mi ∈ {0, 1}, which repre-
sents an n-bit message. An RLWE cipher for m(x) with error size τ is of the form
REs(m(x)) = v +m(x)Dq(0, 1) ∈ R2n,q (3.2)
where v ∈ R2n,q is an RLWE sample with error size τ . Suppose REs(m(x)) =
(a(x), b(x)). Then
b(x)− s(x)a(x) ≡ m(x)Dq + e(x) mod (xn + 1, q),
where e(x) ∈ Rn is random with ||e(x)||∞ ≤ τ . When τ < Dq/2, one can recover
m(x) from b(x)− s(x)a(x), after reduced modulo (xn + 1, q).
3.3 Module Learning with Errors (MLWE)
The Module Learning with Errors problem is a genaralization of the LWE
and RLWE problems. Note that Rrn,q is a rank r Rn,q-module. We let s,a ∈ Rrn,q,
where a is uniform and s is a fixed (small) secret. The error term e ∈ Rn,q follows
some small error distribution. We consider the distribution
(a,b := 〈s,a〉+ e) ∈ Rrn,q ×Rn,q
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and the Search-MLWE problem is to find s given many samples from this distribu-
tion. The Decision-MLWE problem is to distinguish the MLWE distribution from
the uniform distribution on the same set. MLWE ciphers can be defined in an
analogous way to LWE and RLWE.
3.4 Security Reductions
In introducing the LWE problem, Regev proved that it could be reduced
(under a quantum reduction) to solving certain short vector problems in lattices
[108, 109]. This result was further extended to RLWE by Lyubashevsky, Peikert,
and Regev [91] and to decisional-RLWE for any ring and any modulus in [105].
These reductions have paved the way for LWE/RLWE to be studied as candidates
for post-quantum cryptography.
There is some debate as to how useful these reductions are for informing
the choice of concrete parameters for LWE/RLWE schemes. Chatterjee, Koblitz,
and Menezes [41] point out that the LWE reduction is not tight. Also, there are
attacks against RLWE that perform much better against certain choices of rings as
discussed more in Chapter 7.
3.5 Concrete Security of LWE
In practice in any area of cryptography, concrete parameters are generally
set based on considering the best known attacks and estimating their performance
for cryptographic size parameters. Much work has been done in this direction for
lattice-based cryptography; here we will focus on surveying some of the work done
by Albrecht et. al in [14, 8, 10].
In [10] the authors estimate the security of all the LWE/NTRU parameters
in the NIST PQC Round 1 submissions. They consider two main attacks, primal-
uSVP against the Search-LWE problem and the dual attack against the Decision-
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LWE problem. In both attacks, improvements can be made if the LWE instance
is using a small or sparse secret distribution [8]. The estimates for running these
attacks largely depend on the cost model of running the BKZ algorithm, and the
authors of [10] consider 14 different cost models from the literature. Different cost
models can give widely different security estimates, and there is debate as to which
models should be used. Below we will overview these two main attacks and their
use of the BKZ algorithm. Then for the security of a new lattice signature scheme,
we will parallel the security analysis done in [10] using the LWE Estimator [14]
(https://bitbucket.org/malb/lwe-estimator/src/master/).
3.5.1 Primal-uSVP
The primal lattice attack [20, 16, 13] transforms the search-LWE problem
into a unique Stortest Vector Problem (uSVP) in an integer lattice using the lattice
embedding from either [80] or [20].
Kannan’s embedding [80]. One way to consider solving an LWE instance
(A,b) ≡ (A,As + e) ∈ Zm×nq × Zmq
is to find the closest vector to b in the lattice spanned by the columns of A modulo
q. Since multiplying A on the right by s takes a linear combination of the columns
of A; and since e is small, the closest vector in lattice in the lattice spanned by the
columns of A is with high probability y := As. If one knows y, one can solve for s
directly. Kannan’s embedding does this by finding the shortest vector in the lattice
spanned by the rows of the following matrix:
M =

νIn A
′ 0
0 qIm−n 0
bT 0 t

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where A′ comes from taking the reduced row echelon form (with permutations)
[In, A
′] for of A> ∈ Zn×mq . This shortest vector can be found using a lattice reduction
algorithm.
Bai-Galbraith embedding [20]. As described in [13] when considering
an LWE instance
(A,b) ≡ (A,As + e) ∈ Zm×nq × Zmq
one can see that the vector (νs>e>, 1) ∈ (Rm+n+1)> for some ν 6= 0 is in the lattice
Λ =
{
x ∈ ((νZ)n)> × (Zm+1)>∣∣x(1
ν
A|I| − b
)T
≡ 0 (mod q)
}
.
A basis M for the lattice Λ is given by the rows of the following matrix
M =

νIn −AT 0
0 qIm 0
0 b 1
 .
Choosing ν so that the size of νs approximately matches the size e makes it highly
likely that the unique shortest vector in the lattice is (νs>e>, 1). Thus, this vector
can be found by solving uSVP with a lattice reduction algorithm such as BKZ.
3.5.2 Dual-lattice attack.
Recall the Decision-LWE problem is to distinguished the distribution LWE
samples
(A,b) ≡ (A,As + e) ∈ Zm×nq × Zmq
from the uniform distribution on the same set given access to many samples from
one or the other.
In the dual-lattice attack against the Decision-LWE problem, one seeks to
find a short vector y ∈ Zm such that yTA ≡ 0 (mod q). Once such a short y
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has been found, one can compute yTb = yTAs + yTe ≡ yTe (mod q) and the
distribution of yTe can be distinguished from uniform if the samples are actually
LWE samples. On the other hand, if (b,A) is uniform then yTe will also be uniform.
To find this short vector y, we first construct the following lattice basis.
Compute from A a basis Y for its left kernel modulo q which with high-probability
has dimension m′ := (m − n). Writing Y = [Im′ |Y′] and considering the q-ary
lattice spanned by its rows, we are seeking the short vector y in the lattice with
basis given by the rows of L,
L =
 Im′ Y′
0 qIn
 .
This dual attack can be further developed in the case that the secret vector s is
small. In this case, we want to find a short vector in the lattice
L = {(x,y) ∈ Zm+n | x>A ≡ y> mod q}.
Given this short vector (x,y), we can compute
x>b = x>As + x>e
= y>s + x>e;
and since all of these vectors are small, this distribution can be distinguished from
uniform. This can be taken a bit further in that we can guess components of s and
then allow those matching components of y to be arbitrarily large, thereby reducing
the dimension of the lattice we need to find a short vector in.
34
3.5.3 BKZ Cost Models.
The main lattice reduction that influences security estimates is the BKZ
reduction which involves calling an SVP oracle on sub-lattices between runs of the
LLL algorithm. There are various cost models in the literature to describe the cost
of running these SVP oracles in a smaller dimension (β) and the number of times
they need to be run [10]. Security estimates vary widely between these different
models. The disagreement is not about when you can solve decision LWE but about
the cost estimates of calls to the SVP oracle. There is also debate as to whether
costs of sieving SVP oracles or enumeration SVP oracles should be used. Sieving
asymptotically is better than enumeration, but is it an open question as to whether
it is better for cryptographic parameters.
3.5.4 LWE Estimator.
A nice survey of the attacks against LWE is given in [15, 106] and estimates
based on these works can be made using the LWE Estimator. However, the LWE
Estimator does not currently support estimates for hybrid attack which can be the
best performing attacks against small-secrets LWE. Most of the cost models for
solving LWE assume that the error used is discrete Gaussian; however, in practice
many schemes use different error distributions. Since all the best attacks do not
make use of the specific structure of the error distribution, but seem to only depend
on the overall size of the error, it is common practice when using the LWE Estimator
to substitute the standard deviation of the expected Gaussian distribution with the
standard deviation of the different error distribution. In the case of Learning with
Rounding (LWR), (where one rounds from a modulus q down to a modulus p) several
papers make the estimate with standard deviation
√
(q/p)2−1
12 . When considering
lattice based attacks against RLWE or MLWE, it is standard to treat them as plain
LWE, as the multiplication operations are not utilized in the lattice reductions.
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3.5.5 Estimating security for a signature scheme.
We will now apply the LWE Estimator to estimate the security of a new
signature scheme against the main primal and dual attacks. As an example of using
the LWE estimator and for which BKZ cost models we consider, we refer to [10].
Table 4 of [10] gives 14 different BKZ cost models that have been used by at least
one of the NIST PQC submissions.
We estimate the security for the lattice signature scheme [67], which is based
on MLWE. As is customary when considering lattice reduction attacks against
MLWE or RLWE, we treat the problem as a plain LWE problem as the lattice
reduction attacks only make use of the additive structure.
As an example, we consider q = 213 + 212 + 1. The secret key is chosen
uniformly from {−1, 0, 1}n and our error is bounded uniform in the range [−τ, τ ]
We consider several different parameter settings.
1. n = 512, τ = 16.
2. n = 512, τ = 32.
3. n = 1024, τ = 16.
4. n = 1024, τ = 32.
The code we use to run the LWE Estimator is in Listing 3.1, where we use
14 different possible cost models, and the resulting security estimates are in Table
3.5.5
Listing 3.1: LWE Estimator Script
n = 512
tau = 16;
var = ((2*tau+1)^2 -1)/12;
sd = sqrt(var)
q = 2^13+2^12+1
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alpha = sqrt(2*pi)*sd/RR(q)
m = n
secret_distribution = (-1, 1)
success_probability = 0.99
reduction_cost_model = lambda beta, d, B: ZZ(2)**RR(0.18728*beta*log(beta,
2) - 1.0192*beta + 16.1) // an example of one model used
primald = partial(drop_and_solve, primal_usvp, postprocess=False,
decision=False)
primald(n, alpha, q, secret_distribution=secret_distribution, m=m,
success_probability=success_probability,
reduction_cost_model=reduction_cost_model)
Table 3.1: Security estimates for different BKZ cost models
cost model \(n, τ) (512,16) (512, 32) (1024,16) (1024,32)
0.265β 112 125 253 276
0.265β + 16.4 129 142 269 293
0.2975β 126 141 284 310
0.265β + log(β) 121 134 263 286
0.265β + 16.4 + log(8d) 142 154 283 306
0.292β 124 138 278 304
0.292β + 16.4 140 154 295 321
0.368β 156 174 351 384
0.292β + log(β) 133 147 288 314
0.292β + 16.4 + log(8d) 153 167 309 335
1/2(0.187β log(β)− 1.019β + 16.1 139 161 406 456
0.125β log(β)− 0.755β + 2.25 144 169 460 519
0.187β log(β)− 1.019β + 16.1 278 322 813 912
0.000784β2 + 0.366β − 0.9 + log(8d) 312 363 1064 1208
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Chapter 4
Techniques in Homomorphic
Encryption
Homomorphic encryption (HE) allows computations to be done directly on
encrypted data offering a great solution to data privacy in cloud computing envi-
ronments. It was first proposed in 1978 by Rivest, Adleman, and Dertouzos [113].
Fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) allows for any function of any complexity to
be computed on the encrypted data. The first FHE scheme was discovered in 2009
by Gentry [68] who introduced the idea of bootstrapping to make the scheme fully
homomorphic. Many schemes have followed in this blueprint for FHE. Other works
have investigated somewhat homomorphic schemes (SHE) which allow for some re-
stricted family of functions to be performed on the encrypted data. In particular,
Leveled Homomorphic Encryption schemes allow for circuits of bounded depth to
be computed have proven to be very efficient in practice.
To introduce some notation for this section, we will let f(x) ∈ Z[x] be a
monic polynomial of degree n and q be an integer. We define the following rings
Rn,q := Z[x]/〈f(x), q〉 and Zq := Z/qZ.
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4.1 Encryption Methods
There are various encryption methods that appear throughout the homomor-
phic encryption literature; most of them are based on the LWE or RLWE problems.
There are two general distinctions that can be made based on whether the message
is added in the low bits or high bits, and we will refer to these as BGV and FV styles
respectively. The BGV scheme, proposed by Brakerski, Gentry, and Vaikuntana in
2012 and the FV (sometimes called BFV) proposed by Fan and Vercauteren in 2012,
are both based on the RLWE problem.
4.1.1 LWE encryption
A user has a fixed secret key s ∈ Znq , and to encrypt a message m ∈ Zp for
some plaintext modulus p chooses a ∈ Znq from a uniform distribution and e ∈ Zq
from some small error distribution.
1. For BGV style encryption
Es(m) = ct = (a, b := 〈a, s〉+ pe+m) ∈ Znq × Zq.
2. For FV style encryption
Es(m) = ct = (a, b := 〈a, s〉+mD + e) ∈ Znq × Zq
for some large enough constant D.
4.1.2 RLWE encryption
A user has a fixed secret key s ∈ Rn,q and to encrypt a message m ∈ Zp[x]
chooses a ∈ Rn,q from a uniform distribution and e ∈ Rn,q from a small error
distribution.
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1. In the BGV style, encryption is done as
REs(m) = ct = (a, b = as+ pe+m) ∈ Rn,q ×Rn,q,
2. and in the FV style as
REs(m) = ct = (a, b = as+mD + e) ∈ Rn,q ×Rn,q.
If we let sk = (−s, 1), then
1. in BGV 〈ct, sk〉 ≡ pe+m
2. and in FV 〈ct, sk〉 ≡ mD + e
and decryption can be done
1. in BGV as
m = 〈ct, sk〉 (mod p)
2. and in FV as
m =
⌊〈ct, sk〉 (mod p)
D
⌋
.
4.1.3 RLWE public key encryption
Key Generation. To generate the RLWE public keys, one samples a uni-
form random a(x) ∈ Rn,q and error polynomial e(x), then one computes the public
key pk = (a(x), b(x)) as follows:
1. in the BGV scheme
b(x) ≡ a(x) · s(x) + pe(x) mod (f(x), q),
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2. and in the FV scheme as
b(x) ≡ a(x) · s(x) + e(x) mod (f(x), q)
where D =
⌊
q
2p
⌋
.
Encryption. To encrypt a message m(x) ∈ Rn,p under the public key pk =
(a(x), b(x)) one generates a small polynomial u(x) with coefficients in {−1, 0, 1}
and error polynomials e1(x), e2(x), and then computes:
1. for BGV,
a1(x) ≡ a(x) · u(x) + pe1(x) mod (f(x), q) and
b1(x) ≡ b(x) · u(x) + pe2(x) +m(x) mod (f(x), q)
2. for FV,
a1(x) ≡ a(x) · u(x) + e1(x) mod (f(x), q)) and
b1(x) ≡ b(x) · u(x) + e2(x) +Dm(x) mod (f(x), q).
Decryption. To decrypt an RLWE cipher one does the following:
1. for BGV consider the following:
c0 − sc1 = b(x) · u(x) + pe2(x) +m(x)− s(x) · a(x) · u(x)− p · s(x) · e1(x)
= (a(x) · s(x) + pe(x)) · u(x) + pe2(x) +m(x)− s(x) · a(x) · u(x)− p · s(x) · e1(x)
= p[e(x) · u(x) + e2(x)− s(x) · e1(x)] +m(x)
Recall that an RLWE cipher can be correctly decrypted provided the error
size τ <
⌊
q
2p
⌋
; thus, we can decrypt a BGV cipher by computing
(c0 − sc1 mod (f(x), q)) mod p
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provided
||e(x) · u(x) + e2(x)− s(x) · e1(x)||∞ <
⌊
q
2p
⌋
.
2. For FV consider the same value:
c0 − sc1 = b(x) · u(x) + e2(x) +Dm(x)− s(x) · a(x) · u(x)− s(x) · e1(x)
= ((a(x) · s(x) + e(x)) · u(x) + e2(x) +Dm(x)− s(x) · a(x) · u(x)− s(x) · e1(x)
= (e(x) · u(x) + e2(x)− s(x) · e1(x)) +Dm(x)
If
||e(x) · u(x) + e2(x)− s(x) · e1(x)||∞ < D/2
then
Ds(c) =
⌊
c0 − sc1
D
⌉
= m(x).
4.2 Basic Homomorphic Operations
4.2.1 LWE additions
The encryption methods above have some naturally homomorphic operations
that can be done to them. For two BGV LWE ciphers Es(m0) = (a0, b0), Es(m1) =
(a1, b1) ∈ Znq × Zq we can add them directly as
Es(m0) + Es(m1) =(a0, 〈a0, s〉+ pe0 +m0) + (a1, 〈a1, s〉+ pe1 +m1)
=(a0 + a1, 〈a0 + a1, s〉+ (e0 + e1)p+ (m0 +m1))
and the result is still a BGV LWE cipher with a slightly larger error. Adding BFV
LWE ciphers is similar.
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4.2.2 RLWE additions
RLWE ciphers also have a very natural addition property. For two BFV
RLWE ciphers REs(m0) = (a0, b0 = a0s + m0D + e0),REs(m1) = (a1, b1 = a1s +
m1D + e1) ∈ Rn,q ×Rn,q we can add them directly as
REs(m0) + REs(m1) =(a0, a0s+m0D + e0) + (a1, a1s+m1D + e1)
=(a0 + a1, (a0 + a1)s+ (m0 +m1)D + e0 + e1
and the result is still a BFV RLWE cipher with a slightly larger error. Adding BGV
RLWE ciphers is similar.
4.2.3 Flattening and Gadget matrix
In order to perform homomorphic multiplication, Gentry, Sahai, and Waters
(2013 [71]) introduced the idea of a gadget matrix so that new ciphertexts from
multiplication of ciphertexts remain the same size, while previous methods increase
the size of new ciphertexts.
Let B and ` be positive integers so that B` ≥ q. Let
gt = (1, B, . . . , B`−1).
Every element a ∈ Zq can be represented as
a = a0 + a1B + · · ·+ a`−1B`−1 = (a0, a1, . . . , a`−1)g
where ai ∈ Z has small size. For example, if we let −B/2 < ai ≤ B/2, then
(a0, a1, . . . , a`−1) is unique. If we allow |ai| to be larger, say as big as B, this will
allows us to take a random representation. We will return more to this in Section
4.8 and Chapter 6.
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4.2.4 RLWE multiplications
BGV style. We can also multiply RLWE ciphertexts directly. Consider
two BGV style ciphertext
ct0 = (a0, b0 = a0s+ pe0 +m0) ct1 = (a1, b1 = a1s+ pe1 +m1),
from which we want to get a ciphertext for m0m1. Note that
(b0 − a0s)(b1 − a1s) = (pe0 +m0)(pe1 +m1)
= p(pe0e1 + e0m1 +m0e1) +m0m1
= pe2 +m0m1
where e2 := (pe0e1 + e0m1 +m0e1). Also
(b0 − a0s)(b1 − a1s) = b0b1 − (a1b0 + a0b1)s+ a0a1s2 (4.1)
Thus, d = (d0, d1, d2) = (b0b1, a1b0 + a0b1, a0a1) is an encryption of m0m1 under s
and s2. To reduce the size of the ciphertext back to that of the originals and return
decryption to be a linear function of s, one can use relinearization.
Relinearlization. We will publish an encryption of s2, then the quantity
d2s
2 can be computed without knowing s. Let B` ≥ q. Since d2 ∈ Rn,q, we can
flatten it with respect to the base B
d2 =
∑`
i=0
d2iB
i
where d2i ∈ Rn,q and ||d2i||∞ ≤ B/2.
Now instead of encrypting s2, we encrypt Bis2 for 0 ≤ i ≤ `,
eki := (eki0, eki1 := s eki0 + pvi +B
is2).
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Thus, eki1 − eki0s ≡ pvi +Bis2. We can get d2s2 with some error as
∑`
i=0
d2i(ki1 − eki0s) ≡
∑`
i=0
pviB
is2
= p
∑`
i=0
d2ivi +
∑`
i=0
d2iB
is2
= pe3 + d2s
2
where e3 :=
∑`
i=0 d2ivi. Thus, we have that
(∑`
i=0 d2eki0,
∑`
i=0 d2eki1
)
is a cipher-
text for d2s
2 with error e3. We can use this to get a ciphertext for m0m1 as follows.
Compute
b := d0 +
∑`
i=0
d2ieki1
a := d1 +
∑`
i=0
d2ieki0
and consider
b− sa = (d0 +
∑`
i=1
d2ieki1)− s(d1 +
∑`
i=0
d2ieki0)
= d0 − sd1 +
∑`
i=0
d2i(eki1 − seki0)
= d0 − sd1 +
∑`
i=0
d2i(pvi +B
is2)
= d0 − sd1 + pe3 + d2s2
= d0 − sd1 + d2s2 + pe3
and now by Equation 4.1 this is
= pe2 +m0m1 + pe3
= p(e2 + e3) +m0m1.
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Thus, (a, b) is an RLWE cipher for m0m1 with error term e2 + e3 which is
e2 + e3 = pe0e1 + e0m1 +m0e1 +
∑`
i=0
d2ivi.
Thus, this will decrypt to m0m1 provided e2 + e3 is not too large. Recall one of
the terms in e2 is e0e1, so the error is at least squared each time which limits the
number of multiplications that can be done because the second multiplication will
have an error of power 4. To deal with this issue of growing error size, one needs
the next topic of modulus reduction.
We can take a worst case error bound on the error pe0e1 + e0m1 + m0e1 +∑`
i=0 d2ivi. Assume e0, e1, vi are all τ bounded and f(x) = x
n + 1, then
pe0e1 + e0m1 +m0e1 +
∑`
i=0
d2ivi
≤ pnτ2 + 2nτp+ `n(B/2)τ.
4.3 Modulus Reduction
When we perform operations on ciphertexts, we need to control the error
growth in order to get correct decryptions. One method for doing this is modulus
reduction, which takes a ciphertext modulus Q and reduces it to one of modulus
q, where q < Q and the error mod q is less than that of the error mod Q. There
are many different versions of the error bound that can be achieved after modulus
reduction; the following one originates from Lemma 2.3 of [66] where ρ = n.
Lemma 4.3.1. Let f(x) = xn + 1 and m ∈ Rn,p be a message. The encryption
of m under BGV is (a, b) ∈ R2n,Q satisfies b − sa ≡ pv + m mod (f(x), Q) where
v ∈ Rn,q with ||v||∞ < τ . If Q ≡ 1 mod p, q ≡ 1 mod p, s ∈ Rn with coefficients
in {0, 1,−1} with hamming weight ρ, and Qq > 2τ(ρ−3) , then (a′, b′) ∈ Rn,q and
b′ − sa′ ≡ pv′ + m mod (f(x), q) for some v′ ∈ Rn with ||v′||∞ < ρ where δa =
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−(qa)p−1 mod Q, δb = −(qb)p−1 mod Q and
a′ =
(qa+ pδa)
Q
b′ =
(qb+ pδb)
Q
.
Proof. Using centered representatives we have |δa|, |δb| ≤ Q/2. We have that a′ and b′
are polynomials with integers coefficients since qa+pδa ≡ 0 mod Q and qb+pδb ≡ 0
mod Q.
b′ − sa′ = qb+ pδb
Q
− sqa+ pδa
Q
(4.2)
=
q
Q
(b− sa) + p
Q
(δb − sδa) (4.3)
=
q
Q
(pv +m+ w1f(x) + w2Q) +
p
Q
(δb − sδa) (4.4)
= p
(
q
Q
v +
1
Q
(δb − sδa)
)
+
q
Q
m+
q
Q
w1f(x) + qw2 (4.5)
= p
(
q
Q
v +
1
Q
(δb − sδa) +
(
(q −Q)/p
Q
)
m
)
+m+
q
Q
w1f(x) + qw2 (4.6)
b′ − sa′ ≡ pv′ +m mod (f(x), q) (4.7)
Line (4.4) follows from b − sa ≡ pv + m mod (f(x), Q) implies there exists w1, w2
such that
b− sa = pv +m+ w1f(x) + w2Q.
Line (4.6) follows from
q
Q
m−m+m = ( q
Q
− 1)m+m = (q −Q)
Q
m+m = p
(
(q −Q)/p
Q
)
m+m.
On line (4.7) we set
v′ =
q
Q
v +
1
Q
(δb − sδa) +
(
(q −Q)/p
Q
)
m mod (f(x));
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thus, the equivalence part of our claim is true.
Now we will turn to the error bound on v′. Recall |δi| ≤ Q/2, thus
∣∣∣ 1Qδi∣∣∣ ≤ 1/2.
We can write 1Qδa =
n−1∑
i=0
eix
i where |ei| ≤ 1/2, and s =
n−1∑
i=0
six
i.
s
1
Q
δa =
(
n−1∑
i=0
six
i
)(
n−1∑
i=0
eix
i
)
(4.8)
=
n−1∑
i=0
si
n−1∑
j=0
ejx
i+j
 (4.9)
=
n−1∑
i=0
si
n−1∑
j=0
e∗ijx
(i+j) mod n
 (4.10)
Since the polynomial we are reducing by is f(x) = xn + 1, we get xn ≡ −1
mod (f(x)), which tells us if i+ j ≥ n, ej becomes negative. We thus define
e∗ij =

ej i+ j < n
−ej i+ j ≥ n
,
which and use line (4.10).
Therefore, we may write
s
1
Q
δa =
n−1∑
k=0
ckx
k where ck =
n−1∑
i=0
sie
∗
i,k−i.
Using this we can derive a worst case bound on s 1Qδa, by noting
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣s 1Qδa
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∞
= max |ck| ≤
n−1∑
i=0
|si| · |e∗i,k−i| ≤ ρ · 1/2 = ρ/2,
based on the hamming weight of s and the previously mentioned bound on ei. We
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can now combine these bounds to find a worst case bound for v′.
||v′||∞ =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ qQv + 1Q(δb − sδa) +
(
(q −Q)/p
Q
)
m
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∞
(4.11)
≤
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ qQv
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∞
+
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1Qδb
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∞
+
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1Qsδa
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∞
+
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣( (q −Q)/pQ
)
m
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∞
(4.12)
≤ q
Q
τ +
1
2
+
ρ
2
+ 1 (4.13)
<
ρ− 3
2τ
τ +
3 + ρ
2
(4.14)
=
2ρ
2
= ρ (4.15)
The inequalities on line (4.13) come from previous comments, and the final term is
less than 1 since q − Q < Q and m < p. In line (4.14), we use the assumed lower
bound on Q/q. Thus, ||v′||∞ < ρ and the lemma is complete.
4.4 Leveled Homomorphic Encryption
We have shown how additions and multiplications of RLWE ciphertext can
be performed and how a modulus reduction can be used to reduce the size of the
resulting error. A major result in HE was how to combine these tools to create a
leveled HE scheme as done by Brakerski, Gentry, and Vaikuntanathan in [34]. We
now describe how one can use a chain of moduli to homomorphically compute a
circuit of known multiplicative depth. We can define the following chain of moduli
q0 > q1 > · · · > qL where p0, ..., pL are distinct primes,
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q0 =p0p1 · · · pL
q1 =p1p2 . . . pL
...
qL−1 =pL−1pL
qL =pL.
We refer to ciphertexts encrypted with respect to these different moduli as being
at different “levels”. Encryption can be done with respect to the largest modulus
q0. Multiplications and additions can be performed at this level until the error has
grown to a limit, and then a modulus reduction can be performed down to the next
level q1. This can be done at each level all the way down to qL where the ciphertext
can be sent back to the user for decryption.
Now if we know in advance the multiplicative depth of our circuit, then we
can choose our parameters to allow for that number of multiplications. Understand-
ing how the error grows and can be controlled through the modulus reduction over
many levels and how the parameters can be optimized to best achieve this error
control is a fairly open ended question that is still being researched. Work on it has
been done in [53, 54, 73]. We note that the error bound achieved in the above mod-
ulus reduction lemma is conceptually much simpler and often much smaller than
the bounds in these other works. We leave it as future work to investigate how this
bound might be incorporated into the analysis of leveled schemes to choose optimal
parameters.
Below in Section 4.7, we will discus the fundamental technique of bootstrap-
ping that allows a cloud to take a ciphertext from level qL and return it to level
q0 with a fresh error bound. With bootstrapping one can then compute circuits of
arbitrary multiplicative depth.
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4.5 Key Switching
Given an RLWE ciphertext
(a(x), b(x) = a(x)s(x) +m(x)D + e(x)) ∈ Rn,q ×Rn,q
we want to be able to switch to having the message m(x) encrypted under a new
secret key s˜(x), but we want this key switch to be done by the cloud which should
not be able to learn anything about s(x), s˜(x) or m(x). To do this, we will provide
the cloud with a key switching key.
Intuition for Key Switching. We will start by describing intuitively what
we want to achieve (yet without an added key step giving correctness). Suppose we
encrypt s(x) under the new secret key s˜(x) as
(k0, k1 = k0s˜(x) + s(x) + e(x)).
Then suppose we create a new RLWE cipher as
(−a(x)k0(x), b(x)− a(x)k1(x))
= (−a(x)k0(x), a(x)s(x) +m(x)D + e(x)− [a(x)k0s˜(x) + a(x)s(x) + a(x)e(x)])
= (−a(x)k0(x),−a(x)k0s˜(x) +m(x)D + e(x)− a(x)e(x)]).
This is almost what we want in that it encrypts m(x) under s˜(x); the problem is
that the new error term e(x)− a(x)e(x) is too large, in fact uniform random in the
ring. Next, we will show how to fix this using flattening.
Key Switching Formal. We take a base B` > q. The key switching key
is a series of RLWE ciphers the powers s(x)Bi for 0 ≤ i ≤ `− 1,
(k0i, k1i = k0is(x) + s(x)B
i + ei(x).
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Then for the RLWE cipher that we want to perform the key switch on
(a(x), b(x) = a(x)s(x) +m(x)D + e(x) ∈ Rn,q ×Rn,q
we will flatten a(x) into a¯ = (a¯0, ...a¯`−1) such that a¯gt = a(x) where g = (1, B, ..., B`−1).
Then we compute the following RLWE ciphertext,
(
−
`−1∑
i=0
a¯ik0i, b(x)−
`−1∑
i=0
a¯ik1i
)
.
The second component simplifies as
b(x)−
`−1∑
i=0
a¯ik1i =b(x)−
`−1∑
i=0
a¯ik0is˜(x)−
`−1∑
i=0
a¯iB
is(x)−
`−1∑
i=1
a¯iei(x)
=a(x)s(x) +m(x)D + e(x)−
`−1∑
i=0
a¯ik0is˜(x)− a(x)s(x)−
`−1∑
i=1
a¯iei(x)
=−
`−1∑
i=0
a¯ik0is˜(x) +m(x)D + e(x)−
`−1∑
i=0
a¯iei(x).
This new error term e = e(x)−∑`−1i=0 a¯iei(x) can be controlled to be small in size.
4.6 Plaintext Batched Encodings
With homomorphic encryption, the end goal is to be able to compute some
useful circuit which can be expressed in terms of the additions and multiplications
in the plaintext space. When doing multiplications of RLWE ciphertexts as above,
one notices that the ability to work directly with the coefficients of the message
polynomials is limited because the only multiplication operation that can be done
is to multiply the entire message polynomials together, REs(m1(s)) ·REs(m2(s)) =
REs(m1(x)m2(x)). This limitation motivated several works [118, 117, 33, 69, 70]
to develop techniques to exploit the structure of the plaintext space to give more
useful resulting operations.
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First, the parameters can be chosen so that f(x) factors modulo the plaintext
modulus into k factors of the same degree d. This gives a CRT representation of
the plaintext space. This allows additions and multiplications of the ciphertexts to
add and multiply the underlying plaintext “slots” in parallel,
Add((m0, ...,mk), (u0, ..., uk) =(m0 + u0, ...,mk + uk)
Mult((m0, ...,mk), (u0, ..., uk) =(m0 · u0, ...,mk · uk)
This allows for same instruction multiple data (SIMD) operations on the
underlying plaintext space and was introduced in [118]. Going even further, [70]
show how to use automorphisms of these plaintext slots to homomorphically com-
pute arbitrary permutations of the k slots of an encrypted message. This allows one
to harness the efficiency of computing on RLWE ciphertexts to compute arbitrary
circuits.
4.6.1 HElib Plaintext Encoding
For example, in HElib [75] which implements the BGV scheme the polyno-
mial f(x) is chosen to be the mth cyclotomic polynomial Φm(x) and the plaintext
modulus a prime power pr such that
Φm(x) ≡ F1(x) · · ·Fk(x) (mod pr),
where each Fi has the same degree d. Thus by CRT we have that
Z[x]
〈Φm(x), pr〉
∼= Z[x]〈pr, F1(x)〉 × · · · ×
Z[x]
〈pr, Fk(x)〉 .
When addition and multiplication are done to the ciphertexts w.r.t a larger modulus
which does not reduce the message space, decryption w.r.t. the plaintext modulus
pr can be done, and this isomorphism gives those operations as having been done
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on the slots of the plaintext in parallel.
The way they construct arbitrary permutations is by basing them on au-
tomorphisms that can be used to first build cyclic permutations of the plaintext
slots.
4.6.2 SEAL Plaintext Encoding
In the Microsoft SEAL library’s implementation of the BFV scheme, the
polynomial f(x) is chosen to have degree n where n is a power of 2 (this means f(x)
is the 2nth cyclotomic polynomial) and the plaintext modulus is a prime p such that
2n|(p − 1) so that f(x) factors into n linear factors, Fi modulo p. Thus, the CRT
form of the plaintext space is
Z[x]
〈f(x), p〉
∼= Z[x]〈p, F1(x)〉 × · · · ×
Z[x]
〈p, Fn(x)〉
∼= (Z/pZ)n.
The SEAL library supports performing cyclic shifts on these underlying
plaintext vectors.
4.6.3 Plaintext Space Automorphisms
The group of automorphisms of these plaintext spaces in the above two cases
using an mth cyclotomic polynomial is (Z/mZ)×. In the case m = 2n where n is a
power of two, (Z/mZ)× ∼= Z/2Z × Z/n2Z. For each α ∈ (Z/mZ)×, the following
automorphism of Z[x]〈f(x),p〉 will induce a permutation on the roots of f(x) and thus
the CRT slots.
φα :
Z[x]
〈f(x), p〉 →
Z[x]
〈f(x), p〉
x 7→ xα.
Thus, mapping m(x) to m(xα) implicitly permutes the slots (m0, ...,mk) in some
way. Looking concretely at the available permutations, one first figures out how to
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create rotations.
4.6.4 Apply an automorphism on ciphertexts
When an automorphism x 7→ xα is applied to a RLWE cipher,
(a(x), b(x)) 7→ (a(xα), b(xα))
we get that besides the message slots being permuted, the secret key changes as
well (a(xα), a(xα)s(xα)+m(xα)D+e(xα). A key switching key, called a Galois key,
for this automorphism (usually a rotation of the message slots) can be used to key
switch back to the original s(x). The Galois key is
(gk0i, gk1i = gk0is(x
k) + s(x)Bi + ei(x)).
Then we perform a key switch as in Section 4.5 by first flattening a(xα) = a¯gt =
(a¯0, ..., a¯`−1)gt and then computing a new RLWE cipher as
(
−
`−1∑
i=0
a¯igk0i, b(x
α)−
`−1∑
i=0
a¯igk1i
)
which simplifies to
(
−
`−1∑
i=0
a¯igk0i,−
`−1∑
i=0
a¯igk1i +m(x
α)D + e(xα)−
`−1∑
i=1
a¯iei(x)
)
.
This gives an RLWE cipher for the desired permuted message m(xα) under the
original key s(x). Also, the application of the automorphism to the error term
e(xα) only permutes the coefficients of the error polynomial when done modulo
xn + 1 and so does not increase the error size.
Thus for each automorphism, one needs a particular Galois key to be able
to apply it and key switch back to the original key.
55
4.7 Bootstrapping Techniques BGV Line
In bootstrapping (also called recryption) for a leveled scheme as described
above in Section 4.4, we wish to take a level L ciphertext and lift it back to a level
0 ciphertext with small error. Gentry first introduced bootstrapping in 2009 [68].
What we will describe is the bootstrapping procedure introduced by Gentry, Halevi,
and Smart in 2011 [69] along with its further developments. This bootstrapping
procedure for BGV has been further improved and developed in several papers
[17, 74, 75, 76, 42]. This line of works represents the state-of-the-art for BGV
bootstrapping and have been implemented in the HElib library. The 2019 version
of Halevi and Shoup’s paper [74] incorporates all of these improvements into HElib.
We will begin with a high level description of this bootstrapping process.
Take the plaintext modulus of a leveled BGV scheme to be pr where p is
prime and r ≥ 1. We begin with a ciphertext at level L, ct = (c0, c1 = c0s+epr+m)
if we let sk = (−s, 1) then
[〈sk, ct〉]qL ≡ m (mod pr)
where m is our plaintext. We will assume qL = 2
e + 1 (actually HElib does another
modulus switch to get to this modulus but we will simplify some details for presen-
tation). We also introduce the notation that c1 − c0s ≡ Z (mod Φm(x)) but not
reduced modulo qL.
We want to get a ciphertext ct∗ that encrypts m under the same secret key
but with ciphertext modulus q0 and small error. To do this, we will encrypt the
secret key in a level 0 ciphertext with plaintext space of 2e + 1. We refer to this as
the bootstrapping key,
bk = (bk0, bk1 = bk0s+ vqL + s (mod Φm(x), q0)),
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where v is a small error polynomial. Then we can use this encrypted secret key to
homomorphcially decrypt ct. Compute c˜t = (c˜0, c˜1) as follows
c˜0 = −c0bk0, c˜1 = c1 − c0bk1 (mod Φm(x), q0)
≡ c1 − c0[bk0s+ vqL + s]
≡ −c0bk0s+ vqL + c1 − c0s
≡ −c0bk0s+ vqL + Z.
Thus, c˜t is a level 0 ciphertext that encrypts Z. Now in the original GSH recryption
where p = 2 and r = 1, they show in Lemma 1 that if z is a coefficient of Z then
[[z]qL ]2 = z〈e〉 ⊕ z〈0〉
where z〈i〉 is the ith bit of z. This is equal to the corresponding coefficient of the
message polynomial. They also give a data oblivious algorithm for extracting these
bits z〈e〉 and z〈0〉 that can be performed homomorphically on a ciphertext that
encrypts z. But this bit extraction algorithm cannot run homomorphically on the
entire polynomial Z. There are φ(m) coefficients of Z. They assume the plaintext
space factors into ` slots each of degree d, so φ(m) = `d. So rather than extract
the coefficients of Z to each be in their own ciphertext, we will map the ciphertext
that encrypts Z into d different ciphertexts that each hold ` of the coeficients of Z
in their plaintext slots.
c˜t encrypting Z =
φ(m)∑
i=0
zix
i 7→

c˜t1 encrypting message slots (z0, ..., z`)
c˜t2 encrypting message slots (z`+1, ..., z2`)
...
˜ctd encrypting message slots (zφ(m)−`, ..., zφ(m)).
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Then the bit extraction algorithm can be carried out on the ciphertexts c˜tj and
implicitly the algorithm will be carried out on each of the coefficients of Z in the
plaintext slots. This produces in the slots of the d ciphertexts the coefficients of
the message polynomial [[Z]qL ]2 = m. Then there is another map from these d
ciphertexts back into one ciphertext encrypting the message polynomial m at level
0.
The two key compenents of the above process are:
1. Bit extraction algorithm. The original GHS version in 2011 shows how to do
this for the case of p = 2 and r = 1. In implementing HElib [74, 75] in 2014,
Halevi and Shoup extend bit extraction algorithm to work with any prime p
and r ≥ 1. In 2018, Chen and Han give a further significant optimization to
this bit extraction algorithm [42].
2. The map taking 1 ciphertext encrypting Z to d ciphertexts encrypting the
coefficients of Z and its inverse map. The GHS paper gives a method for this
based on the CRT factorization and FFT algorithm [69, Theorems 2 and 3].
Then in 2013, Alperin-Sheriff and Peikert [17] use tensor decomposition to
reduce the complexity of this map. In 2014, HElib incorporated and modified
the technique of Alperin-Sheriff and Peikert; and later in 2018 Halevi and
Shoup developed further optimizations in [76].
Our overview here has been at a high level, and we refer the reader to these papers
mentioned for the details. The updated version of [74] incorporates all these different
developments.
4.8 Bootstrapping Techniques GSW/FHEW/TFHE Line
A different line of work on bootstrapping was introduced by Ducas and
Micciancio (2015 [57]), who use the GSW scheme [71] and a novel homomorphic
embedding to design a bootstrapping procedure that can compute one homomorphic
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bit operation in less than a second. This scheme is then improved by Chillotti et
al. (2016 [49], 2017, [50]; 2018, [51, 52]), who reduce the bootstrapping time down
to 13ms per homomorphic bit operation. On cipher expansion, it is stated in [49]
that the ciphertext size is still 400,000 times that of the original data and noted in
(2018, [52]) that the expansion factor has been be reduced to 8000. Collectively,
these schemes are known as TFHE. On ciphertext expansion, a recent breakthrough
is made by Gao (2018, [66]) reducing the ciphertext expansion to 6 under private
key encryption and 20 under public key encryption. Another recent technique of
Biasse and Ruiz (2015 [29]) allows for homomorphically computing arbitrary lookup
functions on encrypted data. In Chapter 6, we present a new scheme in this same
line and in this section include some of its background information.
4.8.1 Gadget matrix, flattening, external product and GSW ci-
phers
In order to perform homomorphic multiplication, Gentry, Sahai, and Waters
(2013 [71]) introduced the idea of a gadget matrix so that new ciphertexts from
multiplication of ciphertexts remain the same size, while previous methods increase
the size of new ciphertexts.
Gadget matrix and Random Flattening Let B and ` be positive inte-
gers so that B` ≥ q. Let
gt = (1, B, . . . , B`−1).
Every element a ∈ Zq can be represented as
a = a0 + a1B + · · ·+ a`−1B`−1 = (a0, a1, . . . , a`−1)g
where ai ∈ Z has small size. For example, if we let −B/2 < ai ≤ B/2, then
(a0, a1, . . . , a`−1) is unique. We will allow |ai| to be as big as B, which allows us to
take a random representation.
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We now define
G =
g 0
0 g

a (2`) × 2 matrix, called a gadget matrix. Every (a(x), b(x)) ∈ Rn,q × Rn,q can be
written as
(a(x), b(x)) = u(x)G (4.16)
where u(x) ∈ R1×2`n is the flattening of (a(x), b(x)) with ||u(x)||∞ ≤ B/2. We define
(a(x), b(x)) / G−1 = u(x).
The reader should be warned that G is not a square matrix, so it has no inverse.
Here we just use G−1 as an operator that acts from the right on (a(x), b(x)), a
row vector of two polynomials with coefficients in Zq (of large size), to get u(x) =
(a(x), b(x)) / G−1, a random row vector of 2` polynomials each with coefficients at
most B (of small size). This is a nice trick of trading element size for dimension.
For example, when B = 3 and ` = 4, we have
G =
1 3 32 33 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 3 32 33

t
,
and
(5 + 35x,−14) / G−1 = (−1− x,−1, 1 + x, x, 1, 1, 1,−1) ∈ R1×8n .
since 5 = 32 − 3− 1, 35 = 33 + 32 − 1, and −14 = −33 + 32 + 3 + 1. By definition,
we have
(v / G−1)G = v, for every v ∈ Rn,q ×Rn,q. (4.17)
External product. For any row vector v ∈ Rn,q×Rn,q and any A ∈ R2`×2n,q ,
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their external product is defined as
v A = (v / G−1)A ∈ Rn,q ×Rn,q,
which is a vector in Rn,q × Rn,q, since v / G−1 is a row vector of length 2` and
A is an (2` × 2) matrix. This definition can be extended to define the product of
any two (m`)×m matrices (to get another (m`)×m matrix), as originally defined
by Gentry, Sahai, and Waters (2013 [71]). Recently, Chillotti et al (2016 [49, 50])
observed that, for bootstrapping, it is better to use this external product. From the
definition, the external product is right distributive; that is, for any two matrices
A,B ∈ R(2`)×2n,q , we have
v  (A+B) ≡ v A+ v B (mod (xn + 1, q)),
where all three terms use the same v / G−1. However, they are not equal if one
computes each term independently (unless v / G−1 is deterministic). Also, it is not
left distributive, i.e., for two vectors v1,v2 ∈ Rn,q ×Rn,q,
(v1 + v2)A 6≡ v1 A+ v2 A (mod (xn + 1, q)),
in general, since the operator G−1 is not linear when acting on v.
GSW ciphers. Let s(x) =
∑n−1
i=0 six
i, where si ∈ {0, 1}, be an n-bit secret
key of a user. For any m(x) ∈ Rn (say with small coefficients), a GSW cipher for
m(x) with error size τ is of the form
GSWs(m(x)) = A+m(x)G ∈ R(2`)×2n,q (4.18)
where A ∈ R2`×2n,q and each row of A is an RLWE sample (chosen independent
randomly) so that
A(−s(x), 1)t ≡ w(x) mod (xn + 1, q)
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where w(x) ∈ R1×2`n with ||w(x)||∞ ≤ τ . The next lemma is observed by Chillotti
et al (2016 [49]).
Lemma 4.8.1. Let m0,m1 ∈ Rn be any two polynomials. For any REs(m0) with
error polynomial ||w0(x)||∞ ≤ τ0 and any GSWs(m1) with error vector w(x) ∈ R2`n,q
with ||w(x)||∞ ≤ τ1, we have
REs(m0)GSWs(m1) = REs(m0m1),
and REs(m0m1) has error polynomial h ·w(x) +m1w0(x) where h is the flattening
of REs(m0) in R
1×2`
n,q .
Proof. By assumption, we may let
REs(m0) = v +m0Dq(0, 1) ∈ R1×2n,q , GSWs(m1) = A+m1G ∈ R(2`)×2n,q ,
where v ∈ R1×2n,q and A ∈ R2`×2n,q satisfying, modulo (xn + 1, q),
v(−s(x), 1)t ≡ w0(x), A(−s(x), 1)t ≡ w(x), (4.19)
and w0(x) ∈ Rn and w(x) = (w1(x), . . . , w2`(x)) ∈ R1×2`n with ||w0(x)||∞ ≤ τ0 and
||wi(x)||∞ ≤ τ1 for 1 ≤ i ≤ 2`. Let h = REs(m0(x)) / G−1 = (h1, . . . , h2`) ∈ R1×2`n ,
with ||h||∞ ≤ B. Computing modulo (xn + 1, q), we have
REs(m0(x))GSWs(m1(x)) ≡ h(A+m1G) = hA+m1hG
≡ hA+m1([v +m0Dq(0, 1)] / G−1)G
≡ hA+m1[v +m0Dq(0, 1)]
≡ (hA+m1v) +m0m1Dq(0, 1) ∈ R1×2n,q ,
where, in the second to last equation, we used the property of G−1 from (4.17). The
error polynomial is, using (4.19), (hA+m1v)(−s(x), 1)t ≡ h ·w(x) +m1w0(x).
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4.8.2 Bootstrapping LWE ciphers
With these techniques introduced above, we present the high level overview
of the bootstrapping of LWE ciphers that is similar among the FHEW/TFHE/Gao18
schemes. Consider an LWE cipher
(a, b = 〈a, s〉+mDq + e) ∈ Znq × Zq (4.20)
where the error has grown to the point that no further computations can be done.
The key idea of bootstrapping is that we can compute the decryption circuit
under encryption. Decryption starts by computing
b− 〈a, s〉 = mDq + e.
To do this under encryption, the homomorphic embedding of Ducas and Micciancio
[57] allows this computation to be done in the exponents of messages encrypted in
GSW or RLWE ciphers.
Homomorphic mapping. To map any LWE ciphertext homomorphicly to
an RLWE ciphertext, we define m = q2 and let Rm,Q = Z[x]/(x
m + 1, Q); note this
has a subring X = {1, x, x2, . . . , xm−1,−1,−x, . . . ,−xm−1} which is a multiplicative
group that is isomorphic to Zq. The isomorphism is φ : Zq → X by φ(u) = xu; thus,
Equation 4.20 is equivalent to
xb−〈a,s〉 ≡ xmDq+e mod (xm + 1, Q) (4.21)
Suppose each si ∈ {0, 1}, then we have
x−aisi = 1 + (x−ai − 1)si
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which means we can rewrite Equation 4.21 as
xb
n−1∏
i=0
[1 + (x−ai − 1)si] ≡ xmDq+e mod (xm + 1, Q) (4.22)
Since b is public knowledge, we only need a way to compute
n−1∏
i=0
[1 + (x−ai − 1)si]
without direct knowledge of s. We do this by means of a bootstrapping key bk which
will contain a GSW cipher for si for 0 ≤ i ≤ n − 1. Let bk = (C0, C1, . . . , Cn−1),
where each Ci = GSWs(si). Note that
G+(xai−1)GSW (si) = (xai−1)A+(1+(x−ai−1)si)G = (xai−1)A+(xaisiG) = GSW (xaisi)
where the error has only grown slightly. If we start with the RLWE cipher REs(x
b) =
(0, xbDQ), which is a trivial encryption of x
b, we can repeatedly apply Lemma 4.8.1
to the product
REs(x
b)) (G+ (x−a0 − 1)C0) · · ·  (G+ (x−an−1 − 1)Cn−1) = REs
(
xb
n−1∏
i=0
(x−aisi))
)
= REs
(
xb−〈a,s〉
)
= REs
(
xmDq+e
)
.
Different schemes have different ways of finally extracting the message m from this
RLWE cipher, but usually a modulus reduction is used to reduce the size of the
error back down to a small size. We will demonstrate in detail one of the ways of
completing all of this together with precise analysis in Chapter 6.
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Chapter 5
Removing Heuristic
Assumptions in Bootstrapping
Error Growth
In this chapter and in Chapter 7, we will work to bring greater mathematical
rigor to statements and proofs about probability in the RLWE cryptanalysis and
homomorphic encryption literature. We will do this concerning two related problems
that arise in different ways. In both, we are interested in understanding a sum of
LWE error distributions in Zq such as
y0e0 + y1e1 + · · · ynen (mod q)
where ei are iid according an LWE error distribution and the yi come from another
distribution but are not independent of each other.
The first direction, which arises out of analyzing the error growth in ho-
momorphic encryption schemes, concerns the case when the yi’s are small and q is
large relative to the size of the sum so that the sum is never reduced modulo q. In
designing homomorphic encryption schemes, one needs to prove a tight tail bound
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on this sum with high probability. In this chapter, we will further analyze this case.
The second direction, which arises in cryptanalysis of RLWE, concerns the
case when q is small relative to the size of the sum so that the sum is reduced modulo
q. The main goal in cryptanalysis is to distinguish this distribution from a uniform
distribution on Zq. We will return to this case in Chapter 7.
5.1 Current Heuristics
In building fully homomorphic encryption schemes, a key component is man-
aging the growth of the error in LWE or RLWE ciphers. This often involves ana-
lyzing a sum of sub-Gaussian random variables in a form such as
X1Y1 +X2Y2 + · · ·+XnYn, (5.1)
where the coefficient vector X1, ..., Xn may be dependent on the random variables
Y1, ..., Yn. Even if the Yi random variables are all iid, classical results do not allow
us to conclude that the resulting sum is sub-Gaussian of a tight parameter. To
get around this, several major FHE schemes rely on an Independence Heuristic as
in the Chillotti et. al. TFHE schemes (2016, [49]; 2017, [50]; 2018, [51]). In a
concurrent work on a new FHE scheme [39], we also deal with a similar sum of
sub-Gaussians (in the proof of Lemma 5.2). Through a more rigorous study of the
properties of sums of sub-Gaussians presented below, we are able to remove the need
for this Independence Heuristic in our scheme. We hope that in presenting these in
a general form here that they can be used to bring more rigor to the proofs of other
FHE schemes as well. In particular, we will show how they can also be applied to
the heuristic assumptions used in FHEW and amortized FHEW [57, 95].
First, let us discuss where this error sum arises. In bootstrapping, one often
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computes a loop as follows
for (i = 0; i < n; i+ +)
Ai+1 := Ai  Ci
where the Ci’s are GSW ciphers and the Ai are either GSW ciphers as in [57, 95] or
RLWE ciphers as in [46, 66]. Recall GSW ciphers are in R2`×2m,q ; GSW error vectors
are in R2`m,q; flattened GSW ciphers are in R
2`×2`
m,q ; RLWE ciphers are in R
1×2
m,q ; and
flattened RLWE ciphers are in R1×2`m,q . In this product, the Ai is flattened and then
the matrix multiplication is done. For flattening into a base B, we have B` > q and
Ci ∈ R2`×2m,q .
In the case the Ai’s are GSW ciphers in R
2`×2
m,q , the error term that results
in the final An is of the form
e = D(0) · e(0) + D(1) · e(1) + · · ·+ D(n−1) · e(n−1) ∈ R2`m,q (5.2)
where D(i) ∈ R2`×2`m,q is the flattening of Ai ∈ R2`×2m,q and e(i) ∈ R2`m,q is the error term
of Ci. Clearly, D
(i) depends on all the previous D(j), e(j) for j < i. The error terms
e(i) are all assumed to be independent.
In the case the Ai’s are RLWE ciphers in R
1×2
m,q , the error term that results
in the final An is of the form
e = D(0) · e(0) + D(1) · e(1) + · · ·+ D(n) · e(n) ∈ Rm,q (5.3)
where D(i) ∈ R1×2`m,q is the flattening of Ai ∈ R1×2m,q and e(i) ∈ R2`m,q is the error term
of Ci. Clearly, D
(i) depends on all the previous D(j), e(j) for j < i. The error terms
e(i) are all assumed to be independent.
In either case, all the terms in this sum are “small,” and the goal is to derive
a tight tail bound on the overall size of the sum. More specifically, we want to bound
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the size of single coefficient in one of the resulting error polynomials.
Both [57, 95] rely on Fact 12 of [57], but the proof of the Fact relies on
some heuristic assumptions. First, the proof assumes the Ci are “truly uniformly
random.” But this is not true since the Ci’s are GSW ciphers, and although each
component of the matrix is uniform random in Rm,q, the first column depends on
the second column; so the entire matrix is not uniform random in R2`×2m,q . The proof
then goes on to assume that the D(i) are invertible. This is true or can be enforced
similar to [46, Lemma 3.6]. The result follows from these heuristic assumptions.
In TFHE, a different heuristic is made about being able to treat the terms in the
sum Equation 5.4 as independent. To make this more rigorous, we introduced the
following analysis, which first appeared in [38].
5.2 New Properties of Sub-Gaussian Random Variables
A1 sub-Gaussian distribution is any probability distribution that has tails
bounded by a Gaussian and has a mean of zero. It is well known that the sum
of independent sub-Gaussians is again sub-Gaussian. This section generalizes this
result to sums of sub-Gaussians that may not be independent, under the assumption
a certain conditional distribution is also sub-Gaussian. This general result is useful
in the study of noise growth in (fully) homomorphic encryption schemes [39, 50],
and hopefully useful for other applications.
A random variable X over R is called sub-Gaussian with variance proxy σ2 or
parameter σ, and we write X ∼ subG(σ2), if E(X) = 0 and its moment generating
function satisfies
E[exp(tX)] ≤ exp(σ2t2/2), ∀ t ∈ R.
A nice reference on sub-Gaussian random variables is [112] which shows they have
many useful properties similar to Gaussian distributions, and we recall a few that
1This section based on the paper [38] with Colin Gallagher and Shuhong Gao.
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will interest us below. For any real number τ > 0, a τ -bounded random variable is
one that only has support in the interval [−τ, τ ].
Property 1 (sub-Gaussian Properties).
1. X is sub-Gaussian with parameter σ if and only if its tails are dominated as,
Prob(|X| ≥ t) ≤ 2 exp(−(t/2σ)2), for all t ≥ 0.
2. A sum of independent sub-Gaussian random variables on R is still sub-Gaussian;
in particular, [112, Cor1.7] if X1, ..., Xn are n independent sub-Gaussians of
parameter σ, Xi ∼ subG(σ2), then for any a ∈ Rn
Prob
(∣∣∣∣∣
n∑
i=1
aiXi
∣∣∣∣∣ > t
)
≤ 2 exp
( −t2
2σ2||a||22
)
,
or equivalently
n∑
i=1
aiXi ∼ subG(σ2||a||22).
3. A τ -bounded random variable with mean 0 is always sub-Gaussian with pa-
rameter τ [78].
For our new analysis we will focus on a sum of the form
X1Y1 +X2Y2 + · · ·+XnYn (5.4)
where Yi are iid τ -bounded variables with mean 0 and where Xi are α-bounded vari-
ables with mean 0 but are dependent, in that Xi depends on X1, Y1, ..., Xi−1, Yi−1.
Our goal is to show that this whole sum is sub-Gaussian of the smallest parame-
ter possible. Note that this is trivially a bounded distribution of bound nτα with
mean zero, which makes it a subG((nτα)2) random variable, but we are interested
in proving it is sub-Gaussian with a smaller parameter. This worst case bound is
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used in error analysis in [66] and results in no probability of failure. We will in the
end show that it is sub-Gaussian of parameter
√
nτα.
First, note that this result does not immediately follow from Property 1.2;
this is because although the Y1, ..., Yn are all iid subG(τ
2), their coefficient vector
is not fixed. Even though Property 1.2 holds for any fixed a ∈ Rn, this is not the
same as having coefficients that change based on the values that the Yi’s themselves
take on.
We now turn our attention to proving a lemma.
Lemma 5.2.1. If X is subG(t21) and Y |X (Y conditioned on X) is subG(t22) with
t22 free of (X = x) and E[Y ] = 0, then X + Y is subG(t
2
1 + t
2
2).
Proof. By assumption of X being sub-Gaussian of parameter t1, its moment gener-
ating function (MGF) satisfies,
MGF(X) = E[esX ] ≤ e
t21s
2
2 .
Similarly, the MGF of Y |X satisfies
MGF(Y |X) = E[es(Y |X)] ≤ e
t22s
2
2 .
The MGF of X + Y is by definition of expectation equal to the following
E[es(X+Y )] =
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ ∞
−∞
e(x+y)sfX,Y (x, y) dx dy,
where fX,Y (x, y) is the joint density function of X and Y . By the definition of the
conditional density function, we have
fY |X(y|X = x) =
fX,Y (x, y)
fX(x)
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or equivalently
fY |X(y|X = x) · fX(x) = fX,Y (x, y).
Putting these together we see that,
E[es(X+Y )] =
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ ∞
−∞
e(x+y)sfX,Y (x, y) dy dx
=
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ ∞
−∞
exseysfY |X(y|X = x) · fX(x) dy dx
=
∫ ∞
−∞
exsfX(x)
(∫ ∞
−∞
eysfY |X(y|X = x) dy
)
dx
=
∫ ∞
−∞
exsfX(x) ·MGF(Y |X) dx
≤
∫ ∞
−∞
exsfX(x) · e
t22s
2
2 dx.
Now since t22 is assumed to be free of X, we can bring it out of the integral.
= e
t22s
2
2
∫ ∞
−∞
exsfX(x) dx
= e
t22s
2
2 MGF(X)
≤ e
t22s
2
2 · e
t21s
2
2
= e
(t21+t
2
2)s
2
2 .
Moreover, since E[X + Y ] = E[X] + E[Y ] and X as sub-Gaussian has mean zero
and the mean of Y was assumed to be zero, we have that E[X + Y ] = 0. Thus,
these prove X + Y is subG(t21 + t
2
2).
We note that this result may not hold if we do not assume that t22 is free of
(X = x); see the following example.
Example 5.2.2. Let X and Y be independent N(0, 1), normal random variables
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with mean zero and standard deviation 1. They are subG(12). The distribution(
Y
x |X = x
) ∼ N(0, 1
x2
) and this implies
(
Y
x |X = x
)
is subG. But X + YX is not
subG; rather it is Cauchy which has heavier tails than a Gaussian. Thus, although
X and ( YX |X = x) are each subG, their sum is not.
The more general result follows easily by induction, that a sum of sub-
Gaussians is still sub-Gaussian even if they are not independent, so long as the ith
element in the sum has mean 0, and when conditioned on all the previous variables
is sub-Gaussian with a free parameter.
Theorem 5.2.3. If Z1 is subG(t
2
1) and for 2 ≤ i ≤ n, (Zi|Z1, ..., Zi−1) is subG(t2i )
and t2i is free of Z1, ..., Zi−1 and E[Zi] = 0, then Z1+· · ·+Zn is subG(t21+t22+· · ·+t2n).
Now we apply this result to the sum in (5.4).
Corollary 5.2.4. For the sum
X1Y1 +X2Y2 + · · ·+XnYn
where Yi are iid τ -bounded variables with mean 0 and and where Xi are α-bounded
variables with mean 0 but Xi depends on X1, Y1, ..., Xi−1, Yi−1, the total sum is sub-
Gaussian of parameter
√
nτα.
Proof. We let Zi := XiYi. Z1 is subG(τ
2α2) since it is τα-bounded with mean zero.
Likewise, (Zi|Z1, ..., Zi−1) is subG(τ2α2) since xiYi is τα-bounded with mean zero
for any xi sampled from Xi. Finally E[Zi] = 0, so applying Theorem 5.2.3 gives that
the final sum is subG(nτ2α2). In other words sub-Gaussian of parameter
√
nτα.
5.3 Removing Heuristics
We can now apply our results to the sums in Equations 5.2 and 5.3. It
suffices to analyze Equation 5.3 as each component in the error vector e ∈ R2`m,q in
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5.2 looks like the error polynomial e in 5.3.
To study a single coefficient the error polynomial e, we must first expand
the polynomial multiplication in Rm,q. In FHEW and [39] the ring is taken to be
Rm,q =
Z[x]
〈xm+1,q〉 where m is a power of 2. For the sum
e =
n−1∑
i=0
D(i) · e(i)
we first consider one dot product and drop the superscripts to ease notation.
D · e ≡
2∑`
i=1
Di(x)ei(x) where Di(x), ei(x) ∈ Rm,q
≡
2∑`
i=1
m−1∑
j=0
Dijx
j
m−1∑
γ=0
eiγx
γ

≡
2∑`
i=1
m−1∑
j=0
m−1∑
γ=0
Dijeiγx
γ+j
≡
2∑`
i=1
m−1∑
j=0
[(Di0eij + · · ·+ eijwi0)− (Di,j+1ei,n−1 + · · ·+Di,n−1ei,n−(n−1−j)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
m terms
xj .
≡
m−1∑
j=0
2`(m−1)∑
γ=1
Dγ e˜γx
j .
where in the last line, since the eij ’s come from a distribution that is symmetric
about zero, the −eij ’s can be rewritten as e˜ij which are still iid.
Now each coefficient of xj in the sum in (6.10) has the form
2`nm∑
γ=1
Dγ e˜γ .
Note that among the error terms in the bootstrapping key there are 2`nm iid co-
efficients, and these are all represented in these eγ ’s here. Thus, this is the sum
of N := 2`nm iid bounded uniform random variables |eγ | ≤ τbk or also subG(τ2bk).
However, the Dγ coefficients are not independent of the eγ ’s in that in (6.10) D
(i)
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depends on all the previous D(j), e(j), j < i. Thus, we cannot directly apply Corol-
lary 1.7 of [112] to say the resulting sum is sub-Gaussian, but we can use the result
from Corollary 5.2.4 to say this:
(Coef of xj) ∼ subG(τ2bk||D||22).
We will see in Lemma 6.5.2 where this is similarly applied in our k-bit FHE scheme.
We note that schemes such as TFHE assume that the errors have bounded variance
rather than are sub-Guassian or bounded. We leave it as a future direction to extend
our results to cover this case, but if the error in TFHE is taken to be bounded and
of expectation zero then our results apply as is.
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Chapter 6
Fully Homomorphic Encryption
with k-bit Arithmetic
Operations
We1 present a fully homomorphic encryption scheme continuing the line
of works of Ducas and Micciancio (2015, [57]), Chillotti et al. (2016, [49]; 2017,
[50]; 2018, [51]), and Gao (2018,[66]). Ducas and Micciancio (2015) show that
homomorphic computation of one bit operation on LWE ciphers can be done in less
than a second, which is then reduced by Chillotti et al. (2016, 2017, 2018) to 13ms.
According to Chillotti et al. (2018, [52]), the cipher expansion for TFHE is still
8000. The ciphertext expansion problem was greatly reduced by Gao (2018) to 6
with private-key encryption and 20 for public key encryption. The bootstrapping
in Gao (2018) is only done one bit at a time, and the bootstrapping design matches
the previous two works in efficiency.
Our contribution is to present a fully homomorphic encryption scheme based
on these preceding schemes that generalizes the Gao (2018) scheme to perform op-
erations on k-bit encrypted data and also removes the need for the Independence
1This chapter based on the paper [39] with Shuhong Gao, Gengran Hu, and Qiuxia Xu.
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Heuristic of the Chillotti et al. papers. The amortized cost of computing k-bits at a
time improves the efficiency. Operations supported include addition and multiplica-
tion modulo 2k, addition and multiplication in the integers as well as exponentiation,
field inversion, and the machine learning activation function RELU. The ciphertext
expansion factor is also further improved, for k = 4 our scheme achieves a ciphertext
expansion factor of 2.5 under secret key and 6.5 under public key. Asymptotically
as k → ∞, our scheme achieves the optimal ciphertext expansion factor of 1 un-
der private key encryption and 2 under public key encryption. We also introduce
techniques for reducing the size of the bootstrapping key.
6.1 Introduction
Our contribution. In this paper, we present a compact FHE scheme that
has the following features:
1. We generalize the scheme in [66] to work for k-bit encrypted messages and thus
achieve even better ciphertext expansion ratios, e.g. with k = 4 the expansion
ratio under private key is 2.5 and under public key is 6.5, and we remove the
need for the Independence Heuristic in the TFHE schemes.
2. Our scheme supports a variety of multibit operations including k-bit addition
and multiplication modulo 2k and addition and multiplication in the integers.
Performing k-bit operations gives an improved amortized cost for homomor-
phic computing compared to computing only one bit at a time.
3. We also incorporate the low ciphertext expansion under private key and other
new techniques to reduced the size of the bootstrapping key to around 1128
MB for k = 1 (down from around 12GB for similar parameters in [66]).
4. The probability of failure for each bootstrapping operation is less that 2−140;
thus, practically any number of computations can be done.
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5. Our scheme with suggested parameters has at least 128 bits of security.
In our scheme, the LWE ciphers after bootstrapping are always in Znr ×Zr with error
size bounded 4
√
n with probability greater than 1− 2−140, thus allowing practically
any number of computations.
Organization of the chapter. In Section 6.2, we present a high level
overview. In Section 6.3, we include some background material including LWE,
RLWE, and GSW ciphers. We also present randomized flattening and the external
product, which have appeared in the literature in one form or another, but we
present them in an exact form that is important for our scheme. In Section 6.4,
we present our encryption schemes and show how RLWE ciphers can be unpacked
to LWE ciphers. In Section 6.5, we present our bootstrapping procedure, which
is modified from those of [57, 49, 29, 37] along with homomorphic operations our
scheme supports. In Sections 6.6 and 6.7, we present the parameters to instantiate
an instance of our scheme along with some efficiency and security analysis.
6.2 High Level Overview
In this section, we give a high level overview of the scheme with a focus on
the scheme’s functionality and usage.
Key Generation. A user generates a secret key sk, which will be used for
secret key encryption and decryption, a public key pk, which will be used for public
key encryption, and finally a bootstrapping key bk which will be used for performing
fully homomorphic computations by any (untrusted) third party.
Encryption and Storage. To encrypt with our scheme, data is first en-
coded as vectors of length n (e.g. n = 212) with k-bit entries xi ∈ {0, 2k − 1} (e.g.
k = 4). Each vector is then converted to a message polynomial m(x) =
∑n−1
i=0 xix
i
which is encrypted as an RLWE cipher, as shown in section Section 6.4. This en-
cryption can be done using either the secret key or the public key.
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SecEncrypt(sk,m(x))→ c ≡ (a(x), b(x))
and
PubEncrypt(pk,m(x))→ c ≡ (a(x), b(x))
The encrypted data c can then be stored in an untrusted cloud. For k = 4, secret key
encryption has a ciphertext expansion factor of about 2.5, and public key encryption
has an expansion factor of 6.5.
Homomorphic Computing. Homomorphic computations cannot be done
directly on these RLWE ciphers; instead, they must first be unpacked into LWE
ciphers (details given at the end of Section 6.4). With this unpacking, one gets an
LWE cipher for each coefficient of the message polynomial m(x): ci = Es(xi) which
is a vector of length n + 1 with entries from Zr. These LWE ciphers have a much
bigger expansion factor, so they are extracted from storage during computation only
when needed.
Computations on encrypted data can now be performed on these unpacked
LWE ciphers. For any two LWE ciphers c1 = Es(x1) and c2 = Es(x2) where x1 and
x2 are any k bit integers and c1 and c2 may come from the original encryption c or
new LWE ciphers during homomorphic computing, our scheme supports a variety
of operations; and all the new LWE ciphers computed are still LWE ciphers (over
the same Zr and with the same error bound).
The operations supported include the addition and subtraction modulo p ≤
2k, multiplication modulo p ≤ 2k for p odd or a power of 2:
1. Addition modulo p ≤ 2k,
Addmodp(Es(x1),Es(x2), p) = Es(x1 + x2 mod p).
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2. Subtraction modulo p ≤ 2k,
Submodp(Es(x1), Es(x2)) = Es(x1 − x2 mod p).
3. Multiplication modulo p < 2k odd,
Multmodpodd(Es(x1),Es(x2), p) = Es(x1 · x2 mod p)
4. Multiplication modulo 2k,
Multmod2tok(Es(x1),Es(x2)) = Es(x1 · x2 mod 2k).
Also supported are the following two operations in the integers that store
the result across two new ciphertexts:
1. Addition in Z+,
AddinZ(Es(x1), Es(x2)) = (Es(y0), Es(y1)) ,
where x1 + x2 = y0 + y12
k ∈ Z, y0 has k bit, and y1 has one bit.
2. Multiplication in Z+,
MultinZ(Es(x1), Es(x2)) = (Es(y0), Es(y1)) ,
where x1 · x2 = y0 + y12k ∈ Z and both y0 and y1 have k bits.
The above are all binary operations in that they combine two ciphertexts.
We can also perform the following unary operations on a single ciphertext:
1. Inverse modulo p ≤ 2k, with any integer x so that gcd(x, p) = 1,
Inversemodp(Es(x), p) = Es(x
−1 mod p).
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2. Power modulo p ≤ 2k, with any integer i > 1,
Powermodp(Es(x), i, p) = Es(x
i mod p).
3. RELU for any integer x ∈ (−2k, 2k),
RELU(Es(x)) = Es(x
+)
where x+ := max{0, x}.
Each of these LWE ciphers is valid with a probability greater than 1−2−140,
so practically any arbitrary number of computations can be performed while still
preserving a high probability of correctness, (e.g. if 250 homomorphic computations
are done, the probability that the resulted LWE cipher is valid is still 1−2−90). After
the desired homomorphic computations have been performed by some untrusted
party, the result can be returned to the user encrypted as LWE ciphers; or if the
number of such LWE ciphers is close to n or larger, the LWE ciphers can be packed
back into RLWE ciphers for storage in the database or to be sent to the user.
6.3 Background Concepts and Techniques
We show how the flattening process can be modified to get a random flat-
tening.
Lemma 6.3.1. Given B2 ≥ Q > B and integer d ∈ (−Q2 , Q2 ], there exist unique
integers d0 ∈ (−B2 , B2 ] and d1 ∈ [−B2 , B2 ] s.t. d = d0 + d1 ·B.
Proof. Let
d1 = bd/Be, d0 = d− d1 ·B
where x − bxe ∈ (−12 , 12 ] for any x ∈ R. Notice that since B2 ≥ Q > B, and
d ∈ (−Q2 , Q2 ], we have d/B ∈ (−B2 , B2 ]. By the fact that d/B − bd/Be ∈ (−12 , 12 ],
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then we know bd/Be ∈ (−B+12 , B+12 ), implying that d1 = bd/Be ∈ [−B2 , B2 ] as B is
an integer. Moreover, d0 = d− d1 ·B = (d/B − bd/Be) ·B ∈ (−12 , 12 ] ·B ∈ (−B2 , B2 ]
is what we need.
Assume (d′0, d′1), (d0, d1) ∈ (−B2 , B2 ]× [−B2 , B2 ] s.t.
d = d0 + d1 ·B = d′0 + d′1 ·B,
then
d0 − d′0 = (d′1 − d1) ·B.
Since d0, d
′
0 ∈ (−B2 , B2 ], we know d0−d′0 ∈ (−B,B). Notice that B | d0−d′0, actually
d0−d′0 = 0, implying that d0 = d′0, d1 = d′1 which proves the uniqueness of d0, d1.
Using Lemma 6.3.1, we can prove the following random flattening approach.
Lemma 6.3.2. (random flattening) For B2 ≥ Q > B, let SQ = (−Q2 , Q2 ] denote a
residue class mod Q. Given a ∈ SQ uniform random, choose k0, k1 ∈ SQ uniform
randomly and compute i1 = bk1/Be, i0 = k0 − bk0/Be · B, where bxe denotes the
integer closest to x and bxe := k if x = k+ 12 for some integer k, there exists unique
j0 ∈ (−B2 , B2 ], j1 ∈ [−B2 , B2 ] s.t. a + i0 + i1 · B = j0 + j1 · B mod Q, and letting
a0 = j0 − i0, a1 = j1 − i1, we have
a = a0 + a1 ·B mod Q,
where a0, a1 are random variables s.t. |a0|, |a1| ≤ B and E(a0) = E(a1) = 0.
Proof. Let a′ = a + i0 + i1 · B mod Q ∈ SQ, then a′ is uniform in SQ since
a ∈ SQ is already uniform. By Lemma 6.3.1, we know that there exists unique
j0 ∈ (−B2 , B2 ], j1 ∈ [−B2 , B2 ] s.t. a′ = j0 + j1 · B. Moreover, by the proof of Lemma
6.3.2,
j1 = ba′/Be, j0 = a′ − ba′/Be ·B.
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Notice that a′, k1 are both uniform in SQ, we know j1 and i1 actually have the
same distribution, implying that i1 ∈ [−B2 , B2 ] and E(j1) = E(i1). Similarly, since
k0 is also uniform in SQ, j0 and i0 also have the same distribution, it follows that
i0 ∈ (−B2 , B2 ] and E(j0) = E(i0). As a result, we obtain
|a1| = |j1 − i1| ≤ |j1|+ |i1| ≤ B
2
+
B
2
= B
and E(a1) = E(j1)− E(i1) = 0. Similarly, we have
|a0| = |j0 − i0| ≤ |j0|+ |i0| ≤ B
2
+
B
2
= B
and E(a0) = E(j0)− E(i0) = 0.
We can extend this random flattening to any list of elements in Zq and thus
to polynomials.
Lemma 6.3.3. Let n be a power of 2, q = p1p2 · · · pt be the product of distinct
primes such that 2n|(pi−1) for each i. Every polynomial a(x) ∈ Rn,q can be written
as
a(x) = a0(x) + a1(x)B = (a0(x), a1(x))g
t
where ||ai(x)||∞ ≤ B for 0 ≤ i ≤ ` − 1. Furthermore, we can get a(x) = a0(x) +
a1(x)B with a0(x) or a1(x) invertible in Rn,q.
Proof. Using Lemma 6.3.2 we can get a random flattening a(x) = a0(x) + a1(x)B.
Then if we assume q = p1p2 · · · pt is the product of district primes, we can then
check if either a0(x) or a1(x) is coprime to x
m + 1 modulo pi for all i. This can
be done by checking if they share a common root, by evaluating a0(x) at all the
roots of xn + 1 modulo pi, i.e. taking an FFT of a0(x) in Rn,pi and then checking
if any component is zero. If it is not coprime, we can simply apply Lemma 6.3.2
again to get a new one and check if it is coprime. We will argue next why with high
probability we should get coprime with few attempts.
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Heuristic Assumption 6.3.4. In the proof of Lemma 6.3.3, we expect to find a
coprime a0(x) or a1(x) after a very small number of attempts.
Argument: For any pj , let α0, α1, ..., αn−1 be the roots of xn + 1 modulo pj ,
which have the form αi = ω
2i+1 0 ≤ i < n where ω has order 2n. The FFT of a
polynomial v(x) ∈ Rn,q has the form (v(α0), v(α1), ..., v(αn−1)). If v(x) =
∑n−1
i=0 vix
i
is uniform random then the probability that
v(α) = v0 + v1α+ v2α
2 + · · ·+ vn−1αn−1 = 0 (mod pj)
is 1/pj . Thus, the probability that any root would evaluate to zero would be less
than n/qj . Over all pj , 1 ≤ j ≤ t, the probability that any root would evaluate
to zero for any pj would be less than
(
n
p1
+ np2 + · · ·+ npt
)
. When we use this in
our scheme, we will take q = p1p2 each of size around 2
40 and n = 213, so this is
≈ 214/240 = 2−26. Where the heuristic assumption comes in is that v(x) in our case
is not uniform random but rather the outcome of the random flattening process.
Since it is random but not uniform random, the probability is harder to specify.
6.4 Encryption Schemes
We present two encryption schemes based on the RLWE problem [91]: one
using private keys and the other using public keys. We use rounding and modulus
reduction. We note that the technique of modulus reduction has been used in
[36, 34, 35] and rounding was introduced in LWR in (2012, [22]). Brakerski [32]
suggested in a comment to also use rounding to reduce ciphertext sizes in FHE
schemes, but before [66] such techniques had not led to FHE schemes with such
small expansion factors. We shall encrypt a message polynomial m(x) =
∑n−1
i=0 mix
i,
where mi ∈ [0, 2k). Using all these techniques, and by carefully choosing error
distributions, we achieve a cipher expansion of 1 + 6k for encryption with private
keys and 2 + 12k +
log2(n)
2k for encryption with public keys. Let r be a power of 2,
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Dr = r/2
k+2 and Dq = bq/2k+2c.
Secret key. Randomly pick s = (s0, s1, . . . , sn−1) ∈ {0, 1}n of hamming weight at
most n/8, and let s(x) =
∑n−1
i=0 six
i.
Public key. A corresponding public key in R1×2n,q is with respect to a larger modulus
q ≥ 27rn and is generated as pk = (k0(x), k1(x)) where k0(x) ∈ Rn,q is chosen
uniform randomly and
k1(x) := k0(x)s(x) + e(x) mod (x
n + 1, q)
with e(x) ∈ Rn bounded uniform random st ||e(x)||∞ < Dq/(512n).
Pseudo-random number generator P . We also need a pseudo-random num-
ber generator in order to reduce ciphertext size under encryption with private keys.
Suppose P is a function that can expand any n-bit sequence u ∈ {0, 1}n (deter-
ministically) into a sequence of 0’s and 1’s of length ndlog2(r)e, denoted by P (u).
The sequence P (u) can be uniquely converted into a polynomial in Rn,r, denoted by
P (u, x). For example, one can use SHAKE-128 [102] or the lightweight generator
[18]. However, the function P needs not to have a strong cryptographic property, but
only needs to be statistically uniform, that is, when u ∈ {0, 1}n is uniform random,
P (u, x) should be nearly uniform random in Rn,r. The security of our encryption
scheme depends on the RLWE problem in Rn,r and that P (u, x) is nearly uniform
random in Rn,r.
6.4.1 Private-key Encryption
To encrypt a message m(x) under secret key s, our scheme, which is a
generalization of [66], is in Figure 6.1.
Lemma 6.4.1. Let (a(x), b(x)) ∈ R1×2n,r be as computed in Figure 1. Then there
exists w3(x) ∈ Rn with ||w3(x)||∞ < Dr4 so that
2t−k−4b(x)− s(x)a(x) ≡ w3(x) +m(x)Dr mod (xn + 1, r).
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Private-key Encryption : REs(m(x))
Input: s(x) =
∑n−1
i=0 six
i where si ∈ {0, 1}, an n-bit secret key,
m(x) =
∑n−1
i=0 mix
i, where mi ∈ [0, 2k), a kn-bit message,
t := dlog2(r)e − 1, hence 2t < r ≤ 2t+1,
P : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n(t+1), a pseudo-random number gen-
erator.
Output: (u,v) ∈ {0, 1}n × {0, 1}(k+5)n
Step 1. Pick u ∈ {0, 1}n uniform randomly, and compute
a(x) := P (u, x) ∈ Rn,r.
Step 2. Pick w(x) ∈ Rn uniform randomly with ‖w(x)‖∞ ≤ Dr/8,
and compute
b1(x) := a(x)s(x) + w(x) +m(x)Dr mod (x
n + 1, r)
(so that each coefficient of b1(x) is between 0 and r − 1).
Step 3. Taking the highest k+ 5 bits for each coefficient of b1(x):
b(x) := bb1(x)/2t−k−4c.
Let v ∈ ({0, 1}k+5)n denote the bit representation of b(x).
Step 4. Return (u,v).
Figure 6.1: Private-key encryption
In particular, where r = 2k+6
√
n, (u, v) returned in Step 4 has (k + 6)n bits and
represents an RLWE cipher REs(m(x)) with error size < 4
√
n.
Proof. By Step 3, since the coefficients of b1(x) are between 0 and r − 1,
we have b1(x) = 2
t−k−4b(x) + b0(x) for some b0 ∈ Rn with ||b0(x)||∞ < 2t−k−4. By
Step 2, we have 2t−k−4b(x)− s(x)a(x) ≡ −b0(x) +w(x) +m(x)Dr mod (xn + 1, r).
Note that r = 2t+1 and Dr = 2
t−k−1, so
|| − b0(x) + w(x)||∞ ≤ ||b0(x)||∞ + ||w(x)||∞ < 2t−k−4 + Dr8 = Dr4 .
Therefore, the lemma holds with w3(x) = w(x)− b0(x).
6.4.2 Public-key Encryption
The scheme, which is a generalization of [66] is presented in Figure 6.2.
Lemma 6.4.2. Suppose n ≥ 512, r = 2t+1 ≥ 2k+6√n and q ≥ 27rn. Let
(a(x), b(x)) = REpk(m(x)) ∈ R1×2n,r . Then with probability ≥ 1 − n · 2−190, we
have
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Public-key Encryption : REpk(m(x))
Input: pk = (k0(x), k1(x)) ∈ R1×2n,q , t := dlog2(r)e − 1, hence
2t < r ≤ 2t+1
m(x) =
∑n−1
i=0 mix
i: a kn-bit message where each mi ∈
[0, 2k),
Output: (a(x), b(x)) ∈ R1×2n,r
Step 1. Pick u(x) ∈ Rn with each coefficient random in
{−1, 0, 1},
Pick w1(x) ∈ Rn randomly with ||w1(x)||∞ ≤ Dq/(64n),
Pick w2(x) ∈ Rn randomly with ||w2(x)||∞ ≤ Dq/256.
Step 2. Compute:
a1(x) := k0(x)u(x) + w1(x) mod(x
n + 1, q),
b1(x) := k1(x)u(x) + w2(x) mod(x
n + 1, q).
(Both a1(x) and b1(x) have coefficients in [0, q − 1].)
Step 3. Modulus reduction and rounding:
a(x) :=
⌊
r
qa1(x)
⌉
,
b(x) :=
⌊
1
2t−k−5 (
r
q b1(x) +m(x)Dr)
⌉
.
(Each coefficient of b(x) is in [0, 2k+6−1], hence has k+6
bits.)
Step 4. Return (a(x), b(x)).
Figure 6.2: Public-key encryption
2t−k−5b(x)− s(x)a(x) ≡ w3(x) +m(x)Dr mod (xn + 1, r).
for some w3(x) ∈ Rn with ||w3(x)||∞ < Dr4 . In particular, when r = 2k+6
√
n,
each ciphertext REpk(m(x)) has n(2k + 12 +
1
2 log2(n)) bits and the error, i.e. each
coefficient of w3(x) is random in (−4
√
n, 4
√
n).
Proof. By Step 3, we have a(x) = ra1(x)/q + v1(x), and 2
t−k−5b(x) =
rb1(x)/q + v0(x) + m(x)Dr, where vi(x) ∈ R[x] with degree < n for i = 0 and
1, ||v1(x)||∞ ≤ 1/2 and ||v0(x)||∞ < 2t−k−5. By k1(x) = k0(x)s(x) + e(x) mod
(xn + 1, q) and a1(x), b1(x), there exist polynomials h1(x), h2(x) ∈ Z[x] so that
b1(x)− s(x)a1(x) = u(x)e(x) + w2(x)− s(x)w1(x) + h1(x)(xn + 1) + qh2(x).
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Let w(x) = u(x)e(x) + w2(x)− s(x)w1(x). Then
2t−k−5b(x)− s(x)a(x) = r
q
(b1(x)− s(x)a1(x)) + v0(x)− s(x)v1(x) +m(x)Dr
=
r
q
w(x) + v0(x)− s(x)v1(x) +m(x)Dr
+
r
q
h1(x)(x
n + 1) + rh2(x)
≡ w3(x) +m(x)Dr mod (xn + 1, r)
where w3(x) =
r
qw(x) + v0(x)− s(x)v1(x). We need to estimate the coefficient size
of other terms in w3(x)(when reduced modulo x
n+ 1). Since u(x) =
∑n−1
i=0 ui where
ui ∈ {−1, 0, 1}, we have
||u(x)e(x)||∞ ≤
n−1∑
i=0
||uixie(x)||∞ =
n−1∑
i=0
||e(x)||∞ = n||e(x)||∞ ≤ n Dq
512n
=
Dq
512
.
Similarly, since si ∈ {0, 1} and Ham(s) ≤ 18n, we obtain ||s(x)w1(x)||∞ ≤ 18n||w1(x)||∞ ≤
1
8n · Dq64n = Dq512 . Therefore,
||w(x)||∞ ≤ ||u(x)e(x)||∞ + ||w2(x)||∞ + ||s(x)w1(x)||∞ ≤ Dq
512
+
Dq
256
+
Dq
512
=
Dq
128
.
Expanding terms of s(x)v1(x), we obtain
s(x)v1(x) =
n−1∑
i=0
six
i
n−1∑
l=0
v1,lx
l =
n−1∑
i=0
n−1∑
l=0
siv1,lx
i+l
=
n−1∑
k=0
(
k∑
i=0
siv1,k−i −
n−1∑
i=k+1
siv1,k+n−i) · xk
=
n−1∑
k=0
n−1∑
i=0
ck,isiv1,(k−i)mod n · xk
=
n−1∑
k=0
n−1∑
i=0
s′k,iv1,j · xk (mod xn + 1, q).
where s′k,i = ck,isi for ck,i ∈ {−1, 1} and j = (k − i)mod n for some v1,j ∈ R with
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|v1,j | ≤ 12 . Thus ||s′k|| = ||s|| ≤ 18n for 0 ≤ k ≤ n − 1. Moreover, we know that
E(v1,j) = 0 for 0 ≤ j ≤ n − 1 and all v1,j are independent, implying that v1,j ∼
subG(14). By Corollary 1.7 in [112], for
n−1∑
i=0
s′k,iv1,j with bound
23√
2
||s′k||2 ≤ 238
√
n,
we obtain
P (|
n−1∑
i=0
s′k,iv1,j | >
23
8
√
n) ≤ P (|
n−1∑
i=0
s′k,iv1,j | >
23√
2
||s′k||2)
< 2 · e−132.5 < 2−190.
Since ||s(x)v1(x)||∞ = max
k
|
n−1∑
i=0
s′k,iv1,j |, we know
P (max
k
|
n−1∑
i=0
s′k,iv1,j | ≤
23
8
√
n) = 1− P (∃k′, s.t.|
n−1∑
i=0
s′k′,iv1,j | >
23
8
√
n)
≥ 1− n · 2−190.
Thus, we know with probability ≥ 1− n · 2−190,
||v0(x)− s(x)v1(x)||∞ ≤ ||v0(x)||∞ + ||s(x)v1(x)||∞ ≤ 2t−k−5 + 23
8
√
n.
Since n ≥ 512, it follows that with probability ≥ 1− n · 2−190,
||w3(x)||∞ ≤ r
q
||w(x)||∞ + ||v0(x)− s(x)v1(x)||∞
<
r
128q
Dq + 2
t−k−5 +
23
8
√
n
<
Dr
128
+
Dr
24
+
23
8
√
n
=
Dr
128
+
Dr
24
+
23
8
· Dr
24
=
Dr
4
where the last inequality is from r ≥ 2k+6√n and Dr = r/2k+2.
When r = 2k+6
√
n, we know that Dr4 =
r
2k+4
= 2
k+6
2k+4
√
n = 4
√
n, which
completes the proof.
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6.4.3 Decryption, ciphertext expansion, and unpacking
Decryption. To decrypt a ciphertext (a(x), b(x)) from REs(m(x)) or REpk(m(x)),
the user computes
b1(x) := 2
t−k−4b(x)−s(x)a(x) mod (xn + 1, r), or b1(x) := 2t−k−5b(x)−s(x)a(x) mod (xn + 1, r),
and m1(x) = bb1(x)/Dre. Then m1(x) = m(x), the reason is that b1(x) ≡ w(x) +
m(x)Dr mod (x
n + 1, r) for some w(x) ∈ Rn with ||w(x)||∞ < Dr/4.
6.4.3.1 Ciphertext expansion under private key
The ciphertext size under private key encryption is n(k+6) bits and encrypts
kn message bits. Thus, the ciphertext expansion ratio is
n(k + 6)
kn
= 1 +
6
k
.
Asymptotically as k → ∞ we get the optimal ciphertext expansion of 1. For the
values of k = 2, 3, 4, 5 that we suggest for practical use in this scheme, we get
expansion ratios of 4, 3, 2.5, 2.2 respectively as shown in Figure 6.1.
6.4.3.2 Ciphertext expansion under public key
As proved in Lemma 6.4.2 the expansion under public keys when r =
2k+6
√
n, is
n(2k + 12 + 12 log2(n))
kn
= 2 +
12
k
+
log2(n)
2k
.
For n = 212 and the values of k = 2, 3, 4, 5 that we suggest for practical use in this
scheme, we get expansion ratios of 11, 8, 6.5, 5.6 respectively as shown in Figure
6.1.
Unpacking. Given an RLWE cipher REs(m(x)) = c for m(x) =
∑n−1
i=0 mix
i
we want to extract LWE ciphers for each coefficient in the message polynomial. This
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technique has been used in [119, 93] Suppose c is from private-key encryption. Then
c is of the form c = (u, v) where u ∈ {0, 1}n and v ∈ ({0, 1}5)n. Apply the pseudo
random number generator P to u to get a polynomial a(x) = P (u, x) ∈ Rn,r, and
convert v into a polynomial b(x) ∈ Rn,r. By Lemma 6.4.1, we have
2t−k−4b(x) ≡ a(x)s(x) +
(
n−1∑
i=0
mk,ix
i
)
Dr + w(x) mod (x
n + 1, r),
where ‖w(x)‖∞ < Dr/4. In general, for any a(x) = a0+a1x+· · ·+am−1xm−1 ∈ Rm,q
we define
Extract(a(x), i) = (ai, ai−1, . . . , a0,−am−1,−am−2, . . . ,−am−(n−1−i)) ∈ Znq .
This is used to get the coefficients of a(x)s(x) mod (xm + 1). Note that, modulo
xm + 1,
a(x)s(x) =
n−1∑
k=0
m−1∑
j=0
skajx
k+j ≡
m−1∑
i=0
[(s0ai + s1ai−1 + · · ·+ sia0)− (si+1am−1
+ si+2am−2 + · · ·+ sn−1am−(n−1−i))]xi.
Hence, for 0 ≤ i ≤ n, the i-th coefficient of a(x)s(x) mod (xm + 1) is equal to the
inner product of s with Extract(a(x), i). It follows that for 0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1, an LWE
cipher for mi is
Es(mi) = (Extract(a(x), i), 2
t−k−4bi) ∈ Znr × Zr
with error size < Dr/4, where bi is the coefficient of x
i in b(x).
Next suppose ck is from public-key encryption. By Lemma 6.4.2, c is of the
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form (a(x), b(x)) ∈ R1×2n,r so that
2t−k−5b(x) ≡ a(x)s(x) +
(
n−1∑
i=0
mix
i
)
Dr + w(x) mod (x
n + 1, r),
where ‖w(x)‖∞ < Dr/4. Hence, for 0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1, an LWE cipher for mi is
Es(mi) = (Extract(a(x), i), 2
t−k−5bi) ∈ Znr × Zr
with error size < Dr/4, where bi is the coefficient of x
i in b(x).
6.5 Multi-bit Homomorphic Operations
In the previous section we saw how data stored efficiently in RLWE ciphers
can be unpacked to LWE ciphers, and in this section we will show how homomorphic
operations can be done on those LWE ciphers. We follow the approach in Ducas
and Micciancio (2015 [57]) and Chillotti et al. (2016 [49]); however, we do not need
to perform key switch as they do. We incorporate a technique of Biasse and Ruiz
(2015 [29]) which is further developed by Carpov, Izabache`ne, and Mollimard (2018
[37]) for doing arbitrary function lookups.
To give a high level description, we take LWE ciphers in Znr ×Zr with error
size bounded by 4
√
n, which come from the unpacking of RLWE ciphers. The error
bound of 4
√
n is very large with respect to r so only one homomorphic addition or
subtraction can be done at this step. The ciphertexts are then homomorphically
lifted to Rm,Q = Z[x]/(xm + 1, Q) by being embedded in the exponents of RLWE
ciphertexts modulo a much larger Q and mixed with the bootstrapping key in a
way that homomorphically decrypts them. Further arbitrary functions can then be
applied to produce the desired arithmetic operation, and finally the ciphertexts are
mapped back down to Znr × Zr by a modulus reduction. The resulting ciphertexts
still have error bounded by the same starting bound of 4
√
n with high probability.
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Thus, they can continue to be operated on any practical number of times. An
overview diagram of scheme is shown in Figure 6.3.
Rm,Q ×Rm,Q Rm,Q ×Rm,Q ZnQ × ZQ
Rn,r ×Rn,r Znr × Zr
function extract
mod reduction
unpack
pack
HomLift
Figure 6.3: Bootstrapping operation, Rn,r :=
Z[x]
(xn+1,r) .
6.5.1 Homomorphic Lifting
Suppose we are given LWE ciphers Es(xi) ∈ Znr × Zr for xi ∈ {0, .., 2k − 1}
with error size < Dr/4. Let s = (s0, . . . , sn−1) ∈ {0, 1}n, representing an n-bit secret
key of a user. Suppose r ≥ 2k+6√n is a power of 2, Q is much bigger than r (to be
determined later) and
m = r/2, Dr = br/2k+2c, DQ = bQ/2k+2c.
Also take B` ≥ Q > B (we shall take ` = 2 in this paper). We shall work in the
rings
Rm = Z[x]/(xm + 1), Rm,Q = Z[x]/(xm + 1, Q).
Define a bootstrapping key to be bk = (C0, . . . , Cn−1) where
Ci = GSWs(si) = Ai + siG ∈ R(2`)×2m,Q , 0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1, (6.1)
where Ai ∈ R(2`)×2m,Q is a GSW sample (chosen randomly and independently by the
owner of s) with certain error size τbk (to be determined later). Such a bootstrapping
key for the user with the secret key s is made public and can be used by anyone else
to compute homomorphic operations of ciphertexts.
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Suppose Es(x1) = (a1, b1) and Es(x2) = (a2, b2) where a1,a2 ∈ Znr and
bi ≡ 〈s,ai〉+ xiDr + ei (mod r),
for some ei ∈ Z with |ei| < Dr/4 for i = 1, 2. We note that
b1 + b2 ≡ 〈s,a1 + a2〉+ (x1 + x2)Dr + e1 + e2 (mod r), (6.2)
b1 − b2 ≡ 〈s,a1 − a2〉+ (x1 − x2)Dr + e1 − e2 (mod r). (6.3)
We let u ∈ Znr × Zr, y, e be defined any one of the following three ways,
(i) (u0, . . . , un−1) = a1 + a2 ∈ Znr , un = b1 + b2 ∈ Zr, y = x1 + x2, and e =
e1 + e2 ∈ Z,
(ii) (u0, . . . , un−1) = a1 − a2 ∈ Znr , un = b1 − b2 ∈ Zr, y = x1 − x2, and e =
e1 − e2 ∈ Z,
(iii) (u0, . . . , un−1) = a1 ∈ Znr , un = b1 ∈ Zr, y = x1, and e = e1 ∈ Z.
In any case, |e| < Dr/2 and the equations (6.2) and (6.3) become un ≡
∑n−1
i=0 siui +
yDr + e (mod r). Let w = un −
∑n−1
i=0 siui and the equation becomes
w ≡ yDr + e (mod r). (6.4)
Now that the error has grown to be < Dr/2 no more additions can be made. This
is because the modulus r is small compared to the size of the error. We will use our
Homomorphic Lifting operation to lift this ciphertext to a larger modulus Q where
more additions can be performed. Following Ducas and Micciancio (2015 [57]), we
use the group homomorphism from the additive subgroup (Zr,+) to the following
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multiplicative group of Rm,Q = Z[x]/(xm + 1, Q):
〈x〉 = {xi : 0 ≤ i ≤ r − 1} ≡ {1, x, . . . , xm−1,−1,−x, . . . ,−xm−1},
mapping i ∈ Zr to xi ∈ Rm,Q. For any subset T ⊆ Zr, let
t(x) :=
∑
i∈T
xi ∈ Rm,Q.
For example, if r = 20, m = 10 and T = {1, 2,−4, 17}, then
t(x) = x+ x2 + x−4 + x17 ≡ x+ x2 − x6 − x7(mod xm + 1).
For this t(x), its coefficient at x2 is 1, its coefficient at xm+2 = x12 is −1 (since
x2 ≡ −x12), and its coefficient at x3 is 0 since none of 3 and m+3 is in T . Also note
that, if T = {w,w+m}, then t(x) = xw+xw+m ≡ xw+(−1) ·xw ≡ 0 ( mod xm+1).
Hence we should avoid using any subset T that contains w and m+w for some w. We
let T := {i ∈ Z : |i| < Dr/2}. Then by (6.4) we have x−w ≡ x−yDrx−e (mod xm+1)
and multiplying by t(x) which we call the error encoding polynomial we get
t(x)x−w ≡ t(x)x−ex−yDr (mod xm + 1). (6.5)
Now we will show how t(x)x−w can be computed under encryption using the boot-
strapping key, bk = (C0, . . . , Cn−1) from equation (6.1). Note that, for any z ∈ {0, 1}
and u ∈ Z, we have the identity
xzu = 1 + (xu − 1)z. (6.6)
Let C = GSWs(z) ∈ R(2`)×2m,Q be any GSW cipher. One can map zu ∈ Zr to xzu,
then to a GSW cipher: G + (xu − 1)C ∈ R(2`)×2m,Q . We describe the Homomorphic
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Lifting (HomLift) operation in Figure 6.4. The operation is a random mapping
HomLift : (Znr × Zr)×
{
R
(2`)×2
m,Q
}n → R2m,Q
(u, bk) 7→ REs(t(x)x−un+
∑uisi
k=0 ).
Homomorphic Lifting Algorithm : HomLiftbk(u)
Input: bk = (C0, . . . , Cn−1) ∈
{
R
(2`)×2
m,Q
}n
: bootstrapping key,
u = (u0, . . . , un−1, un) ∈ Znr × Zr
Output: REs(t(x)x
−un+
∑n−1
k=0 uisi) ∈ Rm,Q ×Rm,Q
Step 1. Initialization:
t(x) :=
∑
i∈T x
i where T := {i ∈ Z : −Dr < i <
Dr},
A := (0, t(x)x−unDQ) ∈ Rm,Q ×Rm,Q.
Step 2. For k from 0 to n− 1 do (randomness involved here)
A := A (G+ (xuk − 1)Ck).
Step 3. Return A.
Figure 6.4: Homomorphic lifting operation
In Step 2, A is updated n times and we can prove that for the final A =
(A0, A1), A0 will have uniform random and independent coefficients.
Lemma 6.5.1. Taking m = 2t with t > 0, in Step 2 of the Homomorphic Lifting
Algorithm, for any initial A = (A0, A1) in Rm,Q ×Rm,Q, we can guarantee that for
the final A′ = (A′0, A′1), A′0 will have uniform random and independent coefficients.
Proof. According to Step 2 of the Homomorphic Lifting Algorithm, for
i = 0, 1, · · · , n− 1, A = A (G+ (xui − 1) · Ci) where ui ∈ Zr and
Ci =

a1i(x) a1i(x)s(x) + e1i(x)
a2i(x) a2i(x)s(x) + e2i(x)
a3i(x) a3i(x)s(x) + e3i(x)
a4i(x) a4i(x)s(x) + e4i(x)

+ siG mod Q.
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By the definition of the external product  and random flattening, we know that
AM = (A0, A1)M = (A0,L, A0,H , A1,L, A1,H) ·M
where A0 = A0,L + A0,H · B and A1 = A1,L + A1,H · B in Rm,Q. Plugging in the
form of G+ (xui − 1) · Ci and denoting the new A by A′ = (A′0, A′1), we obtain
A′0 = A0,L · ((xui − 1)(a1i(x) + si) + 1) +A0,H · ((xui − 1)(a2i(x) + siB) +B)
+A1,L · (xui − 1)a3i(x) +A1,H · (xui − 1)a4i(x)
= (xui − 1) [A0,La1,i(x) +A0,Ha2,i(x) +A1,La3,i +A1,Ha4,i] + γ
where γ = (xui − 1)si(A0,L +A0,HB) + (A0,L +A0,HB).
If ui = 0, we know that x
ui−1 = 0, implying that A′0 = A0,L+A0,H ·B = A0
and A′1 = A1,L +A1,H ·B = A1. Thus, A remains unchanged during this update.
Claim: If ui 6= 0, we claim that xui − 1 is invertible in Rm,Q.
To show this claim, we show xui − 1 and xm + 1 do not share any common
roots. For xm + 1, xm ≡ −1 (mod Q) thus all roots have order exactly 2m. On the
other hand, xui ≡ 1 (mod Q) so all the roots of xui − 1 have order dividing ui and
ui < r = 2m, thus they have no common roots. This proves the claim.
We can apply Lemma 6.3.3 to the initial A = (A0, A1) to obtain that at
least one of Ai,L and Ai,H , i = 0, 1 is invertible in Rm,Q. WLOG, we assume A0,L
is invertible; thus
A′0 = (x
ui − 1)A−10,L
[
a1,i(x) +A
−1
0,LA0,Ha2,i(x) +A
−1
0,LA1,La3,i +A
−1
0,LA1,Ha4,i
]
+ γ.
Now a1,i(x) has uniform random independent coefficients and is independent of all
the other terms in this expression for A′0. Thus, the result of the sum
S :=
[
a1,i(x) +A
−1
0,LA0,Ha2,i(x) +A
−1
0,LA1,La3,i +A
−1
0,LA1,Ha4,i
]
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is uniform random with independent coefficients. Since (xui − 1)A−10,L is invertible,
(xui − 1)A−10,LS is uniform random and with independent coefficients and remains so
after adding γ. Since u is an LWE cipher, least one value ui is not equal to zero
with extremely high probability.
Next we estimate the error bound on the final ciphertext of the HomLift
algorithm. The following lemma is due to Chillotti et. al. [49], but we make the
error bound explicit for our model.
Lemma 6.5.2 (Homomorphic Lifting). Let bk = C0, ..., Cn−1 be a bootstrapping
key, u = (u0, ..., un−1, un) ∈ Znr × Zr. Suppose REs(m(x)) ∈ Rm,Q × Rm,Q is a
trivial encryption and each Ck, 0 ≤ k ≤ n− 1, has error size at most τbk. Then
REs(m(x))(G+ (xu0 − 1)C0)· · ·(G+ (xun−1 − 1)Cn−1) ≡ REs
(
m(x)x
∑n−1
k=0 uksk
)
with error bounded by 15 · 2Bτbk
√
2`mn with probability 1−m2−161. In particular,
we can let m(x) = t(x)x−unDQ to get REs(t(x)x−un+
∑n−1
k=0 uksk).
Proof. By assumption for 0 ≤ k ≤ n − 1, Ck = GSWs(sk) = Ak + skG where
Ak ∈ R(2`)×2m,Q and Ak(−s(x), 1)t ≡ w(k)(x) mod (xn + 1, Q) with w(k)(x) ∈ R2`m and
||w(k)(x)||∞ ≤ τbk. Then using the identity in (6.6),
G+(xuk−1)Ck = (xuk−1)Ak+(1+(xuk−1)sk)G = (xuk−1)Ak+xukskG = GSWs(xuksk),
and the error polynomial is (xuk − 1)Ak(−s(x), 1)t ≡ (xuk − 1)w(k)(x). So the
product we need to compute becomes
REs(m(x))GSWs(xu0s0) · · · GSWs(xun−1sn−1). (6.7)
Let Rk := REs(m(x))GSWs(xu0s0)· · ·GSWs(xuksk) have error term ek(x) and
flattening h(k) ∈ R1×2`m,Q so in computing the (k−2)th productRkGSWs(xuk+1sk+1) ≡
97
REs
(
m(x)x
∑k+1
j=0 ujsj
)
by Lemma 4.8.1 the new error term is h(k)(xuk+1−1)wk+1(x)+
xuk+1sk+1ek(x). In the full product (6.7), the error term is the following: letting
ψα(x) := x
∑n−1
j=α ujsj ,
ψ0w
(−1)+ψ1(xu0−1)h(−1)w(0)+ψ2(xu1−1)h(0)w(1)+· · ·+ψn(xun−1−1)h(n−2)w(n−1)
(6.8)
where w(−1) and h(−1) are the error term and flattening of REs(m(x)).
Splitting this into two parts for the sake of independence,
ψ0w
(−1) +
n∑
k=1
ψkx
uk−1h(k−2)w(k−1) −
n∑
k=1
ψkh
(k−2)w(k−1), (6.9)
we will analyze the first n + 1 terms together and the latter n terms together. In
analyzing the former, we can drop the ψkx
uk−1 since it just rotates the coefficients
and look just at
w(−1) +
n∑
k=1
h(k−2)w(k−1). (6.10)
To analyze one inner product h(k)w(k+1), we will drop the superscripts to ease
notation and write
hw ≡
2∑`
i=1
hi(x)wi(x) where hi(x), wi(x) ∈ Rm,Q
≡
2∑`
i=1
m−1∑
j=0
hijx
j
m−1∑
γ=0
wiγx
γ

≡
2∑`
i=1
m−1∑
j=0
m−1∑
γ=0
hijwiγx
γ+j
≡
2∑`
i=1
m−1∑
j=0
[(hi0wij + · · ·hijwi0)− (hi,j+1wi,n−1 + · · ·+ hi,n−1wi,n−(n−1−j)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
m− 1 terms
xj .
≡
m−1∑
j=0
2`(m−1)∑
γ=1
hγw˜γx
j .
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where in the last line, since the wij ’s come from a distribution that is symmetric
about zero, the −wij ’s can be rewritten as w˜ij which are still iid.
Now each coefficient of xj in the sum in (6.10) has the form
n(2`(m−1))+1∑
γ=1
hγw˜γ .
Note that among the error terms in the bootstrapping key there are 2`n(m− 1) iid
coefficients, and these are all represented in these wγ ’s here. The one other term
comes from the error term of the initial REs(m(x)), which is just zero when it is a
trivial ciphertext. Thus, this is the sum of N := n(2`(m− 1)) iid bounded uniform
random variables |wγ | ≤ τbk or also subG(τ2bk). However, the hγ coefficients are not
independent of the wγ ’s in that in (6.10) h
(i) depends on all the previous h(j),w(j),
j < i. Thus, we cannot directly apply Cor 1.7 of [112] to say the resulting sum is
sub-Gaussian, but we can use the result form [38, Corollary 2.4] to say this,
(Coef of xj) ∼ subG(τ2bk||h||22).
To bound the error, we need to consider bounding all m coefficients at once and do
so using Thm 1.14 of [112],
Prob
[
max
0≤j≤m−1
|Coef of xj | < t
]
≤ 2m exp
( −t2
2τ2bk||h||22
)
.
In particular, to get a bound with very high probability we choose a bound of 15 stan-
dard deviations, t = 15(τbk||h||2) ≤ 15(τbk)
√
NB2 ≤ 15 · Bτbk
√
2`mn =: τ1, so that
the probability of any coefficient exceeding this bound is less than 2m exp(−152/2) ≤
m2−161. Similarly for the last n terms of Equation (6.9), N will be N := n(2`(m−1))
and the probability that any coefficient exceeds 15 · Bτbk
√
2`mn =: τ2 is at most
m2−161. Thus, the probability that any coefficient in (6.9) exceeds τ1 + τ2 =
15 · 2Bτbk
√
2`mn is at most m2−161.
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6.5.2 Function Lookup.
Now for any function of the following three forms
(i) f : [0, 2k+1)→ [0, 2k),
(ii) f : (−2k, 2k)→ [0, 2k),
(iii) f : [0, 2k)→ [0, 2k),
we want to find Es(f(y)). The three domains correspond to the three choices (i,ii,
iii) for u, y, and e in Section (6.5.1).
Using the technique of Carpov et. al. [37], we define the function encoding
polynomial as
F (x) :=
∑
i∈M
f(i)xiDr .
Multiplying equation (6.5) by F (x) we get
Φf (x) := t(x)x
−wF (x) ≡ t(x)x−ex−yDrF (x) (mod xm + 1, Q). (6.11)
Now we claim that the constant term of this polynomial is f(y) (mod Q), the func-
tion value of which we want an encryption.
Lemma 6.5.3. For y = x1 + x2 ∈ [0, 2k+1) and for any function f : [0, 2k+1) →
[0, 2k) the constant term of Φf (x) is f(y). Similarly, for y = x1 − x2 ∈ (−2k, 2k)
and f : (−2k, 2k) → [0, 2k), the constant term of Φf (y) is f(y). Similarly for
y = x1 ∈ [0, 2k) and f : [0, 2k)→ [0, 2k).
Proof. Case 1. For the first case of f : [0, 2k+1)→ [0, 2k), we have by assumption,
Φf (x) ≡ t(x)x−ex−yDr
∑
i∈[0,2k+1)
f(i)xiDr (mod xm + 1).
The polynomial t(x) has a term xe which can cancel with x−e. F (x) has a term
f(y)xyDr which can cancel with x−yDr to give f(y). Thus, in Φf (x) there is the
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term
xe · x−e · x−yDr · f(y)xyDr ≡ f(y) (mod xm + 1, q).
We just need to show that this is the only constant term in Φf (x). In other words,
if |e1| < Dr/2 and i ∈ [0, 2k+1) so that xe1 is a term in t(x) and f(i)xiDr is a
term in F (x) with either e1 6= e or i 6= y, we need to show that we cannot get
e1 − e+ (i− y)Dr ≡ 0 (mod m). With either e1 6= e or i 6= y, we have
0 6= |(e1 − e) + (i− y)Dr| ≤ |e1 − e|+ |(i− y)Dr|
< Dr + (2
k+1 − 1)Dr
= 2k+1Dr
= r/2 = m.
Thus, e1−e+(i−y)Dr 6≡ 0 (mod m). So the only term contributing to the constant
term of Φf (x) is f(y).
Case 2. In the second case of f : (−2k, 2k)→ [0, 2k) we have,
Φf (x) ≡ t(x)x−ex−yDr
∑
i∈(−2k,2k)
f(i)xiDr (mod xm + 1).
The polynomial t(x) has a term xe which can cancel with x−e. F (x) has a term
f(y)xyDr which can cancel with x−yDr to give f(y). Thus, in Φf (x) there is the
term
xe · x−e · x−yDr · f(y)xyDr ≡ f(y) (mod xm + 1, Q).
We just need to show that this is the only constant term in Φf (x). In other words,
if |e1| < Dr/2 and i ∈ (−2k, 2k) so that xe1 is a term in t(x) and f(i)xiDr is a term
in F (x) with either e1 6= e or i 6= y, we need to show that we cannot get
e1 − e+ (i− y)Dr ≡ 0 (mod m).
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We have (i− y) ∈ [−2k+1 + 2, 2k+1 − 2], and with either e1 6= e or i 6= y,
0 6= |(e1 − e) + (i− y)Dr| ≤ |e1 − e|+ |(i− y)Dr|
< Dr + (2
k+1 − 2)Dr
= 2k+1Dr −Dr
< r/2 = m.
Thus, e1−e+(i−y)Dr 6≡ 0 (mod m). So the only term contributing to the constant
term of Φf (x) is f(y).
Case 3. The proof is similar to Cases 1 and 2.
Now we will show how Φf (x) can be computed under encryption using the
bootstrapping key, bk, and Es(x1) and Es(x2). Recall,
x−w ≡ x−unx
∑n−1
i=0 siui ,
so an untrusted party performing the HE computations with bk and u = (u0, ..., un)
can compute a HomLift to get REs(t(x)x
−unx
∑n−1
k=0 uksk) with the error bound given
by Lemma 6.5.2. Getting F (x) into the product can be done by observing that
REs(Φf (x)) = REs(t(x)x
−unx
∑n−1
k=0 uksk) · F (x) (6.12)
with the error term F (x)w(x). At this point, the final error bound will partially
depend on the choice of the function f which will vary by operation being performed.
But we can consider a worst case bound on the range of f to be [0, 2k), and since
the three possible domains M = [0, 2k+1), M = (−2k, 2k) and M = [0, 2k) have the
size bounded by 2k+1 we can proceed with a general worst case analysis. The error
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term is
F (x)w(x) =
∑
i∈M
f(i)xiDr
m∑
k=1
wkx
k ≡
∑
i∈M
m∑
k=1
f(i)wkx
k+iDr (mod xm + 1, Q).
Taking a worst case bound and using the bound on w(x) from Lemma 6.5.2, we
have all the coefficients are bounded by
||F (x)w(x)||∞ ≤ (2k · 2k+1)(15 · 2Bτbk
√
2`mn) = 15(22k+2)Bτbk
√
2`mn (6.13)
still with probability less than 1−m2−161. Thus, we get REs(Φf (x)) with this error
bound. There is another way to get F (x) into the product and that is to insert it
in the initialization step of the HomLift algorithm; this has been done with TFHE
also. In Step 1 of Figure 6.4, we can let A := (0, F (x)t(x)x−unDQ) This has the
benefit of F (x) not contributing to the error growth, particularly we could reduce
the bound in 6.13 by 22k+1, but we can no longer apply different functions using a
single HomLift. We will consider these trade-offs more in our parameter selection
section.
In (6.12), we can denote the parts of the REs ciphers as
(a(x)F (x), b(x)F (x)) = (a(x), b(x)) · F (x).
From Lemma 6.5.1, we know that a(x) is uniform random with independent coef-
ficients. If F (x) is invertible in Rm,Q, then a(x)F (x) will also be uniform random
in Rm,Q with independent coefficients. In almost all cases, F (x) will be invertible,
and if ever we needed to use an F (x) that was not invertible, we could encrypt F (x)
as a GSW cipher using a public key from the bootstrapping key and then perform
an external product. Lemma 6.5.1 would then guarantee that the resulting first
component of REs(Φf (x)) would be uniform random with independent coefficients.
Next, we will show how to extract an LWE cipher in ZnQ×ZQ for the constant
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term of Φf (x), which is f(y) by Lemma 6.5.3. We denote
REs(Φf (x)) = (a(x), b(x)) =
(
m−1∑
i=0
aix
i,
m−1∑
i=0
bix
i
)
.
As in Section 6.4.3.2, for a(x) = a0 + a1x+ · · ·+ am−1xm−1 ∈ Rm we define
Extract(a(x), i) = (ai, ai−1, . . . , a0,−am−1,−am−2, . . . ,−am−(n−1−i)) ∈ ZnQ.
This is used to get the coefficients of a(x)s(x) mod (xm + 1). Note that, modulo
xm + 1,
a(x)s(x) =
n−1∑
k=0
m−1∑
j=0
skajx
k+j
≡
m−1∑
i=0
[(s0ai + s1ai−1 + · · ·+ sia0)
−(si+1am−1 + si+2am−2 + · · ·+ sn−1am−(n−1−i))]xi.
Hence, for 0 ≤ i ≤ n, the i-th coefficient of a(x)s(x) mod (xm + 1) is equal to the
inner product of s with Extract(a(x), i).
Let a := Extract(a(x), 0) and c := (a, b0). It follows that
b0 ≡ 〈s,a〉+ f(y)D˜Q + v (mod Q)
where |v| ≤ τ where τ is the bound in equation (6.13). So Es(f(y)) = (a, b0) ∈
ZnQ × ZQ is an LWE cipher with error bounded by τ with probability 1−m2−161.
Now we will use a modulus reduction to take Es(f(y)) ∈ ZnQ×ZQ to an LWE
cipher in Znr × Zr. For the modulus reduction Lemma 6.5.4 we need τ ≤ Q
√
n/r
which if we solve for Q is
15(22k+2)Brτbk
√
2`m ≤ Q. (6.14)
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Taking Q at least this big, we get after the modulus reduction Es(f(y)) ∈ Znr × Zr
has error bounded by 4
√
n. We give the details of the modulus reduction next.
6.5.3 Modulus reduction
We describe how an LWE ciphertext over ZQ can be converted to an LWE
ciphertext over Zr where r is much smaller than Q in our FHE scheme. This
technique of modulus reduction is used in [34, 35, 36].
Lemma 6.5.4. (Modulus reduction: deterministic rounding.) If 2k+2|n, n ≥
210, x ∈ {0, 1, · · · , 2k−1}, Q, r ∈ Z+ s.t. Q is odd, r ≥ 2k+6√n, Q ≥ 2k+2 · r, e ∈ Z
with |e| ≤ τ = Q
√
n
r , Dr = br/2k+2c, DQ = bQ/2k+2c, given a ∈ ZnQ uniformly
random with independent components, s ∈ {0, 1}n with Ham(s) ≤ ρn and
b ≡ 〈s,a〉+ e+ xDQ (mod Q),
let
b′ = brb/Qe, a′ = bra/Qe,
computed component wise, then
b′ ≡ 〈s,a′〉+ e′ + xDr (mod r)
for some e′ ∈ Z s.t. |e′| < 4√n with probability ≥ 1− 2−( 17.7ρ ln 2−1).
Proof. Note that
b′ =
rb
Q
+ 0, a
′
i =
rai
Q
+ i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
for some i ∈ R with |i| < 1/2 for 0 ≤ i ≤ n. The fact that |i| 6= 1/2 comes from
that Q is odd. Let gcd(r,Q) = d, Q = q1d and r = r1d. Then rai/Q = r1ai/q1.
Since all the ai are independently uniform random in ZQ, we know all the r1ai
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are independently uniform in Zq1 , implying that
rai
Q are also independently uniform
random on 1q1Z/(q1Z), (by which we mean the set of fractions consisting of the
standard representatives of Zq1 all divided by q1). By choosing the closest integer
to raiQ , we know that E(i) = 0 and |i| < 1/2 for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, implying that
i ∼ subG(1/4) and are independent. Since b = s at+e+xDQ+Qy for some integer
y, we have
rb
Q
=
n∑
i=1
si
rai
Q
+
re
Q
+ x
rDQ
Q
+ ry,
hence b′ =
∑n
i=1 sia
′
i + xDr + e
′ + ry, where e′ is an integer and
e′ = 0 −
n∑
i=1
sii + x
(
rDQ
Q
−Dr
)
+
re
Q
.
If 2k+2|n and Q ≥ 2k+2 · r, then in fact Dr = r/2k+2. Noticing that
| r
Q
DQ −Dr| = r
Q
|DQ − Q
r
Dr| = r
Q
|bQ/2k+2c −Q/2k+2| ≤ r
Q
≤ 1
2k+2
,
we know that
|x( r
Q
DQ −Dr)| ≤ |x| · 1
2k+2
< 2k · 1
2k+2
= 1/4.
We apply Corollary 1.7 in [112] for
∑n
i=1 sii with bound
2.975√
ρ ‖s‖ ≤ 2.975
√
n to
obtain
P (|
n∑
i=1
sii| > 2.975
√
n) = P (|
n∑
i=1
sii| > 2.975√
ρ
‖s‖) < 2·e− 17.7ρ < 2·2− 17.7ρ ln 2 = 2−( 17.7ρ ln 2−1).
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Generic Bootstrapping Algorithm : BTbk(u)
Input: bk = (C0, . . . , Cn−1) ∈
{
R
(2`)×2
m,Q
}n
: bootstrapping key,
u ∈ Znr × Zr where u = Es(y) .
Output: Es(fj(y)), for 1 ≤ j ≤ α for fj : M → [0, 2k) where
M = [0, 2k+1) or (−2k, 2k) or [0, 2k).
Step 1. HomLift:
A := HomLiftbk(u, bk)
Step 2. Function lookup: For j from 1 to α do
Fj(x) :=
∑
i∈M f(i)x
iDr , 1 ≤ j ≤ α,
Aj := A · Fj(x)
Step 3. Extract: suppose Aj = (aj(x),
∑m−1
i=0 bjix
i) ∈ R1×2m,Q. Set
aj := (Extract(aj(x), 0), bj0) ∈ ZnQ × ZQ,
Step 4. Modulus reduction: For j from 1 to α do
cj := braj/Qe ∈ Znr × Zr.
Step 5. Return cj , 1 ≤ j ≤ α.
Figure 6.5: Bootstrapping algorithm
Thus with probability ≥ 1− 2−( 17.7ρ ln 2−1), since n ≥ 210,
|e′| < 1/2 + 2.975√n+ 1/4 +√n
< 3/4 + 3.975
√
n
< 0.025
√
n+ 3.975
√
n
= 4
√
n
which completes the proof.
Our generic bootstrapping algorithm is described in Figure 6.5, for comput-
ing one HomLift followed by an independent number of function lookups.
Theorem 6.5.5. Suppose a bootstrapping key bk has error size at most τbk, r is
divisible by 2k+2 and
r ≥ 2k+6√n, Q ≥ 15(22k+2)Brτbk
√
2`m
Then, for any LWE cipher Es(y) = u ∈ Znr × Zr with error size < Dr/2 the
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bootstrapping algorithm in Figure 6.5 outputs random LWE ciphers Es(fj(y)), ∈
Znr × Zr, all with error < Dr/4 = 4
√
n for any lookup functions fj : M → [0, 2k).
Proof. Let w = un −
∑n−1
i=0 siui. By Lemma 6.5.2 after Step 1, A = REs(t(x)x
−w)
with error bounded by 15 · 2Bτbk
√
2`mn with probability 1−m2−161.
At Step 2, letting A = (a(x), b(x)) ∈ Rm,Q, we have
bj(x) ≡ aj(x)s(x) + t(x)x−wDQ + v(x) mod (xm + 1, Q), (6.15)
and v(x) ∈ Rm with ||v(x)||∞ ≤ 15 ·2Bτbk
√
2`mn with probability 1−m2−161. Now
letting Aj = (a(x)Fj(x), b(x)Fj(x)), we have
bj(x)Fj(x) ≡ aj(x)Fj(x)s(x) + t(x)x−wFj(x)DQ + v(x)Fj(x) mod (xm + 1, Q),
(6.16)
with by equation (6.13), ||v(x)F (x)||∞ ≤ 15(22k+2)Bτbk
√
2`mn with probability
1−m2−161. In Step 3 let
uj := Extract(aj(x), 0).
We have
bj0 ≡ 〈s,uj〉+ cjDQ + vj0 (mod Q),
where cj is the constant term of t(x)x
−wFj(x), which by Lemma 6.5.3 is fj(y) and
|vj0| ≤ 15(22k+2)Bτbk
√
2`mn with probability 1−m2−161.
At Step 5, for ρ = 1/8, we apply the modulus reduction in Lemma 6.5.4 to
aj to get LWE ciphers in Znr × Zr with error size < 4
√
n = Dr/4 for probability
greater than 1−2−143. To apply this modulus reduction, we need aj to have uniform
random independent entries, and this follows from Lemma 6.5.1.
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6.5.4 Select k-bit Arithmetic Operations
Using the HomLift procedure and a variety of novel functions and relations,
we are able to perform many useful arithmetic operations homomorphically.
Addition (mod p ≤ 2k). To homomorphically add x1, x2 ∈ [0, 2k) modulo
p ≤ 2k, we take y = x1 + x2 in Equation (6.4) and use the function
f : [0, 2k+1)→ [0, p) ⊂ Z,
y 7→ y (mod p).
Then for two ciphertext of x1 and x2 we can perform the addition using one HomLift
and f :
Addmodp(Es(x1), Es(x2)) = Es(f(x1 + x2)) = Es(x1 + x2 (mod p)).
The algorithm is show in Figure 6.6.
Addition (mod p ≤ 2k) : Addmodp(Es(x1),Es(x2), p)
Input: bk = (C0, . . . , Cn−1) ∈
{
R
(2`)×2
m,Q
}n
: bootstrapping key,
v1,v2 ∈ Znr × Zr where vi = Es(xi) for x1, x2 ∈ [0, 2k).
Output: Es(x1 + x2 (mod p))
Step 1. Compute u := v1 + v2 = (u0, . . . , un−1, un) ∈ Znr × Zr.
Step 2. HomLift:
A := HomLift(u, bk)
Step 3. Function lookup:
F (x) :=
∑
i∈M f(i)x
iDr , with M = [0, 2k+1)
and f(y) = y (mod p).
A := A · F (x)
Step 4. Extract: suppose A = (a(x),
∑m−1
i=0 bix
i) ∈ R1×2m,Q. Set
a := (Extract(a(x), 0), b0) ∈ ZnQ × ZQ,
Step 5. Modulus reduction:
c := bra/Qe ∈ Znr × Zr.
Step 6. Return c.
Figure 6.6: Addition (mod p ≤ 2k)
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Subtraction (mod p ≤ 2k) To homomorphically subtract two k bit inte-
gers x1, x2 ∈ [0, 2k) modulo p ≤ 2k, we take y = x1 − x2 and use the function
f : (−2k, 2k)→ [0, p) ⊂ Z
y 7→ y (mod p).
Then for two ciphertext of x1 and x2 we can perform the following using one HomLift
and f
Submodp(Es(x1), Es(x2)) = Es(f(x1 − x2)) = Es(x1 − x2 (mod p)).
Addition in Z For x1, x2 ∈ [0, 2k), x1 +x2 = y0 + y12k ∈ Z where y0 has k
bits and y1 has one bit. Since the sum of x1 and x2 in Z will be a k+ 1 bit message,
we will need to store it across two ciphertext since each ciphertext is the encryption
of only k message bits. We will need two functions to do this, f0 will extract the
lower k bits,
f0 : [0, 2
k+1)→ Z,
y 7→ y (mod 2k) = y0.
Another function f1 will extract the 1 highest bit, f1 : [0, 2
k+1)→ Z, y 7→ by/2kc =
y1.
Then for ciphertexts of x1 and x2 we can get an encryption of x1 + x2 in Z
spread across two ciphertexts using one bootstrapping and two function lookups,
AddinZ(Es(x1), Es(x2)) = (Es(f0(x1 + x2)), Es(f1(x1 + x2)))
= (Es(y0), Es(y1)) .
Multiplication (mod p < 2k odd). To multiply x1, x2 ∈ [0, 2k) modulo
p < 2k, p odd, and get one cipher for x1 · x2 (mod p) ∈ [0, 2k), the key will be to
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use the following identity which holds in Z
x1 · x2 =
(
x1 + x2
2
)2
−
(
x1 − x2
2
)2
. (6.17)
If we consider this equation modulo p for p odd, 2 will have an inverse and (6.17)
becomes
x1 · x2 ≡ ((x1 + x2)2−1)2 − (x1 − x2)2−1)2 (mod p).
Note that if p were even, 2 would not have an inverse modulo p and this equation
would not be well defined. We will find intermediate ciphertexts for z1 :=
(
x1+x2
2
)2
(mod p) and z2 :=
(
x1−x2
2
)2
(mod p) using two HomLifts. First for z1 :=
(
x1+x2
2
)2
(mod p) we have x = x1 + x2 ∈ [0, 2k+1). We will use the function
f1 : [0, 2
k+1)→ [0, p) ⊂ Z,
f1(x) =
(
x · 2−1)2 (mod p).
Then one HomLift and one function lookup gives a ciphertext Es (z1) .
Now to get the intermediate ciphertext for z2, we will perform another Hom-
Lift of u := Es(x1)−Es(x2) and use the function
f2 : (−2k, 2k)→ [0, p) ⊂ Z,
f2(x) =
(
x(2−1)
)2
(mod p).
Thus, one HomLift and one function lookup gives a ciphertext Es (z2) .
Finally, we will need to combine these two ciphertexts Es (z1) and Es (z2) to
get one for x1 · x2 ≡ z1 − z2 (mod p). We have z1 − z2 ∈ (−2k, 2k), and we will use
the function
f3 : (−2k, 2k)→ [0, p) ⊂ Z,
111
f3(x) = x (mod p).
Now the one final HomLift and function lookup gives us a ciphertext for
x1·x2 ≡ z1−z2 (mod p). In total, we needed three HomLifts to do this multiplication
modulo p < 2k odd. The procedure is shown in Figure 6.7.
Mult (mod p < 2k odd) :
Multmodpodd(Es(x1),Es(x2), p)
Input: bk = (C0, . . . , Cn−1) ∈
{
R
(2`)×2
m,Q
}n
: bootstrapping key,
v1,v2 ∈ Znr × Zr where vi = Es(xi) for x1, x2 ∈ [0, 2k).
p < 2k odd.
Output: Es(x1 · x2 (mod p))
Step 1. Compute u := v1 + v2, u˜ := v1 − v2 ∈ Znr × Zr.
Step 2. HomLift:
A1 := HomLift(u, bk), A2 := HomLift(u˜, bk)
Step 3. Function lookup:
A1 := A1 · F1(x), A2 := A2 · F2(x)
Step 4. Extract: For j = 1, 2 suppose Aj = (aj(x),
∑m−1
i=0 bjix
i) ∈
R2m,Q. Set
aj := (Extract(aj(x), 0), bj0) ∈ ZnQ × ZQ,
Step 5. Modulus reduction: For j = 1, 2 do
cj := braj/Qe ∈ Znr × Zr.
Step 6. Compute u := c1 − c2
Step 7. HomLift:
A := HomLift(u, bk),
Step 8. Function lookup:
A := A · F3(x),
Step 9. Extract: suppose A = (a(x),
∑m−1
i=0 bix
i) ∈ R1×2m,Q. Set
a := (Extract(a(x), 0), b0) ∈ ZnQ × ZQ,
Step 10. Modulus reduction:
c := bra/Qe ∈ Znr × Zr.
Step 11. Return c.
Figure 6.7: Multiplication (mod p < 2k odd
Multiplication (mod 2k). To take two cipher for x1, x2 ∈ [0, 2k) and get
one ciphers for x1 ·x2 (mod 2k) ∈ [0, 2k), we cannot use the identity in (6.17) modulo
2k because 2 would not have an inverse, but we can use the following modified
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identity that holds modulo 2k:
x1 · x2 ≡
⌊
(x1 + x2)
2 (mod 2k+2)
4
⌋
−
⌊
(x1 − x2)2 (mod 2k+2)
4
⌋
(mod 2k).
(6.18)
Using this we can compute a cipher of k bits for z1 :=
⌊
(x1+x2)2 (mod 2k+2)
4
⌋
using a
HomLift of y = x1 + x2 and the function
f1 : [0, 2
k+1)→ [0, 2k),
f1(x) =
⌊
x2 (mod 2k+2)
4
⌋
.
We also compute a cipher of k bits for z2 :=
⌊
(x1−x2)2 (mod 2k+2)
4
⌋
by a
HomLift of y = x1 − x2 ∈ (−2k, 2k), and the function
f2 : (−2k, 2k)→ [0, 2k),
f2(x) =
⌊
x2 (mod 2k+2)
4
⌋
.
Finally, we do another HomLift of z1 − z2 and use the function
f3 : (−2k, 2k)→ [0, 2k),
f3(x) = x (mod 2
k),
to get a cipher Es(x1 · x2 (mod 2k)). In total, we needed three HomLifts to do this
multiplication modulo 2k.
Multiplication in Z Given ciphers Es(x1) and Es(x2) for x1, x2 ∈ [0, 2k),
we want to compute their product in Z, which can be expressed as
x1 · x2 = y0 + y12k
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where y0 ∈ [0, 2k) and y1 ∈ [0, 2k − 1). We will need to store the result y0 and
y1 encrypted in two separate ciphertexts. Using our multiplication mod 2
k, we
can get a ciphertext for y0 as y0 ≡ x1 · x2 (mod 2k); and using two of the same
HomLifts but different lookup functions for our multiplication mod p = 2k − 1, we
get an intermediate ciphertext y˜1 := x1 · x2 (mod 2k − 1). This is equivalent to the
following:
y˜1 = x1 · x2 (mod 2k − 1)
= y0 + y12
k (mod 2k − 1)
≡ y0 + y1 (mod 2k − 1),
since 2k ≡ 1 (mod 2k − 1). Computing y0 and y˜1 takes 4 HomLifts. Finally, we get
a ciphertext for y1 by y1 = y˜1− y0 (mod 2k − 1). This brings the total HomLifts to
5. Two pairs of HomLifts can be done in parallel, leaving the number of sequential
HomLifts at 3. The procedure is show in Figure 6.11 where the lookup functions
are defined as follows.
1. f1 : [0, 2
k+1)→ [0, 2k), f1(x) =
⌊
x2 (mod 2k+2)
4
⌋
.
2. f2 : (−2k, 2k)→ [0, 2k), f2(x) =
⌊
x2 (mod 2k+2)
4
⌋
.
3. f3 : [0, 2
k+1)→ [0, 2k − 1), f3(x) =
(
x(2−1)
)2
(mod 2k − 1).
4. f4 : (−2k, 2k)→ [0, 2k − 1), f4(x) =
(
x(2−1)
)2
(mod 2k − 1).
5. f5 : (−2k, 2k)→ [0, 2k), f5(x) = x (mod 2k).
6. f6 : (−2k, 2k)→ [0, 2k), f6(x) = x (mod 2k − 1).
7. f7 = f6.
Recall that specifying the lookup function along with its domain is sufficient to
define the corresponding function encoding polynomial.
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Field inverse in Fp for p < 2k. The preceding operations have all been
binary, combining two ciphertext in some way. These remaining operations are
unitary operations performed on a single ciphertext. For p < 2k prime, Zp is a
field and as such every element except for 0 has a multiplicative inverse. We can
homomorphically compute the inverse x ∈ [0, p) as follows. We let u = Es(x) and
perform a HomLift following by a function lookup using
f : (0, p)→ (0, p)
f(i) = i−1 (mod p).
Computing i−1 (mod p) is in general best done using the extended Euclidean algo-
rithm, but for our use here since k is not large f could be computed using a simple
table lookup. At this level, we must leave it to the designer of homomorphic circuit
to avoid calling this function for 0 which has no inverse. Having this operation
completes all the basic field operations in Fp. The procedure is given in Figure 6.8
and takes one HomLift. This same operation works if p is not prime, but in that
case there will be more elements that do not have inverses, since Zp would not be a
field. In particular, x ∈ Zp is invertible if gcd(x, p) = 1.
Power operation (mod p ≤ 2k). For the ciphertext of x ∈ [0, 2k), we show
how to compute xα for any power α ∈ Z+ using only one HomLift. We perform a
HomLift of u := Es(x) and then use the function lookup,
f : [0, 2k)→ [0, 2k)
f(i) = iα (mod p).
The procedure is given in Figure 6.9 and takes one HomLift.
RELU. The RELU function (Rectified Linear Units) is one of the most
common machine learning activation functions. For creating neural nets that can
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Inverse : Inversemodp(Es(x), p) where p ≤ 2k is prime.
Input: bk = (C0, . . . , Cn−1) ∈
{
R
(2`)×2
m,Q
}n
: bootstrapping key,
u ∈ Znr × Zr where u = Es(x) for x ∈ (0, 2k).
Output: Es(x
−1 (mod p))
Step 1. HomLift:
A := HomLift(u, bk)
Step 3. Function lookup:
F (x) :=
∑
i∈M f(i)x
iDr , with M = (0, 2k)
and f(i) = i−1 (mod p).
A := A · F (x)
Step 4. Extract: suppose A = (a(x),
∑m−1
i=0 bix
i) ∈ R2m,Q. Set
a := (Extract(a(x), 0), b0) ∈ ZnQ × ZQ,
Step 5. Modulus reduction:
c := bra/Qe ∈ Znr × Zr.
Step 6. Return c.
Figure 6.8: Inverse in Fp
operate on encrypted data homomorphically this is a very desirable function. The
RELU problem is to compute the following max function
x+ := max{0, x}.
There are potentially several domains that x may be chosen from. If we specify to
x ∈ (−2k, 2k) ⊂ Z we can solve this. In particular, consider x ∈ (−2k, 2k), then
x+ :=
 0 if x ∈ (−2
k, 0)
x if x ∈ [0, 2k).
If we are given Es(x) for x ∈ (−2k, 2k), we can perform a HomLift of u := Es(x)
and use the lookup function f(x) = x+, and the function encoding polynomial
F (x) =
∑
i∈(−2k,2k)
f(i)xiDr
to get Es(x
+). The procedure is giving in Figure 6.10 and takes one HomLift.
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Power (mod p ≤ 2k): Powermodp(Es(x), α, p)
Input: bk = (C0, . . . , Cn−1) ∈
{
R
(2`)×2
m,Q
}n
: bootstrapping key,
u ∈ Znr × Zr where u = Es(x) for x ∈ [0, 2k). p ≤ 2k,
α ∈ Z+
Output: Es(x
α (mod p)).
Step 1. HomLift:
A := HomLift(u, bk)
Step 3. Function lookup:
F (x) :=
∑
i∈M f(i)x
iDr , with M = [0, 2k)
and f(i) = iα (mod p).
A := A · F (x)
Step 4. Extract: suppose A = (a(x),
∑m−1
i=0 bix
i) ∈ R1×2m,Q. Set
a := (Extract(a(x), 0), b0) ∈ ZnQ × ZQ,
Step 5. Modulus reduction:
c := bra/Qe ∈ Znr × Zr.
Step 6. Return c.
Figure 6.9: Power (mod p ≤ 2k)
6.5.5 Combining operations
In this paper, we do not get into the details of how to combine these opera-
tions when creating a circuit. We do point out that care will need to be taken when
managing ciphertexts that store the higher and lower bits of an integer resulting
from the operations of addition/multiplication in Z.
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RELU : RELU(Es(x))
Input: bk = (C0, . . . , Cn−1) ∈
{
R
(2`)×2
m,Q
}n
: bootstrapping key,
u ∈ Znr × Zr where u = Es(x) for x ∈ (−2k, 2k).
Output: Es(x
+).
Step 1. HomLift:
A := HomLift(u, bk)
Step 3. Function lookup:
F (x) :=
∑
i∈M f(i)x
iDr , with M = (−2k, 2k)
and f(i) = i+.
A := A · F (x)
Step 4. Extract: suppose A = (a(x),
∑m−1
i=0 bix
i) ∈ R1×2m,Q. Set
a := (Extract(a(x), 0), b0) ∈ ZnQ × ZQ,
Step 5. Modulus reduction:
c := bra/Qe ∈ Znr × Zr.
Step 6. Return c.
Figure 6.10: RELU
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Mult in Z : MultinZ(Es(x1),Es(x2))
Input: bk = (C0, . . . , Cn−1) ∈
{
R
(2`)×2
m,Q
}n
: bootstrapping key,
v1,v2 ∈ Znr × Zr where vi = Es(xi) for x1, x2 ∈ [0, 2k).
Output: Es(y0), Es(y1) st x1 · x2 = y0 + y12k
Step 1. Compute u := v1 + v2, u˜ := v1 − v2 ∈ Znr × Zr.
Step 2. HomLift:
A := HomLift(u, bk), A˜ := HomLift(u˜, bk)
Step 3. Function lookup:
A1 := A · F1(x), A2 := A˜ · F2(x)
A3 := A · F3(x), A4 := A˜ · F4(x)
Step 4. Extract: For j = 1 to 4, suppose Aj =
(aj(x),
∑m−1
i=0 bjix
i). Set
aj := (Extract(aj(x), 0), bj0) ∈ ZnQ × ZQ,
Step 5. Modulus reduction: For j from 1 to 4 do
cj := braj/Qe ∈ Znr × Zr.
Step 6. Compute u¯ := c1 − c2, u¨ := c3 − c4
Step 7. HomLift:
A¯ := HomLift(u¯, bk), A¨ := HomLift(u¨, bk)
Step 8. Function lookup:
A5 := A¯ · F5(x), A6 := A¨ · F6(x)
Step 9. Extract: For j = 5, 6 suppose Aj = (aj(x),
∑m−1
i=0 bjix
i).
Set
aj := (Extract(aj(x), 0), bj0) ∈ ZnQ × ZQ,
Step 10. Modulus reduction: For j = 5, 6
cj := braj/Qe ∈ Znr × Zr.
Step 11. Compute uˆ := c6 − c5,
Step 12. HomLift:
Aˆ := HomLift(uˆ, bk),
Step 13. Function lookup:
A7 := Aˆ · F7(x),
Step 14. Extract: For j = 7, suppose Aj = (aj(x),
∑m−1
i=0 bjix
i).
Set
aj := (Extract(aj(x), 0), bj0) ∈ ZnQ × ZQ,
Step 15. Modulus reduction: For j = 7 do
cj := braj/Qe ∈ Znr × Zr.
Step 16. Return: c5 = Es(y0) and c7 = Es(y1).
Lookup functions:
f1 : [0, 2
k+1)→ [0, 2k), f1(x) =
⌊
x2 (mod 2k+2)
4
⌋
.
f2 : (−2k, 2k)→ [0, 2k), f2(x) =
⌊
x2 (mod 2k+2)
4
⌋
.
f3 : [0, 2
k+1)→ [0, p), f3(x) =
(
x(2−1)
)2
(mod p).
f4 : (−2k, 2k)→ [0, p), f4(x) =
(
x(2−1)
)2
(mod p).
f5 : (−2k, 2k)→ [0, 2k), f5(x) = x (mod 2k).
f6 : (−2k, 2k)→ [0, 2k), f6(x) = x (mod 2k − 1).
f7 = f6
Figure 6.11: Homomorphic integer multiplication of x1, x2 ∈ [0, 2k) with output
stored in two ciphertexts: x1 · x2 = y0 + y12k ∈ Z where both y0 and y1 have k bits,
MultinZ(Es(x1), Es(x2)) = (Es(y0), Es(y1)) .
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6.6 Fully Homomorphic Encryption Scheme
6.6.1 Parameter Conditions
We shall assume that k ∈ Z+, n ≥ 1024 is a power of 2, r is a power of 2,
m = r/2, and
` = 2, r ≥ 2k+6√n, q ≥ 27rn.
For B and Q we need them to satisfy the assumptions of Theorem 6.5.5,
15(22k+2)Brτbk
√
2`m ≤ Q < B2.
This implies 15(22k+2)rτbk
√
2`m ≤ B′ < B. In the variant where we apply F (x)
during the initialization of HomLift, the bound becomes 15(2)rτbk
√
2`m ≤ B′ < B.
We will also take Q = B · B′ with both B, B′ prime for Lemma 6.3.3. In
practice to make the implementation more efficient, we will choose B,B′ such that
r|(B − 1) and r|(B′ − 1). This will allow more efficient FFTs when parallelizing
using the CRT. Let
Rn,r = Z[x]/(xn + 1, r), Rn,q = Z[x]/(xn + 1, q), Rm,Q = Z[x]/(xm + 1, Q),
Dr = br/2k+2c, Dq = bq/2k+2c, DQ = bQ/2k+2c.
Each user generates a secret key s ∈ {0, 1}n and a public key as described in Section
6.4.
Bootstrapping key (standard).
A corresponding bootstrapping key bk = (C0, C1, . . . , Cn−1) is generated as
follows. For each 0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1 do the following:
 pick aji(x) ∈ Rm,Q uniform random and independent, for 1 ≤ j ≤ 4,
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 pick eji(x) ∈ Rm bounded uniform random and independent with
τbk = ||eji(x)||∞ ≤ 2
√
n, 1 ≤ j ≤ 4,
 Compute bji(x) := aji(x)s(x) + eji(x) mod (x
m + 1, Q), for 1 ≤ j ≤ 4,
 Set
Ci :=

a1i(x) b1i(x)
a2i(x) b2i(x)
a3i(x) b3i(x)
a4i(x) b4i(x)

+ siG mod Q.
Bootstrapping key (smaller). Now we introduce some size optimizations for
storing the bootstrapping key. We do so by storing each of the four RLWE ci-
phertexts that correspond to si for each 0 ≤ i ≤ n − 1 in a more compact form.
Let t := dlog2(Q)e − 1, hence 2t < Q ≤ 2t+1, and assume we have a PRG
P : {0, 1}m → {0, 1}4tm−2t. Sample ui ∈ {0, 1}m uniform random and then use
the PRG to expand it to represent the polynomials a3i(x), a4i(x) and all the terms
of a1i(x), a2i(x) except their constant terms, call these a˜1i(x), a˜2i(x). Randomly
sample the constant terms a˜1i0, a˜2i0 separately from ZQ. Then let
a1i(x) := a˜1i(x) + a˜1i0 + si
and
a2i(x) := a˜2i(x) + a˜2i0 + siB
with constant terms denoted as
a1i0 := a˜1i0 + si
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and
a2i0 := a˜2i0 + siB.
Now using the bootstrapping key encryption subroutine in Figure 6.12 (proof sim-
ilar to private key encryption) to round the RLWE ciphertexts, we get that the
bootstrapping key can be defined as
Ci :=

a1i(x) BTs(a1i(x), 0)
a2i(x) BTs(a2i(x), 0)
a3i(x) BTs(a3i(x), si)
a4i(x) BTs(a4i(x), siB)

mod Q.
But we only need to store the seed u and the constant terms a1i0 and a2i0. Thus,
we can recreate Ci from the following
{u, a1i0, a2i0,BTs(a1i(x), 0),BTs(a2i(x), 0),BTs(a3i(x), si),BTs(a4i(x), siB)}
which is m+2t+4(t−5)m bits. Thus, the entire bootstrapping key Ci, 0 ≤ i ≤ n−1,
can be recreated from n(m+ 2t+ 4(t− 5)m) bits.
Bootstrapping Key Subroutine : BTs(a(x),m(x))
Input: s(x) =
∑n−1
i=0 six
i where si ∈ {0, 1}, an n-bit secret key,
m(x) message to encrypt, a(x) uniform random
t := dlog2(Q)e − 1, hence 2t < Q ≤ 2t+1,
Output: v ∈ {0, 1}(t−5)m
Step 1. Pick w(x) ∈ Rm uniform randomly with ‖w(x)‖∞ ≤√
n = 26, and
b1(x) := a(x)s(x) + w(x) +m(x) mod (x
m + 1, Q)
(so that each coefficient of b1(x) is between 0 and Q− 1).
Step 2. Taking the highest t− 5 bits for each coefficient of b1(x):
b(x) := bb1(x)/25c.
Let v ∈ ({0, 1}t−5)m denote the bit representation of b(x).
Step 2. Return v.
Figure 6.12: Bootstrapping key subroutine
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Lemma 6.6.1. Let (a(x), b(x)) ∈ Rm,Q×Rm,Q be as computed in Figure 6.12, then
there exists w3(x) ∈ Rm with ||w3(x)||∞ < 2
√
n = 27 so that
25b(x)− s(x)a(x) ≡ w3(x) +m(x)B mod (xm + 1, Q).
Proof. By Step 1, since the coefficients of b1(x) are between 0 and Q − 1,
we have
b1(x) = 2
5b(x) + b0(x)
for some b0 ∈ Rm with ||b0(x)||∞ < 26. By Step 2, we have
25b(x)− s(x)a(x) ≡ −b0(x) + w(x) +m(x)B mod (xm + 1, Q).
Thus,
|| − b0(x) + w(x)||∞ ≤ ||b0(x)||∞ + ||w(x)||∞ <
√
n+
√
n = 2
√
n.
Therefore, the lemma holds with w3(x) = w(x)− b0(x).
6.6.2 Suggested Parameters Sizes
The main parameters affecting performance and security that need to be
fixed in choosing concrete parameters are n and k. To meet the necessary security
constraints analyzed more fully in the next section, we will need n ≥ 212 for the
variant where the lookup function F (x) is added after the HomLift algorithm. In
Figure 6.1, we list some parameters that satisfy the conditions above for this variant.
In Figure 6.2, we list parameters that correspond to the variant where we apply
the lookup function F (x) at the beginning of HomLift. The row for cs gives the
ciphertext expansion ratio under private-key encryption, that is, the bit size of a
ciphertext of an n-bit message divided by n; the row for cpk gives the ciphertext
expansion ratio under public-key encryption. The row for bk indicates the bit size of
bootstrapping keys. Note that the size of the bootstrapping key grows exponentially
as k increases, and this is a reason in practice to choose a small k.
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Table 6.1: Suggested parameters: The row of cs gives the cipher expansion under
private-key encryption, the row of cpk is for cipher expansion for public-key encryp-
tion, and the row bk is for the size of bootstrapping keys. The row λi is the security
estimate for ciphertexts of Type i in Section 6.7
n 212 212 212 212 212
k 1 2 3 4 5
r =
2k+6
√
n
213 214 215 216 217
m = r/2 212 213 214 215 216
q ≥ 27rn 32 bits 33 bits 34 bits 35 bits 36 bits
Q 71 bits 78 bits 85 bits 92 bits 99 bits
cs 7 4 3 2.5 2.2
cpk 20 11 8 6.5 5.6
bk transmit 556 MB 1,229 MB 2,693 MB 5,855 MB 12,650
MB
λ1 BKZ 1000+ 1000+ 1000+ 1000+ 1000+
λ2 BKZ 838 798 762 728 696
λ3 BKZ 249 219 196 177 162
Failure probability The probability of failure has been bounded at each step, the
largest the probability of failure has grown to is less than 2−140.
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Table 6.2: Suggested parameters for early F (x) variant: The row of cs gives the
cipher expansion under private-key encryption, the row of cpk is for cipher expansion
for public-key encryption, and the row bk is for the size of bootstrapping keys. The
row λi is the security estimate for ciphertexts of Type i in Section 6.7
n 211 211 211 211 211
k 1 2 3 4 5
r ≥
2k+6
√
n
213 214 215 216 217
m = r/2 212 213 214 215 216
q ≥ 27rn 31 bits 32 bits 33 bits 34 bits 35 bits
Q 64 bits 67 bits 70 bits 73 bits 76 bits
cs 7 4 3 2.5 2.2
cpk 19.5 10.8 7.8 6.4 5.5
bk transmit 249 MB 522 MB 1095 MB 2290 MB 4782 MB
λ3 BKZ 128 121 114 108 103
125
6.7 Security Analysis
In this section, we give a brief analysis of the security of our homomorphic
encryption scheme. Although the LWE and RLWE problems have hardness tied to
worst case lattice problems, we still need to estimate the concrete complexity of all
current attacks for our proposed parameters. This is an active and ongoing impor-
tant area of research, particularly in light of the NIST post-quantum cryptography
process.
In our scheme, according to Figure 6.1, n is a power of 2, and we have RLWE
ciphertexts over Zq for three choices of q:
Type 1. q = r = 2k+6
√
n and the error size is bounded by 4
√
n: corresponding to
ciphertexts in Rn,q ×Rn,q from private-key and public-key encryptions of the
original data (see Lemmas 6.4.1 and 6.4.2);
Type 2. q ≈ 27rn and the error size is bounded by Dq/(512n) ≥ 4
√
n: corresponding
to the public key pk = (k0(x), k1(x)) ∈ Rn,q ×Rn,q;
Type 3. q = Q ≈ 27k+32n1.5τ2bk and the error size is bounded by τbk = 2
√
n: cor-
responding to a bootstrapping key Ci ∈ Rm,Q × Rm,Q, 1 ≤ i ≤ n and the
extractions into ZnQ × ZQ.
Number theoretic attacks.
The RLWE problem over the above two rings and more general rings of
the form Z[x]/(f(x), q) have been studied in [60, 61, 40, 44, 45, 46] using algebraic
number theory. They present several attacks that show many weak instances of the
general rings. However, their attacks do not apply to the two rings used by our
scheme. In fact, one of the main ideas of the attacks is to test if f(x) modulo q
has a factor of small degree and the roots of the factor have a small multiplicative
order. For our two rings, when n is a power of 2, xn + 1 has all roots of order 2n
modulo any q > 2. Similarly for xm + 1. Hence, the number theoretic attacks can
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not be applied effectively to our rings.
Lattice basis reduction attacks. The most powerful attacks on RLWE/LWE
is to use the lattice basis reduction algorithm (LLL) due to Lenstra, Lenstra and
Lovasz (1982, [86]); see [100] for its practical performance and [97, 99] for its recent
improvements. There is also a BKZ variation [115, 47] which uses SVP oracles
[96, 77, 123, 124, 84, 85, 25]. There are several approaches that can reduce LWE
problems over Zq to lattice problems over Z, including the SIS method [6, 94, 88],
the BKW method [31, 9, 11, 12, 56, 72, 82], and the bounded distance decoding
(BBD) method [80, 88, 89, 21].
The paper by Albrecht, Player, and Scott [15] gives a nice survey on these
methods and give concrete complexity analysis; they also have an LWE estima-
tor (bitbucket.org/malb/lwe-estimator) that is also used to give the security
estimates for the HE Standards document [7]. These LWE estimates are based
on discrete Gaussian error and so do not apply directly to our bounded uniform
distribution. However, the known lattice reduction attacks do not make use of the
particular error distribution; but rather, their performance depends on the standard
deviation of the error distribution. Thus, it has become common to use the LWE
estimator even when the error distribution is not Gaussian; e.g. in the NewHope
Round 2 NIST submission, the error is binomial.
We use a bounded uniform distribution with error bound τbk = 2
√
n for the
bootstrapping key and τ = 4
√
n for all other ciphertexts. The variance of a discrete
bounded uniform distribution on [a, b] is
(b− a+ 1)2 − 1
12
.
Thus, the variance our our τ bounded error distribution is (2τ+1)
2−1
12 . Our code for
using the estimator for our parameters follows.
load("https://bitbucket.org/malb/lwe-estimator/raw/HEAD/estimator.py")
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#For estimating the security of Type 1 ciphers
n = 2^12; q = 2^13; #q=2^{13,14,15,16,17}
tau = 4 * sqrt(n); var = ((2*tau +1)^2 - 1 )/12; stddev = sqrt(var); alpha
= alphaf(sigmaf(stddev), q)
_ = estimate_lwe(n, alpha, q, reduction_cost_model=BKZ.sieve)
#For estimating the security of Type 2 ciphers
n = 2^12; q = 2^32; # q = 2^{32,33,34,35,36}
tau = 4 * sqrt(n); var = ((2*tau +1)^2 - 1 )/12; stddev = sqrt(var); alpha
= alphaf(sigmaf(stddev), q)
_ = estimate_lwe(n, alpha, q, reduction_cost_model=BKZ.sieve)
#For estimating the security of Type 3 ciphers
n = 2^12; q = 2^100; # q = 2^{71,78,85,92,99}
tau = 2 * sqrt(n); var = ((2*tau +1)^2 - 1 )/12; stddev = sqrt(var); alpha
= alphaf(sigmaf(stddev), q)
_ = estimate_lwe(n, alpha, q, reduction_cost_model=BKZ.sieve)
6.8 Leveled Version
The use of leveled homomorphic encryption schemes has seen great improve-
ment in the BFV/BGV lines of work. In the case of our scheme, it is possible to
incorporate this idea of a leveled scheme in two ways. First, after extracting the
result of the computation as an LWE cipher, computations could be done coming
down level-by-level instead of just using one modulus reduction to return to the
original r. The drawback here is that these computations could only be additions or
multiplications of the k-bit integers rather than the more arbitrary operations sup-
ported through the HomLift operation; but for some computations, the possibility
of performing additions and multiplications with the periodic arbitrary nonlinear
operations could be useful.
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Another way to incorporate a leveled version would be to try and bridge the
gap between the bootstrapping techniques used in BFV/BGV and the FHEW/TFHE.
One could use this k-bit scheme to perform the bootstrapping for a leveled BFV
scheme by first extracting the coefficients of the RLWE cipher as LWE ciphers and
then performing the HomLift operation on each LWE cipher. Once in a larger mod-
ulus, one could pack the LWE ciphers into an RLWE cipher and modulus switch
down to the highest level modulus of the leveled scheme. The drawback to this idea
is that the k-bit scheme can only support small plaintext spaces, while leveled BFV
schemes are most efficient with large plaintext spaces. Some rough estimates indicate
that this idea for combining bootstrapping techniques in this way would not match
the amortized performance of existing bootstrapping techniques for BFV/BGV that
support large plaintext spaces.
It is not clear how to take an LWE/RLWE ciphertext with large plaintext
space and while under encryption translate it into the many ciphertexts with smaller
plaintext spaces, where those smaller plaintext spaces together represent the larger
plaintext in some way. If such a technique existed, it could be a useful way to perform
certain nonlinear operations within an existing leveled BFV/BGV framework. We
leave this as a possible future direction for work.
6.9 Conclusions
We presented a fully homomorphic encryption scheme with a small cipher
expansion and k-bit arithmetic operations. The scheme is suitable for practical
applications in distributed networks of computers (including IoTs, blockchains and
cloud servers), and can be used in many applications including outsourced comput-
ing. On the theoretical side, this is the first FHE scheme to achieve asymptotically
a ciphertext expansion factor of 1, and to our knowledge demonstrate k-bit multi-
plication done in the integers as in Figure 6.11. Moreover, through more study of
sub-Gaussian properties, we have been able to avoid using an Independence Heuris-
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tic as in the Chillotti et al. [51] TFHE schemes.
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Chapter 7
Cryptanalysis of RLWE using
Homomorphism Attacks
In Chapter 3, we surveyed lattice reduction attacks against LWE. These
attacks can also be applied to RLWE, but in a way that simply discards the added
algebraic structure. In this chapter, we will look at a class of attacks that can only
be applied to RLWE.
The error distribution plays a central role in the security of encryption based
on LWE and RLWE. In this chapter, we1 investigate the error distribution of weak
RLWE instances. For this purpose, we derive a closed-form formula to compute the
mapped error distribution. With this algebraic approach to evaluate the error, we
examine the recently proposed attacks on RLWE and reassess their parameters in
order to include more instances. Notably, our method can also be applied when the
mapped error distribution is non-Gaussian. We conduct experiments to investigate
the shape of the mapped error distribution and confirm that in many cases it is
no longer Gaussian nor uniform; our experimental results from distinguishers also
validate our theoretical analysis.
1This chapter based the paper [46] with Yao Chen, Shuhong Gao, and Guang Gong.
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7.0.1 Our Contribution
In this chapter, we first review the conditions for the attack in [61] to be
launched. We show that the mapped error distribution can be precisely computed;
therefore, the restriction in their work can be relaxed to allow a broader range of
instances to be attacked the same way. Then we show the mapped discrete Gaussian
distribution, with different widths, according to calculation based on our method.
We believe this work is the first to reveal the shape of exact mapped distributions,
although estimations have been made repeatedly.
Having established the mapped distribution, we demonstrate how effective
distinguishers can be built for weak instances recognized by our method, with or
without information of the mapped distribution.
Also, we point out two places where the mapped error distribution has been
mis-characterized for certain cases in the literature [61, 62].
7.0.2 Related Work
Since RLWE can be reduced to lattice and LWE problems, all lattice re-
duction attacks such as LLL and general decoding attacks such as BKW apply to
RLWE. However, people generally believe and the weak-instance attacks described
below show that the RLWE problem is potentially easier to tackle than the LWE
problem because of the additional algebraic structure.
Weak instances of RLWE are analogous to weak primes in factorization; their
special properties significantly reduce the difficulty of the problem so that specialized
algorithms can be designed to launch an attack. Weak RLWE instances usually
involve some ring homomorphism, under which the image of the error distribution
can be distinguished from a uniform distribution.
Generally, weak instance attacks involve three steps:
1. Exploiting the algebraic property to reduce the search space for Step (2);
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2. Exhausting the secret s;
3. Testing if the samples agree with a certain distribution generated with the
guessed secret.
Considering different rings with special properties leads to various weak instance
attacks.
7.0.2.1 Algebraic Structures
The first such attack was developed by Eisentra¨ger et al. [60] on Polynomial-
LWE (Poly-LWE). For our purposes, we have defined RLWE to be the same as
Polynomial-LWE, though we note that in much of the literature RLWE is defined in
the more general setting of rings of integers of number fields. They consider polyno-
mial rings of the form Zp[x]/〈f(x)〉, where p is prime and f(x) is irreducible over Q
but has a low-order root α modulo p. Their attack exploits a ring homomorphism
induced by α into the finite field Fp. When p is small enough, it becomes feasible
to search for the image of secret s in Fp.
Similar attacks were soon carried out on more general RLWE cases [61, 40].
The conditions for a possible attack are similar, but the attacker is faced with bigger
distortions introduced by the conversion from RLWE instances to Poly-LWE ones
in order for the original attack to work.
A more delicate attack was delivered by Chen et al. [45, 44] on RLWE
instances based on families of Galois number fields whose ring of integers can be
decomposed into orthogonal subspaces, where their homomorphism will likely nullify
a component of the error drawn from a discrete Gaussian distribution.
7.0.2.2 Distinguishing Distributions
In Step (3) of the attack, we need to decide which distribution fits the one
computed from the guessed secret and samples better: uniform or the error distri-
bution (under the homomorphism). All previous works achieve this by comparing
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the sampled distribution with uniform under the assumption that the mapped error
distribution will be far enough apart from uniform.
For this particular task, there are general purpose distinguishers available
such as the Chi-square test. Another distinguisher with dual lattices is considered
by Peikert [104] and can be used in conjunction with all existing weak instance
attacks.
7.0.3 Organization
This chapter is organized as follows: Section 7.1 summarizes the Poly-LWE
problem and other related background. Section 7.2 shows the image of error distri-
bution mapped under the homomorphism and introduces our method to compute
it. Section 7.3 discusses different methods to distinguish distributions with samples
and demonstrates our simulation results.
7.1 Background
Let f(x) be a monic irreducible polynomial in Z[x] of degree n (not neces-
sarily cyclotomic). Let q ∈ Z (not necessarily prime). If we let p ∈ Z, it will always
denote a prime. We will be working in the following polynomial ring Z/qZ[x]/〈f(x)〉
which we denote as
Rn,q := Zq[x]/〈f(x)〉.
Recall that for f(x) monic, Z/qZ[x]/〈f(x)〉 ∼= Z[x]/〈f(x), q〉. Observe that there
are qn elements inRn,q that are of the form
d0 + d1x+ d2x
2 + · · ·+ dn−1xn−1 + 〈f(x)〉
where di ∈ Z/qZ 0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1. Roots of f(x) mod q will be denoted as α1, ..., αi for
as many roots as there are. If only one root is being considered, it may be denoted
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as just α. Since a root α is in Z/qZ, we can talk about its order with respect to the
multiplication in Z/qZ,
ord(α) := min{m ∈ Z+|αm = 1}.
In general, we will not assume that f(x) factors completely mod q; however, we will
assume that f(x) has at least one root α mod q.
On the ring Rn,q, we consider the following discrete probability distributions.
Let URn,q denote the discrete uniform distribution on Rn,q, i.e. coefficients of the
polynomials coming from the discrete uniform distribution on Z/qZ. Let DRn,q
denote a discrete Gaussian distribution on Rn,q, i.e. one that is the preimage of a
discrete Gaussian distribution over a lattice in the canonical embedding of a number
field K when considering Rn,q is considered as isomorphic to an ideal of K. Note
this distribution DRn,q is the one considered in [61]. Let χRn,q denote the discrete
Gaussian distribution on Rn,q, i.e. coefficients of the polynomials coming from
a discrete Gaussian distribution on Z/qZ. The precise formulation of a discrete
Gaussian on Z/qZ is as follows where we try to keep the definitions consistent with
[109]. Let U ,rRn,q denote an r−bounded uniform distribution on Rn,q, i.e. the
coefficients of the polynomials coming from an r−bounded uniform distribution on
Z/qZ. (An r−bounded uniform distribution being a uniform distribution from −r
to r when the elements are Z/qZ are represented from −(q− 1)/2 to (q− 1)/2. Let
ERn,q denote any distribution on Rn,q where the coefficients are sampled from a
given distribution E on Z/qZ.
Definition 7.1.1. For β ∈ R+ the continuous distribution Ψβ on [0, 1) is obtained
by sampling from a normal distribution with mean 0 and standard deviation β√
2pi
and reducing the result mod 1. This probability distribution is given as
∀r ∈ [0, 1), Ψβ(r) :=
∞∑
k=−∞
1
β
· exp
(
−pi
(
r − k
β
)2)
.
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Now using Ψβ, the discrete Gaussian distribution on Z/qZ is defined as follows.
Definition 7.1.2. The discretization of a Gaussian distribution on Z/qZ (we denote
as Gq,β) is obtained by sampling from Ψβ and multiplying by q. This probability
distribution is give by
Gq,β(i) =
∫ (i+ 1
2
)/q
(i− 1
2
)/q
Ψβ(x)dx.
Note that one can easily generate random values from Gq,β, and one can nu-
merically approximate the probability distribution of Gq,β by using approximations
for the infinite sum and the integral. We now introduce the two main problems of
interest.
Problem 7.1.2.1 (Search Poly-LWE Problem). Let s(x) ∈ URq be secret. The
Search Poly-LWE Problem is that of finding s(x) given a poly(n) number of samples
of the form
(aj(x), bj(x) := aj(x) · s(x) + ej(x)) ∈ Rn,q ×Rn,q
where aj(x) ∈ URq and ej(x) is sampled from an error distribution on Rn,q.
A related problem is to distinguish samples coming from a Search LWE
Problem from uniform samples on Rn,q × Rn,q, and our attack can be extended to
work against this variant as well.
Problem 7.1.2.2 (Decision Poly-LWE Problem). Given poly(n) samples from one
of the following two distributions on Rn,q×Rn,q the Decision Poly-LWE Problem is
to decide which distribution the samples are coming from:
(1) samples from a Search Poly-LWE Problem, i.e. of the form
(aj(x), bj(x) := aj(x) · s(x) + ej(x))
where aj(x) ∈ URq and ej(x) is sampled from an error distribution, or
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(2) samples that are uniform, i.e. of the form
(aj(x), bj(x))
where aj(x), bj(x) ∈ URq.
Attack. In [61] they develop the following attack against the Decision Poly-
LWE Problem which we describe here with a couple of adjustments. For a poly-
nomial f(x) that is irreducible over Z, let p ∈ Z be a prime such that f(x) has
at least one root α mod p. Note that in [61] the authors assume that f(x) factors
completely mod p which is often the case in practice so that fast multiplication can
be done in the ring using the Chinese Remainder Theorem, but we will not need
this assumption for our attack.
Given access to L :=poly(n) samples from a Decision Poly-LWE Problem
(aj(x), bj(x)) ∈ Rp ×Rp
we want to transfer the problem to Zp. To do this, we will build a well defined ring
homomorphism
φ¯ :
Zp[x]
〈f(x)〉 → Zp.
Since we are assuming we have a root α of f(x) mod p, we can consider the ring
homomorphism
φ : Zp[x]→ Zp
y(x) 7→ y(α).
It is clearly well defined, and one can check it is a ring homomorphism. Moreover,
〈f(x)〉 ⊆ Ker(φ) which gives that φ¯ is a well defined ring homomorphism defined as
φ¯ :
Zp[x]
〈f(x)〉 → Zp
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z(x) + 〈f(x)〉 7→ φ(z(x)) = z(α).
Now we take the samples and map them according to φ¯
(aj(x), bj(x)) 7→ (aj(α), bj(α)) .
If the samples are coming from the Search Poly-LWE distribution, s(α) will be some
element in Zp. For the attack we will guess s(α). For each g ∈ Zp we assume g is
the correct guess for s(α) and compute
bj(α)− aj(α)g.
Since the multiplication and addition is preserved by φ¯ this gives us
ej(α) = bj(α)− aj(α)g.
We can now analyze the distribution of ej(α) to decide which distribution the sam-
ples came from. The error polynomial ej(x) can be written as
ej(x) =
n−1∑
i=0
eijx
i,
which, when evaluated at α, is
ej(α) =
n−1∑
i=0
eijα
i,
From now on we will be considering ej(α) for a particular guess g and will
drop the j subscript and just write
e(α) =
n−1∑
i=0
eiα
i,
This can be simplified by considering the order of α, which we denote as r.
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For simplicity of notation assume r divides n. This gives
e(α) =(e0 + er + · · ·+ en
r
) + (e1 + er+1 + · · ·+ en
r
+1)α+ · · ·
+ (er−1 + e2r+(r−1) + · · ·+ en
r
+(r−1))αr−1.
This can be further simplified and written as
e(α) = v0 + v1α+ · · ·+ vr−1αr−1,
where
v0 = e0 + er + · · ·+ en
r
v1 = e1 + er+1 + · · ·+ en
r
+1
...
vr−1 = er−1 + e2r+(r−1) + · · ·+ en
r
+(r−1).
If the errors are from DRn,q as in [61], then depending on the value of α and the
order of α, this distribution e(α) may be either a discrete Gaussian or a periodic
distribution; and depending on the parameters, it may be very close to a uniform
one. In [61, Section 3.2 Case 2] and [62, Section 4 Case 2], the authors state that
when α has small order ≥ 3, e(α) will be Gaussian; however, this is not quite right as
the distribution may be highly periodic as we will demonstrate. Since the algorithms
in [61] are strongly dependent on e(α) being Gaussian to distinguish, we will need
to introduce some other methods for algorithms to distinguish in this case. We shall
see that Chi-square test will work much better, and this is used in later papers such
as [43].
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7.2 Error Distribution
7.2.1 Computing Probability Distributions
In the above attacks, we need to understand the probability distribution of
e(α). More generally, we consider
e = e0 + e1a1 + · · ·+ en−1an−1 ∈ Zp
where ai ∈ Zp are fixed and ei’s are chosen according to a given probability dis-
tribution E on Zp. In the following, we derive the probability distribution of e.
We first show how to compute the exact distribution of e efficiently, and then we
demonstrate several possible distributions of e on Zp, including distributions that
are neither Gaussian nor uniform.
Lemma 7.2.1. Let u and v be independent random variables on Zp with probability
distributions (a0, a1, . . . , ap−1) and (b0, b1, . . . , bp−1), respectively. Let
a(x) =
∑
i∈Zp
aix
i, b(x) =
∑
i∈Zp
bix
i.
Then the probability distribution of u+ v can be computed as the coefficients of the
polynomial a(x)b(x) (mod xp − 1).
The proof is simple since, for any k ∈ Zp, the probability
P (u+ v = k) =
∑
i∈Zp
P (u = i)P (v = k − i mod p) =
∑
i∈Zp
aibk−i,
where the subscript k − i of b is computed modulo p.
Theorem 7.2.2. Suppose e0, e1, . . . , en−1 are independent random variables on Zp
with the same probability distribution (c0, c1, . . . , cp−1). Let c(x) =
∑
i∈Zp cix
i.
Then, for any a1, . . . , an−1 ∈ Zp, the probability distribution of e = e0 + e1a1 +
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· · ·+ en−1an−1 mod p can be computed as the coefficients of the polynomial
c(x)c(xa1) · · · c(xan−1) (mod xp − 1).
The theorem follows from the above lemma, since the random variables
e0, e1a1, . . . , en−1an−1 are independent and c(xai) represents the probability dis-
tribution of eiai. The product can be computed recursively, and the polynomial
multiplication done using an FFT. This takes at most O (log(n) log(p)p) operations
in Zp. In Appendix A we show how we implemented this.
7.2.2 Intuition for the Error Distribution
In this subsection, we give several examples of the mapped error distribution
a0e0 + a1e1 + · · ·+ an−1en−1 mod p
where ei, 0 ≤ i < n, are independent identically distributed Gp,β distributions on
Zp and ai ∈ Zp, 0 ≤ i < n, are fixed constants. The number of terms n and the
sizes of the ai’s greatly affects the shape of the above distribution. To get an idea
of what one should expect, we look at three general cases.
7.2.2.1 Case 1: small coefficients
The first case we consider is when all the a0, ..., an−1 coefficients are 1 and
the standard deviation is fixed; in this case, we consider how varying n affects the
shape of the distribution. As n grows large, the distribution remains Gaussian but
approaches uniform.
Example 7.2.3. Let β = 0.01, p = 331. The distribution e1 + e2 + · · · + en for
n = 1, 20, 40, 100 with ej iid Gp,β is shown in Figure 7.1.
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Figure 7.1: Sum of n iid discrete Gaussian distributions on Z331.
7.2.2.2 Case 2: large coefficients
The second case we consider is when all the a0, ..., an−1 coefficients are large
and the standard deviation is fixed; in this case, we consider how varying n affects
the shape of the distribution. We want to answer the question of how large n
needs to be for the distribution to be almost uniform. In this case n can be quite
small and the distribution already be very close to uniform. However, note that the
distributions in the following example are neither Gaussian nor uniform.
Example 7.2.4. We consider the distributions of 23e0+45e1 and 23e0+45e1+43e2
and 23e0 + 45e1 + 43e2 + 95e3 where β = 0.01 and p = 331 and ej iid Gp,β. For
each additional term in the sum, the distributions gets considerably closer to uniform
while remaining periodic. The three graphs are shown in Figure 7.2.
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Figure 7.2: The distributions of 23e0+45e1 and 23e0+45e1+43e2 and 23e0+45e1+
43e2 + 95e3 where ej are iid discrete Gaussians on Z331
7.2.2.3 Case 3: root of small order
In the third case, we consider a situation that may arise in the attack where
the coefficients are all powers of a root α
e0 + αe1 + α
2e2 + α
3e3 + · · ·+ αn−1en−1
where ej are iid discrete Gaussian distributions. We want to specifically consider
what effect the order of α has on the distribution. We choose f = xn + ax+ b to be
an irreducible polynomial over Z that has a root α mod p.
We want to specifically consider the case when α has small order mod p and
n is not too large. When α has low order, the distribution will be considerably
farther from uniform compared to when α has large order. Consider the following
example where f has one root of low order and another of high order.
Example 7.2.5. The polynomial f = x9 + 11x− 11 is irreducible over Z but has a
two roots α1 = 31, α2 = 82 mod 331 with α1 having order 3 and α2 having order
165. Consider the following distribution which arises if α1 is used to define the
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homomorphism in the attack
e0 + α1e1 + α
2
1e2 + α
3
1e3 + · · ·+ α81e8.
Here we are assuming ej are iid Gp,β for β = 0.01. The graph of the distribution is
show in Figure 7.3. It is neither Gaussian nor uniform.
When using the root α2 with larger order, we see that the distribution e0 +
α2e1 + α
2
2e2 + α
3
2e3 + · · ·+ α82e8 is much closer to uniform as seen in Figure 7.4.
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Figure 7.3: The distribution of e0 + α1e1 + α
2
1e2 + α
3
1e3 + · · · + α81e8 for α = 31 of
order 3 and ej iid discrete Gaussians on Z331.
7.2.2.4 Summarize Cases
Considering these three cases, we note that if the distribution e(α) appears
like Case 1 it can be fairly easily distinguished from the uniform for small n. For
Case 2, distinguishing from the uniform gets much harder because when adding a
large number of terms with large coefficients, the distribution rapidly approaches
uniform. For Case 3, when α has small order this is similar to Case 2 with a small
number of terms; but if the order of α is small enough and n not too large, we can
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Figure 7.4: The distribution of e0 + α2e1 + α
2
2e2 + α
3
2e3 + · · ·+ α82e8 for α2 = 84 of
order 165 and ej iid discrete Gaussians on Z331.
hope to be able to distinguish this from uniform. We will consider this case further
in the next section. In Case 3, when α has large order, this is similar to Case 2
when there are a large number of terms; and it is unlikely one would be able to
distinguish this from uniform.
7.3 Statistical Tests and Simulation
7.3.1 Distinguishing statistical tests
In this section, we will discuss how one can decide if a guess g in the attack is
correct. If the guess g is correct, we have shown in the previous section how we can
compute what the distribution of the error will be; we denote this computed error
distribution as E . If the guess g is not correct, then the samples will be uniform,
which we denote as U .
Assume that we have L samples of RLWE public keys:
(ai(x), bi(x)), bi(x) = ai(x)s(x) + ei(x), i = 1, . . . , L
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where ai(x) ∈ URp, ei(x) ∈ χRp. Let A and B be two random variables taking
samples
A ∈ {ai(α) | i = 1, . . . , L}
B ∈ {bi(α) | i = 1, . . . , L}.
In general, (A,B) cannot be distinguished from (A,B′), where B′ is uniform. But
the homomorphism attack allows us to consider the distribution
S(g) := B −Ag, g ∈ Zp.
Property 2. S(g) ∼ E if g = s(α); otherwise S(g) ∼ U if g 6= s(α).
Now if E is not too close to U , we will be able to decide which one S(g)
matches by considering a reasonable number of samples. There are several methods
one might use to decide which distribution S(g) fits.
7.3.1.1 Method 1: Chi-square Tests
First, we will use a Chi-square goodness-of-fit test to test the S(g) against
a uniform distribution. For a description of this test see [83, pg 37]. Let e˜k denote
the number of ej(α)’s equal to k mod p. Let L denote the total number of samples.
We set up our null hypothesis to be that S(g) is distributed according to a uniform
distribution
H0 : S(g) ∼ U
H1 : S(g) 6∼ U .
Then we compute the Chi-square statistic as
V =
p−1∑
k=1
(e˜k − L/p)2
L/p
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where there are p−1 degrees of freedom. If V is too large or too small based on our
choice of Type 1 error rate, we reject H0. For this test to be considered reliable, we
need L/p ≥ 5 samples, i.e. L ≥ 5p.
Second, we test S(g) against our computed distribution E using a Chi-square
test in a non-traditional way.
H0 : S(g) ∼ E
H1 : S(g) 6∼ E .
Let Ek := Pr[E = k ∈ Zp]. Then we compute the Chi-square statistic as
V =
p−1∑
k=1
(e˜k − LEk)2
LEk
where there are p− 1 degrees of freedom. We then reject or accept based on V and
our desired Type 1 error rate. In this setup, we are inverting the usual setup for a
Chi-square test. Note that the distribution in the null hypothesis has been switched.
But this problem is also unusual in that it is a promise problem, giving us that the
S(g) must be one of two known distributions, which is not an assumption generally
considered for most statistical tests like the Chi-square test.
7.3.1.2 Other Methods
Since the attack of weak Poly-LWE instances is reduced to distinguishing
two distributions, other statistical tests that serve this purpose can also be used.
For example, likelihood-ratio test is similar to Chi-square test and hence can be
applied; Peikert shows a standard distinguishing method based on lattice properties
in [104]. Below, we will also discuss another method based on testing the uniformity
of collisions.
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7.3.1.3 Type 1 Errors
One further thing that must be considered when using any tests like Methods
1 with a fixed Type 1 error probability is that using the test repeatedly for each of
the p guesses will result in a much higher overall Type 1 error probability. To see
this in detail, if γ is set to be the Type 1 error probability for a single test, then 1−γ
is the probability of not having a Type 1 error on that test. If one runs p such tests,
the probability of no Type 1 errors in all p tests is (1 − γ)p. Thus, the probability
of at least one Type 1 error is 1− (1− γ)p. To be clear, this is an upper bound on
probability of a Type 1 error and in practice a test may have a true Type 1 error
rate much lower, but we may no longer have a very good upper bound. To see how
much the Type 1 error bound can grow, consider that if γ = 0.02 and p = 331, then
1− (1− 0.02)331 ≈ 0.9987.
It is possible to keep the overall Type 1 error bound to a desired rate. One
way is to use a Bonferroni correction, which is a way of setting the Type 1 error rates
on the individual tests to guarantee a particular overall Type 1 error. In particular
if we set the new Type 1 error for each test at βγ :=
γ
p , the overall Type 1 error
will still be bounded by γ. However, this may result in an impractically high Type
2 error rate, so in practice we would recommend using the tests at multiple levels
and using a variety of tests as described above.
7.3.2 Simulations
We simulate these Chi-square methods and look at the true Type 1 and
Type 2 error rates.
Example 7.3.1. Continuing with the earlier Example 7.2.5, we show how we can
use Method 1 of the Chi-square tests to determine for which guess of g the distribu-
tion e(α) follows the computed error distribution rather than a uniform distribution.
With 2000 samples and the individual Chi-Square tests’ Type 1 error rates set at 2%,
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the overall test is successful at rejecting the null hypothesis that the errors are from
the uniform each time out of ten independent simulations while only ever giving two
false rejections.
For those same ten simulations, the Chi-square test against the uniform with
Type 1 error rates set at 1 × 10−9 (corresponding to this tests Type 2 error rates
because of the inverted setup) rejects all guesses correctly without giving any false
rejections.
Example 7.3.2. Next we consider a new example. Let f = x15 + 125x− 334 which
is irreducible over Z but has a root α = 396 of order 3 mod 607. The distribution E
is shown in Figure 7.5. Clearly, it is neither Gaussian nor uniform.
Using the Chi-square test against uniform with 5000 samples and having the
individual tests set at a Type 1 error rate of 2%, we are able to reject the guess
correctly for every one of ten independent simulations while only ever giving one
false rejection.
For those same ten simulations, the Chi-square test against the uniform with
Type 1 error rate set at 1×10−9 (corresponding to this test’s Type 2 error rate because
of the inverted setup) is not helpful on this example as it never rejects anything.
Example 7.3.3. We used Method 2 (statistical distance) on the following instance:
f(x) = xn + p− 1, where n = 8, p = 257, and β = 0.2. In this setup, f(x) has root
α = 1 mod p. With 1200 samples, the test is successful at finding the image of s in
all of the ten independent simulations, when either of (??) and (??) is used.
This instance has been attacked successfully by [60], because of its simplic-
ity. However, our method may be able to improve the efficiency of their attack by
computing s(α) directly from the error distribution under the homomorphism. We
leave that as a future work.
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Figure 7.5: The distribution of e0 + αe1 + α
2e2 + α
3e3 + · · ·+ α12e12 for α = 396 of
order 3 and ej iid discrete Gaussians on Z607.
7.3.3 Broader Class of Examples
In the previous sections of the chapter, we have shown how a single root of
low order can be used to create an effective homomorphism attack. Now we will
show a broader class of examples that this attack can work against. Instead of
considering a single root (a linear factor) of f , let us consider a factor, h ∈ Zq[x], of
f ∈ Zq[x] that has low degree and small coefficients. Similar to before, we want to
build a ring homomorphism
φ¯ :
Zq[x]
f(x)
→ Zq[x]
h(x)
.
To do this, we first build a well defined ring homomorphism:
φ : Zq[x]→ Zq[x]
h(x)
y 7→ y + 〈h〉.
One can check that this is a well defined ring homomorphism and that 〈f〉 ∈ Ker(φ).
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Thus,
φ¯ :
Zq[x]
f(x)
→ Zq[x]
h(x)
y + 〈f〉 7→ φ(y) = y + 〈h〉
is also a well defined ring homomorphism. If q is prime and h is irreducible, then
Zp[x]
h(x) is the finite field Fpd where d = deg(h). Now we take the samples and map
them according to φ¯
(aj(x), bj(x)) 7→ (aj(x) mod h, bj(x) mod h) .
If the samples are coming from the Search Poly-LWE distribution, s(x) (mod h)
will be some element in Zq[x]/h(x). For the attack, we will guess s(x) (mod h). For
each g ∈ Zq[x]/h(x), we assume g is the correct guess for s(x) (mod h) and compute
(bj(x) mod h))− (aj(x) mod h) g
Since the multiplication and addition is preserved by φ¯, this gives us
ej(x) (mod h) = (bj(x) mod h)− (aj(x) mod h) g.
We can now analyze the distribution of ej(x) (mod h) to decide which distribution
the samples came from. The error polynomial ej(x) can be written as
ej(x) =
n−1∑
i=0
eijx
i,
which, when mapped by φ¯, is represented as ej(x) (mod h),
ej(x) (mod h) =
d−1∑
i=0
cijx
i,
where the cij are sums of coefficients ej(x) multiplied by the constant coefficients of
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h. This means that the distribution of these coefficients cij are linear combinations
of the original error distribution. We showed earlier how this can be computed using
our method. For the cij distributions to be distinguishable from uniform, we need
the coefficients of h to be small as discussed in Section 7.2. We now give an example
of this more general approach.
Example 7.3.4. Let q = 7681 and f = (x2 + x + 1)(x498 + 247x23 + x13 + x6 −
x4 + 17) + q. f is irreducible in Z[x] but has an irreducible factor h = x2 + x+ 1 in
Zq[x]. An error polynomial e(x) looks like
e(x) =
499∑
i=0
eix
i.
Now e(x) (mod h) is
ω1x+ ω0 :=
 ∑
i≡1 (3)
ei −
∑
i≡2 (3)
ei
x+
 ∑
i≡0 (3)
ei −
∑
i≡2 (3)
ei
 .
where each coefficient is taken modulo q. Each of the coefficients of this remainder,
ω1 and ω0 is the sum of iid samples from the error distribution. Therefore, the
distributions of ω1 and ω0 can be found using our method described earlier. The
computed error distribution for ω1 is given in Figure 7.6 for two different error
distributions—one an r-bounded uniform random distribution on Z7681 with r = 240
and the other an r-bounded uniform random distribution with radius r = 480. An
interesting future direction would be to make precise how many samples would be
needed to distinguish a known distribution from a uniform distribution.
We see that if the error distribution only has radius 240, the resulting
mapped distribution could be distinguishable from uniform given enough samples.
If the error distribution has radius 480, this resulting mapped distribution will be
much harder to distinguish from uniform.
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Figure 7.6: The distribution of ω1 when Search-PLWE has error from uniform ran-
dom distribution of radius r = 240 and 480.
7.4 Using Multiple Roots
The idea for an extension to the attack would be to run the attack using
several different roots α0, α1, ..., αt. So each sample would be mapped according to
all the maps
e0 + e1α
1
0 + e2α
2
0 + · · ·+ en−1αn−10
e0 + e1α
1
1 + e2α
2
1 + · · ·+ en−1αn−11
...
...
e0 + e1α
1
t + e2α
2
t + · · ·+ en−1αn−1t .
Now all of these equations are being reduced mod q since they are in Z/qZ. If we
could take a linear combination of these equations so that the coefficients which are
the powers of αi’s, would get smaller, we might be looking at a sum of ei’s that
could be distinguished from uniform. So essentially what we are looking for is a
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short vector in the q-ary lattice with basis given by the rows of the following matrix,
A =

1 α0 α
2
0 · · · αn−10
1 α1 α
2
1 · · · αn−11
...
...
1 αt α
2
t · · · αn−1t

We can find a short vector in the above q-ary lattice by finding a short vector
in the following integer lattice where we have adjoined qI to represent reducing mod
q.
Aq =

1 α0 α
2
0 · · · αn−10
1 α1 α
2
1 · · · αn−11
...
...
1 αt α
2
t · · · αn−1t
q
q
. . .
q

We can run BKZ to find a short vector in Aq, call it
δ = (δ0, ..., δn−1).
We then write this vector δ in terms of the basis that is the rows of A.
The limitation on this attack is the following. When you are guessing the
image of s(x), you would need to guess all t maps correctly before you could have
access to ei(α0), ei(α1), ..., ei(αt) to combine them to get a short vector revealing
the error distribution as different than uniform. It is likely that if you used a large
t and if you did guess correctly, the task of distinguishing would be very easy and
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would not require many samples. However, this attack has a running time that is
exponential. In particular, there are qt possible guesses for what the set of images
of s(x) is under all the maps. Often q will be at least 29. Thus, for this attack to
even have a chance at being better than other known attacks, we would need t small
enough so that qt ≤ 2128 which implies t ≤ 14. In such a low dimensional sub-lattice
(recall n will be at least 29), it is unlikely that there exists a short enough vector δ
to make the attack feasible.
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7.5 Modulus Reduction Plus Homomorphism Attack
One immediate defense against the homomorphism attacks in the previous
section is to simply not choose an f(x) and q such that f(x) has no low order roots
modulo q. This is in fact one of the motivations considered in the design of the
NTRUPrime scheme [26]. In NTRUPrime the ring Rn,q is chosen to be a field and
so has no nontrivial homomorphisms for an attacker to use. Many other schemes
choose a f(x) to factor completely modulo q but in such a way that all the roots
have high order 2n.
We investigate idea of first performing a modulus reduction [36] to change
to a ring where the homomorphism attack can then be carried out. This attack has
been suggested before in [45, 26] and conjectured not to be feasable. The success of
this attack depends on the statistical distance of the mapped error distribution from
uniform, as knowing this distance ahead of time gives the exact number of samples
needed when using the statistical distinguisher from [55]. In the case of using a
homomorphism attack alone, this distance can be computed exactly [46]. But to
this point, when using a modulus reduction plus a homomorphism attack, we have
not been able to compute the exact distance of the mapped distribution to uniform.
Instead, we give two heuristic models of the mapped distribution that we hope give
a reasonable lower bound on the distance from uniform. Using these models, one
could estimate the number of samples needed to perform the attack. However, we
also consider experimental results which indicate that these heuristic models do not
provide a reliable lower bound on the distance from uniform.
7.6 Round5 Ring
In the Round5 [28] ring Rn,q = Z[x]/(fn(x), q). where
fn(x) = x
n + xn−1 + · · ·+ 1 = x
n+1 − 1
x− 1 ,
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and q is chosen such that fn(x) is irreducible modulo q, the homomorphism attack
itself cannot be carried out directly in this ring since fn(x) has no roots modulo q.
We will use a modulus reduction to transfer the problem to a different ring where the
homomorphism attack can be carried out. Observe that fn(1) = n+ 1 ≡ 0 (mod p)
where p := n + 1. We will perform a modulus switch to transfer the problem from
the ring Rn,q to Rn,p. Then 1 will be a root of fn(x) modulo p. Also note that it
is often assumed about the secret key that it has the same number of ±1’s making
s(1) = 0 = g, so we do not have to guess what this value is when carrying out the
homomorphism attack with the root α = 1.
Modulus Reduction For p < q, s(x) =
∑n−1
i=0 six
i with si ∈ {0,±1} and
with Hamming weight Ham(s) ≤ ρ. Let (a(x), b(x)) ∈ R2n,q and
b(x) ≡ a(x)s(x) + e(x) (mod (fn(x), q)),
where a(x) ∈ Rn,q is uniform random and e(x) ∈ Z[x] comes from a known error
distribution. Let
b′(x) =
⌊
p
q
b(x)
⌉
b
, a′(x) =
⌊
p
q
a(x)
⌉
b
,
where the rounding is computed for each coefficient.
Let a(x) =
∑n−1
i=0 aix
i and b(x) =
∑n−1
i=0 bix
i, then
b′i =
pbi
q
− νi, a′i =
pai
q
− µi, 0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1,
for some νi, µi ∈ R with |νi|, |µi| ≤ 1/2 for 0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1.
By assumption, b(x) ≡ a(x)s(x) + e(x) + qu(x) (mod fn(x)) for some poly-
nomial u(x) ∈ Z[x], we have
pb(x)
q
≡ pa(x)s(x)
q
+
pe(x)
q
+ pu(x) (mod fn(x)).
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Thus,
b′(x)− s(x)a′(x) ≡ e′(x) + pu(x) (mod (fn(x)))
≡ e′(x) (mod (fn(x), p))
where e′(x) = ν(x)− µ(x)s(x) + pq e(x) mod (fn(x)).
Notice that in this ring xn+1 ≡ 1 and xn ≡ −(xn−1+ · · ·x+1) mod (fn(x)).
By expanding the terms of s(x)µ(x), we have
s(x)µ(x) =
n−1∑
i=0
six
i ·
n−1∑
j=0
µjx
j
≡
n−1∑
i=0
n−1∑
j=0
siµjx
i+j
≡
n−1∑
k=0
((
k∑
i=0
siµk−i +
n−1∑
i=k+2
siµk+n+1−i) · xk + (
n−1∑
i=1
siµn−i)xn)
≡
n−1∑
k=0
((
k∑
i=0
siµk−i +
n−1∑
i=k+2
siµk−i) · xk − (
n−1∑
i=1
siµn−i)(xn−1 + · · ·+ x+ 1))
≡
n−1∑
k=0
(
n−1∑
i=0
siµk−i −
n−1∑
i=0
siµn−i) · xk
where the subindex of µ is computed modulo n+ 1 and µn := 0. By stretching out
the coefficients, we know s(x)µ(x) ≡∑n−1k=0 ckxk where
ck :=
n−1∑
i=0
si(µk−i − µn−i).
Thus,
e′(x) = ν(x)−
n−1∑
k=0
ckx
k +
p
q
e(x) mod (fn(x)).
When we perform the homomorphism attack by evaluating at the root of 1,
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we want to understand the distribution of e′(1) mod p. From above we know
n−1∑
k=0
ck =
n−1∑
k=0
n−1∑
i=0
si(µk−i − µn−i)
= (s0 + · · ·+ sn−1)µ0 +
n−1∑
k=1
(s0 + · · ·+ sn−1 − (n+ 1)sn−k)µk
= sˆ ·
n−1∑
k=0
µk − (n+ 1) ·
n−1∑
k=1
sn−kµk
where sˆ :=
∑n−1
i=0 si. Thus, we have
e′(1) = ν(1)− sˆ ·
n−1∑
k=0
µk + (n+ 1) ·
n−1∑
k=1
sn−kµk +
p
q
e(1)
=
n−1∑
k=0
νk − sˆ ·
n−1∑
k=0
µk + (n+ 1) ·
n−1∑
k=1
sn−kµk +
p
q
e(1).
It is this distribution that we would like to know exactly in order to calculate its
distance from uniform in order to know how many samples are needed to carry out
the attack as will be explained in Section 7.7. We can write it as
e′(1) = X1 − sˆX2 + (n+ 1)X3 +X4
where
X1 :=
n−1∑
k=0
νk, X2 :=
n−1∑
k=0
µk, X3 :=
n−1∑
k=1
sn−kµk, X4 :=
p
q
e(1).
Since νk, µk ∼ i.i.d. subG(1/4), we know that
X1, X2 ∼ SubG
((√
n
2
)2)
and X3 ∼ SubG
((√
ρ
2
)2)
.
and that X4 =
p
q e(1) is also sub-Gaussian with parameter
p
q
√
nβ.
(Inaccurate) Heuristic Models of new error distribution: Due to the
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dependence between ν(x) and the other terms it seems difficult to exactly compute
the distribution of e′(1) as can be done when only a homomorphism attack is per-
formed as shown in [46]. Instead, we will seek to model the distribution in such
a way as to get a lower bound on its distance from the uniform distribution. We
model the distribution of e′(1) as
X = X1 + a2X2 + a3X3 +X4
where X1, X2, X3, X4 are independent sub-Gaussians over Zp with parameters σ1 =
√
n, σ2 =
√
n, σ3 =
√
ρ, σ4 =
p
q
√
nβ respectively, and a2, a3 are fixed constants in
Zp. We model these sub-Gaussians in two ways:
Model-U: each Xi is uniform on the interval [−σi, σi] ⊂ Z.
Model-G: each Xi is discretized Gaussian on Zp with parameter σi/p.
We compute this distribution exactly for all coefficients a2 and a3 in Zp and record
the minimum `1 and `2 distances from the uniform distribution over all the possible
a2, a3 coefficients in Zp. For the method used to compute the distributions, see the
Appendix. We will point out below that these heuristics do not in practice capture
the behavior of the mapped error distribution.
7.7 Statistical Distinguishers Revisited
Ultimately, we will need to use a statistical test to determine if our samples
are coming from the distribution of e′(1) or from uniform. The Chi-square test is a
general test for doing this that has been used before with homomorphism attacks.
But here we use the more precise test against uniform from Diakonikolas et. al.
2016 [55]. If you know the statistical distance from uniform of the distribution you
are testing, this test provides an explicit number of samples that are needed for the
test to distinguish with a fix probability.
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The test works as follows. For a probability distribution P = (P1, ..., Pn)
defined on a set [N ] = {1, ..., N} that we want to distinguish from the uniform
distribution UN on this set, let  denote its `1-distance from uniform,
 =
N∑
i=1
∣∣∣∣ 1N − Pi
∣∣∣∣ = ||P − UN ||1.
If we scale the `1-distance by 1/2, it is what is known as the statistical distance.
The `2-distance from uniform is
||P − UN ||2 =
(
N∑
i=1
(
1
N
− Pi
)2) 12
.
The statistical test is then performed as follows:
Algorithm ([55] Figure 1). Test-Uniformity-Collisions(P,N, )
Input: sample access to a distribution P over [N ] and  > 0.
Output: YES if ||P − UN ||22 ≤ 2/(2N); NO if ||P − UN ||22 ≥ 2/N .
1. Draw m iid samples from P .
2. Let σij be an indicator variable which is 1 if samples i and j are the same and
0 otherwise.
3. Define the random variable s =
∑
i<j σij and the threshold t =
(
m
2
) · 1+32/4N
4. If s ≥ t return NO; otherwise return YES.
Theorem 7.7.1 ([55] Theorem 1). The above estimator, when given m samples
drawn from a distribution P over [N ] will, with probability at least 3/4, distinguish
the case that ||P −UN ||22 ≤ 2/(2N) from the case that ||P −UN ||22 ≥ 2/N provided
that m ≥ 3200N1/2/2.
This test can be computed efficiently by first collecting all the frequencies
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(f1, f2, ..., fN ) of the m samples (fi is the number of samples equal to i ∈ [N ]), then
s =
(
f1
2
)
+
(
f2
2
)
+ · · ·+
(
fN
2
)
.
This simplifies to
s =
1
2
(
N∑
i=1
f2i
)
− m
2
since m =
∑N
i=1 fi. To use this test in our case, we will collect the frequencies of the
b′j(1)−a′j(1)s(1) = b′j(1) in Zp and then compute the statistic. When we use this, it
would help to have an idea of what  can be expected. This is what motivates our
modeling of the distribution in the previous section. If the precise distance of the
distribution of e′(1) can be calculated or lower bounded, that gives the number of
samples needed for this attack to succeed.
7.8 Computational Data and Comments
We compute the data for the following parameters sets:
 q = 214, n = 1018, ρ = 334 , β = 23, 24, 25, 26,
 q = 212, n = 722, ρ = 240, β = 23, 24, 25, 26,
 q = 212, n = 490, ρ = 160, β = 23, 24, 25, 26,
where ρ is the hamming weight of s(x) and β is the bound on the original bounded
uniform error in the RLWE samples. For each of the two heuristic models for the
distribution of e′(1), we compute the `1 and `2 distances to uniform and use this
and Theorem 7.7.1 to give the estimated number of samples that would be required
to carry out the attack. We present the results of our computation in Table 7.8.
We also compute the sampled distance from uniform using 107 samples to compare
with the modeled distance.
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However, further simulations of the attack against Round5 ring instances
have revealed that these heuristics do NOT capture what the way the actual error is
behaving. What we have seen in our simulations, for smaller examples, is that as the
number of samples increases the mapped error distribution grows continually more
uniform and does not stop at the distance from uniform predicted by the heuristics
described here.
Parameters Model-U Model-G Sim: 107
q n ρ β `1 `2 # `1 `2 # `1 `2
214 1018 334 8 1.22e-04 4.35e-06 243 1.29e-12 4.9e-14 296 7.95e-03 3.11e-04
214 1018 334 16 5.87e-05 2.15e-06 245 7.16e-15 2.85e-16 2110 8.19e-03 3.21e-04
214 1018 334 32 3.11e-05 1.28e-06 247 1.99e-16 8.33e-18 2121 7.95e-03 3.07e-04
214 1018 334 64 1.40e-05 4.97e-07 249 1.88e-16 7.797e-18 2122 7.89e-03 3.07e-04
212 722 240 8 5.21e-05 2.08e-06 246 1.98e-15 9.35e-17 2115 6.93e-03 3.19e-04
212 722 240 16 2.39e-05 1.09e-06 248 8.16e-16 3.04e-17 2117 6.61e-03 3.08e-04
212 722 240 32 1.83e-05 7.94e-07 248 7.50e-17 4.05e-18 2124 6.59e-03 3.14e-04
212 722 240 64 7.00e-06 3.46e-07 251 6.06e-16 2.28e-17 2118 7.03e-03 3.31e-04
212 490 160 8 1.18e-04 6.29e-06 243 4.43e-12 2.47e-13 292 5.56e-03 3.18e-04
212 490 160 16 4.85e-05 2.99e-06 245 6.96e-16 3.88e-17 2117 5.55e-03 3.17e-04
212 490 160 32 2.98E-05 1.47e-06 247 1.23e-15 5.73e-17 2116 5.66e-03 3.13e-04
212 490 160 64 1.01e-05 6.63e-07 250 1.84e-16 1.10e-17 2121 5.34e-03 3.01e-04
Table 7.1: Modeled distribution distances and simulation: for the heuristic model of
the distribution of e′(1) using bounded uniform distributions (discretized Gaussian
distributions), Model-U (Model-G), we list the `1 and `2 distances of the modeled
distribution to uniform and give the estimated number of samples, # required for
the attack to succeed. In the column Sim: 107, we give the sample distance from
uniform when running the attack with 107 samples which are constructed from a
secret key with the same number of ±1’s.
7.9 NTRU Prime Ring
In NTRU Prime [26] the ring Rn,q = Z[x]/〈xn − x − 1, q〉 is chosen to be a
field. One of the motivations given for this is to prevent any of these homomorphism
attacks. It is then natural to consider whether a modulus switch to another ring
could be useful. The NTRU Prime paper addresses this idea saying, “It is sometimes
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claimed that modulus switching makes the choice of q irrelevant, but an attacker
switching from q to another modulus will noticeably increase noise, interfering with
typical attack algorithms.” An argument for this is also given in [43], but it still
seems there is a lack of work to fully analyze this possible line of attack.
We give here a small toy example of an NTRU Prime style ring for which
a modulus reduction plus homomorphism attack is possible, though not necessarily
better than other direct attacks.
Example 7.9.1. Consider the ring R6,41 = Z[x]/〈x6−x− 1, 41〉. Let the secret key
be s = x−x2 which has low Hamming weight and the error be bounded by ||e||∞ ≤ 1.
If we consider the new modulus p = 29, we have that f(x) = x6 − x − 1 has a root
α = 23 with order 7 modulo p. If we perform a modulus switch from q to p on
the RLWE samples and then apply a homomorphism attack using α we find that
we can distinguish the distribution from uniform using 33,600,000 samples and the
Test-Uniformity-Collisions distinguisher.
Clearly, this seems like a very large number of samples needed to distinguish;
and while this is not necessarily the minimum number needed for these parameters,
we have found that in attempting to scale up the parameters to larger examples this
amount or more is not sufficient to distinguish. To summarize, it seems like even
though some small examples exist of the modulus reduction plus homomorphism
attack succeeding, our simulations have not shown them to scale well to examples
with larger parameters. There is still more work that could be done to refine how the
number of samples needed increases as various parameters are changed; for example,
low Hamming weight seems to be necessary to make the attack perform better.
Below is a table of small parameters from which we have found some that
can be broken and could be helpful in considering how the attack scales.
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Table 7.2: Small NTRU Prime style rings. n is polynomial degree. q is original
modulus. p is new modulus. α is root for homomorphism attack with order m
modulo p.
n q p α m
6 41 37 9 9
31 15 10
29 23 7
3 7
5 3 4
7 47 19 16 9
11 4 5
5 2 4
11 59 19 5 9
13 97 37 33 9
29 23 7
5 7
17 8 8
11 6 10
16 127 67 35 11
18 11
16 11
14 11
31 15 10
29 24 7
6 7
13 2 12
17 113 79 64 13
57 13
31 19 15
19 14 9
4 9
11 4 5
19 139 131 112 13
101 13
23 2 11
17 5 16
11 7 5
3 5
20 151 137 73 17
3 17
61 46 15
29 23 7
23 8 11
7 11
19 15 9
5 9
17 15 8
12 8
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Chapter 8
High-Speed Modular Multiplier
for Lattice-Based
Cryptosystems
Modular multiplication plays an important role in lattice-based cryptogra-
phy algorithms, as this is the underlying operation used in any polynomial multi-
plication algorithm, and represents the dominate cost in hardware implementation.
Therefore, accelerating such algorithms, especially under the umbrella of resource-
constrained platforms such as IoT and mobile devices, becomes critical in facilitating
practical deployments of these technologies. In the literature, many techniques for
modular reduction have been proposed. For instance, Montgomery modular multi-
plication [98], which is designed for an arbitrary modulus, is widely used in RSA.
On the other hand, the Barrett reduction [24] that considers a constant modulus, is
more suitable for the lattice-based scheme implementations [111, 23, 114]. Addition-
ally, an alternative category-modular reduction of partial products was proposed to
further improve the efficiency by eliminating expensive long-bit multiplications [103].
This chapter1 proposes an optimized high-speed modular Karatsuba mul-
1this chapter is based on joint work with Weihang Tan, Antian Wang, Shuhong Gao and Yingjie
Lao
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tiplier which follows the idea of category-modular reduction of partial products.
We utilize the divide and conquer strategy and exploit a special modulus to speed
up the calculation while simultaneously reducing the hardware complexity. In our
algorithm, only two v-bit and one (v + 1)-bit multipliers along with a few adder-
s/subtractors are required for multiplication modulo a special 2v-bit prime Q, as
opposed to most of the previous designs that need to expand their results to 4v-bit
and then use either multiplications or subtractions to reduce the results modulo Q.
The main contribution lies in the modification of the Karatsuba multiplication [81]
by performing the reduction directly on the partial products. As a result, most
operations are only around 2v-bit or v-bit, with the largest bit-length among all the
operations being (3v + 2)-bit.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 8.1 reviews the math-
ematical background and the prior works on hardware implementation of modular
multipliers for different lattice-based cryptographic algorithms. Section 8.2 intro-
duces the details of our optimized modular multiplication algorithm. For the pro-
posed novel hardware architecture and its performance, we refer the reader to our
paper [120].
8.1 Background
8.1.1 Modular Multiplication
As we mentioned above, the operations in lattice cryptography in a ring such
as Rn,Q := Z[x]/(xn + 1, Q) [39] are computationally heavy. The lowest level oper-
ation, which is used in any polynomial multiplication algorithm such as a number
theoretic transform (NTT), is multiplication modulo Q which can be expressed as:
ab = t (mod Q), (8.1)
where 0 ≤ a, b, t < Q.
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In the literature, a variety of algorithms have been proposed to improve the
efficiency of the modular multiplication, which can be broadly classified as either
product partitioning or multiplication by reciprocal of modulus [103]. For the prod-
uct partitioning, the main idea is to perform general multiplication first and then
use subtraction or multiplication to reduce the product. The Montgomery reduction
falls into this category [98], which two 2v-bit multiplicands a and b to be multiplied
a factor r = 22v. Then, the reduction can be achieved by c = abr−1, where r−1 is
the inverse of r modulo Q.
On the other hand, Barrett reduction belongs to the category of multipli-
cation by reciprocal of modulus. It also first computes the product c′ from the
general multiplication of a and b. However, it reduces c′ back to the range [0, Q− 1]
differently: c = c′ − c′mQ, where m = b24v/Qc, and Q is the modulus [24]. Re-
cently, a method called Shift-Add-Multiply-Subtract-Subtract (SAMS2) has been
proposed, which follows the same idea of Barrett reduction, while using the addi-
tion and shifting instead of the expensive multiplication/division for reduction [90].
8.1.2 Hardware Implementation for Modular Multiplication
The algorithms mentioned above can theoretically improve the modular mul-
tiplication. Meanwhile, many dedicated techniques for hardware implementations
and optimizations of modular multiplications have also been developed.
For instance, one recent hardware optimization of Montgomery reduction
for HE schemes is presented in [92], which accelerates the operation by applying
a word-level version of the Montgomery reduction algorithm and an NTT-friendly
prime to eliminate the multiplication with r−1.
In fact, most of the hardware implementations for modular multiplication
in HE and PQC are based on Barrett reduction [111, 23], as the primes are usually
fixed in these applications. It has been shown that the Barrett reduction can be
implemented by using multipliers and shifting operations only [111, 23]. Besides, the
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SAMS2 algorithm only requires adders/subtractors and one multiplier for reducing
the original product [110].
8.2 Optimized Modular Karatsuba Multiplication
As opposed to following the directions of the Barrett reduction or Mont-
gomery reduction, this paper exploits a different category of modular multiplica-
tion optimization, i.e., modular reduction of partial products. As this technique
calculates several partial products in parallel and then performs reduction before
combining them back, it has the potential to accelerate the operation as well as
reduce the area consumption of the hardware implementation. To this end, we first
perform a flattening step to split the operands and then reduce the partial products
according to a base B.
8.2.1 Base B Representation
Recall the standard definition of base B representation for an integer. For
positive integers Q,B, `, if Q < B`, then any integer y ∈ [0, Q − 1] can be written
uniquely in base B as
y = y0 + y1B + y2B
2 + · · ·+ y`−1B`−1 (8.2)
where 0 ≤ yi < B. If B is a power of 2, B = 2v, it is simple to convert from
the binary representation of an integer into its base B representation. In this case,
yi = [(i+ 1)v − 1, iv], where i is an integer and 0 ≤ i ≤ `− 1.
8.2.2 Optimally Chosen Prime
Performing an NTT is the primary algorithm for polynomial multiplication
used in lattice-based cryptography. We will design our algorithm to use a fixed
prime that is chosen to be compatible with fast NTT operations modulo (xn + 1)
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where n is a power of 2. In order to perform the NTT, the prime must be chosen
such that 2n divides (Q − 1). To further optimize the modular multiplication, we
will to chose the prime to have a “sparse” representation in the following sense.
The core of our algorithm is based on choosing a power of 2, B = 2v, and
selecting a sparse prime Q such that Q < B2. In particular for integers v1 and v2
where v2 < v1 ≤ v − 2, we consider sparse primes of the following two forms:
Q = 22v − 2v1 ± 2v2 + 1, (8.3)
and
Q = 22v − 2v1 + 1. (8.4)
We refer to the forms in Equations (8.3) and (8.4) as 4-sparse and 3-sparse primes,
respectively. We choose these forms for several reasons:
1. our technique will use the fact that Q < 22v = B2 to represent the inputs as
two base B digits, thus we must subtract the power 2v1 ;
2. one of our optimizations is based on the assumption that v1 ≤ v − 2;
3. the least significant bit (LSB) of a prime has to be 1, otherwise Q is even, and
we add 1 rather than subtract so that Q−1 will be divisible by a larger power
of 2;
4. finally, in order to be able to find primes of any desired size we add the power
2v2 to the form which lets us find more numbers of this form which are prime.
In order to support an NTT in rings with large n (as is needed for strong security
of the Ring Learning with Errors (RLWE) problem [14]), v2 needs to be large in the
case of a 4-sparse prime, while v1 should be large in the case of a 3-sparse prime.
For example, the 64-bit prime Q = 264 − 224 + 1 supports an NTT with n
up to 23 which is sufficiently large for practically any RLWE parameters. For other
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Figure 8.1: Optimized Modular Karatsuba Multiplication
applications, we may choose a prime with small v1 and v2 for better efficiency in
the multiplication, such as the 32-bit prime Q = 232 − 23 + 21 + 1.
8.2.3 Proposed Algorithm for the Modular Karatsuba Multiplica-
tion
We describe our algorithm in detail for the case of a 4-sparse prime Q =
22v − 2v1 + 2v2 + 1, but this algorithm can be easily extended to the 3-sparse prime
case and the other 4-sparse case we described above.
Algorithm 8.1 presents our optimized modular Karatsuba multiplication.
It can be seen that only three small multiplications are required, while the other
operations are only simple shifting and addition/subtraction, as the multiplication
with 2k can be realized using shifting.
Our algorithm multiplies a, b ∈ [0, Q − 1] together modulo Q by first rep-
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resenting a and b in base B as a = a0 + a1B and b = b0 + b1B, as shown in Step
1. Then, similar to the original Karatsuba multiplication, we generate the partial
products of c0 = a0b0, c1 = a1b1, and c2 = (a0 +a1)(b0 + b1), as shown in Step 2. As
a result, the product ab = (a0 + a1B)(b0 + b1B) can be expressed in terms of these
three partial products as
ab = c0 + (c2 − (c1 + c0))B + c1B2. (8.5)
The main idea is to reduce this to the range [0, Q−1] while preserving its congruence
modulo Q and do so in an optimal way. As opposed to multiplying c1 by B
2
as in the original Karatsuba algorithm, we multiply it by (2v1 − 2v2 − 1) since
B2 = 22v ≡ 2v1 − 2v2 − 1 (mod Q). In Step 3, we note this intermediate value as c,
c := c0 + (c2 − (c1 + c0))B + c1(2v1 − 2v2 − 1). (8.6)
At this point, c is still not guaranteed to be in the range [0, Q − 1]. However, we
prove in Lemma 1 that c < 23v+2.
Lemma 8.2.1. The intermediate value c obtained in Step 3 can be strictly upper-
bounded by 23v+2, i.e.,
c = c0 + (c2 − (c1 + c0))B + c1(2v1 − 2v2 − 1) < 23v+2.
Proof. We have c2 = (a0 + a1)(b0 + b1), c1 = a1b1, and c0 = a0b0, so c2 − (c1 + c0)
simplifies to a0b1+a1b0. Since a0, a1, b0, b1 ≤ 2v−1, all the products c0 = a0b0, c1 =
a1b1, a0b1, a1b0 are less than or equal to (2
v − 1)2. Thus, we can first simplify c and
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then bound (since the terms contribute positively)
c = c0 + (a0b1 + a1b0))B + c1(2
v1 − 2v2 − 1)
≤ (2v − 1)2 + 2(2v − 1)22v + (2v − 1)2(2v1 − 2v2 − 1)
= (2v − 1)2[1 + 2v+1 + 2v1 − 2v2 − 1]
= (2v − 1)2[2v+1 + 2v1 − 2v2 ].
Since v1 < v, we can bound 2
v1 ≤ 2v+1. Also (2v − 1)2 < 22v, and we can drop the
negative term −2v2 and bound as,
< (2v − 1)2[2v+1 + 2v+1]
< 22v(2v+2) = 23v+2.
By utilizing Lemma 1, in Step 4 we split c in a base B representation as
c = f0 + f1B
2 + f2B
3, (8.7)
where 0 ≤ f0 < B2, 0 ≤ f1 < B and 0 ≤ f2 < 22 − 1 (Lemma 1). Consequently, we
reduce this modulo Q in Step 5 as
f = f0 + f1(2
v1 − 2v2 − 1) + f2(2v1 − 2v2 − 1)2v, (8.8)
since B3 ≡ (2v1 − 2v2 − 1)2v (mod Q). After this step, f will be very close to the
desired range of [0, Q−1]. We show in Lemma 2 that f < 2Q−1, if v1 ≤ v−2. Thus,
we only need to check whether f ≥ Q in Step 6. If it is the case, one subtraction by
Q is enough to reduce it into the range of [0, Q− 1].
Lemma 8.2.2. Assuming v2 < v1 ≤ v − 2, we have f < 2Q − 1. Thus, if f ≥ Q,
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then f −Q < Q− 1.
Proof. We have f0 ≤ 22v − 1, f1 ≤ 2v − 1 and by Lemma 1 f2 ≤ 22 − 1. Thus, we
can bound f as
f =f0 + f1(2
v1 − 2v2 − 1) + f22v(2v1 − 2v2 − 1)
≤22v − 1 + (2v − 1)(2v1 − 2v2 − 1) + 3 · 2v(2v1 − 2v2 − 1).
Factoring out (2v1 − 2v2 − 1), we can simplify and drop some negative terms,
= 22v − 1 + (2v1 − 2v2 − 1)[(2v − 1) + 3 · 2v]
= 22v − 1 + (2v1 − 2v2 − 1)[2v+2 − 1]
< 22v + (2v1 − 2v2 − 1)2v+2
Then dropping the negative term −2v2 and using the assumption that v1 ≤ v − 2
we can bound 2v1 ≤ 2v−2,
< 22v + (2v−2 − 1)2v+2
= 22v+1 − 2v+2
< 22v+1 − 2v1+1 + 2v2+1
= 2Q− 2.
For the hardware implementation and performance results we refer the reader
to our forthcoming paper.
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Chapter 9
Another Algorithm for the
Partial Approximate Common
Divisor Problem
In this chapter, we analyze a previously unpublished algorithm for solving
the Partial Approximate Common Divisor (PACD) problem, also known as the Par-
tial Approximate Greatest Common Divisor (PAGCD). PACD was the problem used
in early fully homomorphic encryption schemes [122], though most later fully homo-
morphic encryption schemes use the LWE/RLWE problems for greater efficiency.
Given t samples of the form xi = pqi + ri 0 ≤ i ≤ t − 1, where p is a fixed prime,
qi are random integers larger than p and ri are random integers with absolute value
smaller than p with r0 = 0, the PACD problem is to recover p.
9.1 The ACD and PACD Problem
The ACD problem was first introduced by Howgrave-Graham in [79]. For-
mally we define the problem as follows. Fix γ, η, ρ ∈ N. Take p to be an η−bit odd
integer (we consider the case when p is prime). Define the distribution Dγ,ρ(p) as
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Dγ,ρ(p) = {pq + r|q ← Z ∩ [0, 2γ/p), r ← Z ∩ (−2ρ, 2ρ)}.
Definition 9.1.1. Given polynomially many samples xi from Dγ,ρ(p), the approx-
imate common divisor problem (ACD) is to compute p.
Definition 9.1.2. Given polynomially many samples xi from Dγ,ρ(p) as well as
one special sample x0 = pq0 (called a clean multiple) where q0 is sampled from
Z∩ [0, 2γ/p), the partial approximate common divisor problem (PACD) is to
compute p.
Earlier works including Black’s dissertation [30] use a different notation for
the sizes, which we will refer to as original notation. Let |x|b denote the bit length
of an integer x. Then in original notation one refers to the sizes of q, p, and
r as |q|b, |p|b, |r|b. One can convert between the two notations by observing that
γ = |q|b + |p|b, η = |p|b, ρ = |r|b.
Cheon and Stehle´ in [48] give a reduction from decision LWE to decision
ACD. This reduction combined with the equivalence of the decisional and compu-
tational forms of ACD from [122] gives a reduction from LWE to the ACD variant
of Cheon and Stehle´.
If two clean multiples were provided, a straight forward polynomial time
algorithm based on repeated use of the Euclidean algorithm is able to solve for p.
Thus, a reduction from ACD to PACD is unlikely since if for m samples with error
you could recover one clean multiple, you could use 2m samples to recover two clean
samples and then solve ACD. Even with this apparent difference between these two
problems and their hardness, there are currently no algorithms in the literature that
are able to take advantage of a clean multiple to solve PACD any better than solving
the more general ACD.
The PACD problem is a natural one to consider in fully homomorphic en-
cryption applications because the presence of the clean multiple x0 allows one to
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keep the ciphertext from growing too much by reducing the ciphertext modulo x0.
Thus, it is interesting to study the difficulty of solving PACD independently of ACD.
Our Contribution. We analyze the h-star algorithm in Black’s dissertation
[30, Section 5.3] and determine experimentally when the algorithm will succeed in
solving the PACD problem. As far as has been studied, this algorithm only applies
to PACD and not ACD; however, our analysis shows that the performance of the
algorithm is not better than existing algorithms for ACD.
9.2 Existing Algorithms
In [64] Galbraith et al. overview the three main algorithmic approaches to
solving ACD. Those include the simultaneous diophantine approximation approach,
orthogonal-based approach, and multivariate polynomial approach. In summary,
the authors are evaluating the three approaches primarily based on how many ACD
samples each needs to succeed. The simultaneous diophantine approximation (SDA)
approach requires
t+ 1 >
γ − ρ
η − ρ
samples to succeed. The orthogonal-based approach needs
t ≥ γ − ρ
η − ρ
samples to succeed. The multivariate polynomial approach performs similarly.
None of these approaches perform notably better for the PACD version than
the more general ACD version. The only attack that we are aware of that applies
to PACD and not also to the more general ACD is a factoring attack on the clean
multiple x0 = pq0.
Our Result Below we will analyze the h-star algorithm and determine that
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it requires
t >
γ − η + ρ
η − ρ
samples to solve the PACD problem.
To compare our result with the existing algorithms, we find it a bit easier
if we first convert into original notation. The h-star algorithm in original notation
requires
t >
|q|b + |r|b
|p|b − |r|b . (9.1)
The SDA algorithm in original notation requires
t+ 1 >
|q|b + |p|b − |r|b
|p|b − |r|b (9.2)
t >
|q|b
|p|b − |r|b . (9.3)
Thus, it is clear the SDA algorithm requires fewer samples; although, asymptotically
this does not seem to be a major difference since r is smaller than p and q. We leave
open the problem of for what values of q, p, and r the difference between these two
results is maximized or minimized. We note that the difference in these two results
comes about in the data analysis section below from our taking the fit for slope
m = (−t+ 1); if we were able to take m = −t the results would be identical.
9.3 h-star Algorithm
The algorithm we present here was first seen in the PhD dissertation of
Nathanial Black in [30]. We modify it slightly and do a more complete analysis of
when it correctly solves PACD. A full explanation as to why this algorithm works
is still an open problem though we show through extensive experiments the number
of samples needed.
Given samples x0, ..., xt we form a lattice with basis given by the rows of the
following matrix:
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L =

0 0 0 · · · x0
1 0 0 · · · x1
0 1 0 · · · x2
0 0 1 · · · x3
...
. . .
...
0 0 · · · xt

.
Next, run the LLL algorithm to produce a reduced basis consisting of the rows of B
B =

b0,0 b0,1 · · · b0,t
b1,0 b1,1 · · · b1,t
...
...
. . . · · ·
bt−1,0 bt−1,1 · · · bt−1,t
bt,0 bt,1 · · · bt,t

.
The last row bt in B is then dropped to form the t× (t+ 1) matrix B¯
B¯ =

b0,0 b0,1 · · · b0,t
b1,0 b1,1 · · · b1,t
...
...
. . . · · ·
bt−1,0 bt−1,1 · · · bt−1,t

.
Now, we put B¯ into echelon form (Hermit normal form) over the integers obtaining
H =

h0,0 h0,1 · · · h0,t−2 h0,t−1 h0,t
0 h1,1 · · · h1,t−2 h1,t−1 h1,t
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
0 0 · · · ht−2,t−2 ht−2,t−1 ht−2,t
0 0 · · · 0 ht−1,t−1 ht−1,t

.
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Then we take the product of the diagonal entries
h :=
t−1∏
i=0
hi,i.
(In [30] h := ht−1,t−1 and this value is called h∗.) For the parameters for which the
algorithm successfully solves, h appears to always have a large common factor with
the clean multiple x0 = q0p. More specifically, either
h = q0
or
kh = q0
for a small integer k. So computing x0/h gives kp from which we can recover p.
9.4 Simulations and Analysis
We collected data on whether the algorithm successfully solved across various
values of |p|b, |q|b, |r|b , and t. More specifically, for five different values of p we
varied t and for each combination of (p, t) we tested the algorithm’s success across
a grid of varying values of |q|b and |r|b. For each set (p, t, |q|b, |r|b), we ran the
algorithm a small number (∼ 10) of independent times and recorded the proportion
of the successes.
Right away one sees a linear relationship partitioning values of (|q|b, |r|b) for
which the algorithm succeeds, see for example Table 9.4. For each grid of results
we pull off points that are on this border line and used them to fit a regression line
giving the slope, which we denote by m, and y-intercept, which we denote by b. One
can observe that the algorithm succeeds on each table when
|q|b ≤ m|r|b + b.
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For each value of p we consider about 5 different values for t and generate a grid
over |q|b, |r|b. For sake of space, we will not display the grid of raw data for each
parameter set; instead, for a given p we plot the different lines for each t on the
same plot as in Figures 9.1(a), 9.2(a), 9.3(a), 9.4(a), 9.5(a).
Combining these observations across various values of t for a fixed p one
notes that there is a strong linear relationship between the values for slope and t.
Specifically, m = −(t + 1) is a good fit, see these values plotted in Figures 9.1(b),
9.2(b), 9.3(b), 9.4(b), 9.5(b). Also, there is a strong linear relationship between the
values of t|p|b and the y-intercept b. Specifically, t|p|b = b is a good fit, see these
values plotted in Figures 9.1(c), 9.2(c), 9.3(c), 9.4(c), 9.5(c).
This second linear relationship t|p|b = b also holds when you combine these
data points across the multiple value of p, as shown in Figure 9.6.
Putting these together we see that the algorithm succeeds when
|q|b ≤ −(t+ 1)|r|b + t|p|b
and solving this for t gives
|q|b + |r|b
|p|b − |r|b ≤ t.
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Table 9.1: |p|b = 25, t = 18, |r|b across the top, |q|b down the side. Entries are
the proportion of the 10 trials that were run with those parameters and solved
successfully.
25, 18 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
12 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
32 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
52 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 .8 0 0 0 0 0
72 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 .9 0 0 0 0 0 0
92 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 .8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
112 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 .5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
132 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 .5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
152 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 .3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
172 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 .2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
192 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 .1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
212 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 .2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
232 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 .2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
252 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 .1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
272 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 .1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
292 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
312 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
332 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
352 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
372 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
392 .6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
412 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
432 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
452 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
472 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
492 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
512 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
532 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
552 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
572 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
592 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
612 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
632 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
652 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
672 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
692 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
712 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
732 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
752 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
772 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
792 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
812 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
832 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
852 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
872 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
892 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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Figure 9.1: For |p|b = 25 and with 4 different values of t we generate a grid over
|q|b and |r|b. In Panel (a) we plot the lines that partition the parameters solvable
vs. not (below the line are solvable). In Panel (b) we fit the slopes m of the lines
in Panel (a) to t. In Panel (c) we fit the y-intercepts of the lines in Panel (a) to the
quantity t|p|b.
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Figure 9.2: For |p|b = 99 and with 5 different values of t we generate a grid over
|q|b and |r|b. In Panel (a) we plot the lines that partition the parameters solvable
vs. not (below the line are solvable). In Panel (b) we fit the slopes m of the lines
in Panel (a) to t. In Panel (c) we fit the y-intercepts of the lines in Panel (a) to the
quantity t|p|b.
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Figure 9.3: For |p|b = 133 and with 6 different values of t we generate a grid over
|q|b and |r|b. In Panel (a) we plot the lines that partition the parameters solvable
vs. not (below the line are solvable). In Panel (b) we fit the slopes m of the lines
in Panel (a) to t. In Panel (c) we fit the y-intercepts of the lines in Panel (a) to the
quantity t|p|b.
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Figure 9.4: For |p|b = 165 and with 4 different values of t we generate a grid over
|q|b and |r|b. In Panel (a) we plot the lines that partition the parameters solvable
vs. not (below the line are solvable). In Panel (b) we fit the slopes m of the lines
in Panel (a) to t. In Panel (c) we fit the y-intercepts of the lines in Panel (a) to the
quantity t|p|b.
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Figure 9.5: For |p|b = 264 and with 7 different values of t we generate a grid over
|q|b and |r|b. In Panel (a) we plot the lines that partition the parameters solvable
vs. not (below the line are solvable). In Panel (b) we fit the slopes m of the lines
in Panel (a) to t. In Panel (c) we fit the y-intercepts of the lines in Panel (a) to the
quantity t|p|b.
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Figure 9.6: We fit the y-intercepts to the quantity t|p|b across the data for all values
of p. The different shapes for the data points correspond to their shapes in the
previous Panel (c)’s.
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Appendix A Computing Probability Distributions
In Chapter 7, we need to implement the following theorem where the multi-
plication of polynomials takes place in the ring R[x]/〈xp − 1〉.
Theorem A.1. Suppose e0, e1, . . . , en−1 are independent random variables on Zp
with probability distributions (ci0, ci1, . . . , ci,p−1) for 0 ≤ i ≤ n − 1. Let ci(x) =∑
k∈Zp cikx
k. Then, for any a1, . . . , an−1 ∈ Zp, the probability distribution of e =
e0+e1a1+· · ·+en−1an−1 mod p can be computed as the coefficients of the polynomial
c0(x)c1(x
a1) · · · cn−1(xan−1) (mod xp − 1).
Computing the product of these n polynomials in a recursive fashion, we can
get the number of polynomial multiplications down to log2 n. If we use a complex
valued FFT to perform the multiplication of two degree p polynomials, this can
be done in time O(p log p). This resulting polynomial of degree 2p then needs to
be reduced modulo xp − 1, and this can be done with a cyclic reduction algorithm
that runs in time O(p). We implemented these operations using the NTL [116]
and FFTW [63] libraries. Here we explain our usage of the FFTW library for
performing the polynomial multiplication. What FFTW represents in the “in” array
is the coefficient array
in = {c0, c1, ..., cN−1}
representing the polynomial
f = c0 + c1x+ · · ·+ cN−1xN−1
which it evaluates at the N complex roots of unity. The order of the roots starts at
(1, 0) and then goes clockwise around the unit circle,
{1, e 2pii(N−1)N , e 2pii(N−2)N , ..., e 2piiN .}
Thus, the “out” array is
out = {f(1), f(e 2pii(N−1)N ), f(e 2pii(N−2)N ), ..., f(e 2piiN )}.
When you multiply two polynomials with an FFT, you need the number
of points you evaluate each at to be greater than or equal to the degree of their
product so that the product will be uniquely defined by the evaluated points. In
one of our examples, we have polynomials of degree p = 7681, so the product could
have degree 2 · 7681 = 15362. Thus, we need the size of the FFT to be at least
15362, and for the implementation optimizations FFTW suggests picking a size
that has lots of small factors; the next largest power of 2 is 214 = 16384. Thus, the
“in” array will only be filled with the coefficients of the polynomial to about half
way and the remainder of the array will be filled with zeros. For a basic example,
see github.com/bmcase/FFTWbasics. The code for the two main methods of our
implementation are shown in Listing A. For the full code for computing distributions
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using these methods see github.com/bmcase/computingdistributions
void CyclicReduce(Vec<double>& x, const fftw_complex *a, const long q,
const long N)
// computes x = a mod X^q-1 (based on an NTL method)
{
long i, j;
double accum;
for (i = 0; i < q; i++) {
accum = a[i][0];
for (j = i + q; j <= N; j += q){
accum = accum + a[j][0];
}
x[i] = accum;
}
} //end CyclicReduce
void multiply_list_iterativerecursion(Vec< Vec< double>>& flist, const
long & q) {
//flist is a list of polynomials, each entry f, is the coef
representation of a polynomial f,
// this method multiplies them all in the ring $\R[x]/(x^q-1)$ where \R
is the real numbers and returns the product in flist[0].
int length = flist.length();
int i;
//set up FFTs: two forward, one backward
//two polynomials at a time will be transformed by p_forward1 and
p_forward2 and then their FFT
//representations multiplied. The result will be transformed back using
p_backwards and then the
//result will be reduced mod x^q-1 by the cyclic reduce method.
fftw_complex *in1, *out1, *in2, *out2;
fftw_plan p_forward1, p_forward2, p_backward;
int deg;
deg = flist[0].length();
int N;
N = 2 * deg;
in1 = (fftw_complex*) fftw_malloc(sizeof(fftw_complex) * N);
in2 = (fftw_complex*) fftw_malloc(sizeof(fftw_complex) * N);
out1 = (fftw_complex*) fftw_malloc(sizeof(fftw_complex) * N);
out2 = (fftw_complex*) fftw_malloc(sizeof(fftw_complex) * N);
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// Note that FFTW using Measure or Estimate will differ slightly between
runs. If you use wisdom or Estimate
// it will be deterministic and give the same result between runs.
http://fftw.org/faq/section3.html#nondeterministic
// FFTW Measure
//p_forward1 = fftw_plan_dft_1d(N, in1, out1, FFTW_FORWARD,
FFTW_MEASURE);
//p_forward2 = fftw_plan_dft_1d(N, in2, out2, FFTW_FORWARD,
FFTW_MEASURE);
//p_backward = fftw_plan_dft_1d(N, in1, out1, FFTW_BACKWARD ,
FFTW_MEASURE);
// FFTW Estimate
p_forward1 = fftw_plan_dft_1d(N, in1, out1, FFTW_FORWARD, FFTW_ESTIMATE);
p_forward2 = fftw_plan_dft_1d(N, in2, out2, FFTW_FORWARD, FFTW_ESTIMATE);
p_backward = fftw_plan_dft_1d(N, in1, out1, FFTW_BACKWARD ,
FFTW_ESTIMATE);
// FFTW Patient
//p_forward1 = fftw_plan_dft_1d(N, in1, out1, FFTW_FORWARD,
FFTW_PATIENT);
//p_forward2 = fftw_plan_dft_1d(N, in2, out2, FFTW_FORWARD,
FFTW_PATIENT);
//p_backward = fftw_plan_dft_1d(N, in1, out1, FFTW_BACKWARD ,
FFTW_PATIENT);
while(length > 1){
//std::cout << "length = " << length << "\n";
if(0 == length % 2){
for(int i = 0; i < length; i+=2){
for(int j = 0; j< N; j++){
if(j < deg) {
in1[j][0] = flist[i][j]; //move f_i into in1
in1[j][1] = 0;
in2[j][0] = flist[i+1][j]; //move f_{i+1} into in2
in2[j][1] = 0;
}else{
in1[j][0] = 0;
in1[j][1] = 0;
in2[j][0] = 0;
in2[j][1] = 0;
}
}
fftw_execute(p_forward1);
fftw_execute(p_forward2);
//multiply fft_out1 and fft_out2
for(int k = 0; k < N; k++){ //(a+bi)(c+di) = (ac - bd) + (bc +
ad)i
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in1[k][0] = out1[k][0] * out2[k][0] - out1[k][1] *
out2[k][1]; //real component
in1[k][1] = out1[k][1] * out2[k][0] + out1[k][0] *
out2[k][1]; //imaginary component
}
fftw_execute(p_backward); //stores into out1
for(int k = 0; k < N; k++){ //scale to adjust how FFTW works
out1[k][0] = out1[k][0] / N;
}
CyclicReduce(flist[int(i/2)],out1,q,N); //now out1 just needs
to be cyclic reduced.
}
length = int(length/2);
}else{//1 == length % 2
for(int i = 0; i < length-1; i+=2){
for(int j = 0; j< N; j++){
if(j < deg) {
in1[j][0] = flist[i][j]; //move f_1 into in1
in1[j][1] = 0;
in2[j][0] = flist[i+1][j]; //move f_2 into in2
in2[j][1] = 0;
}else{
in1[j][0] = 0;
in1[j][1] = 0;
in2[j][0] = 0;
in2[j][1] = 0;
}
}
fftw_execute(p_forward1);
fftw_execute(p_forward2);
//multiply fft_out1 and fft_out2
for(int k = 0; k < N; k++){ //(a+bi)(c+di) = (ac - bd) + (bc +
ad)i
in1[k][0] = out1[k][0] * out2[k][0] - out1[k][1] * out2[k][1];
in1[k][1] = out1[k][1] * out2[k][0] + out1[k][0] * out2[k][1];
}
fftw_execute(p_backward); //stores into out1
for(int k = 0; k < N; k++){
out1[k][0] = out1[k][0] / N;
}
CyclicReduce(flist[int(i/2)],out1,q,N);
}
flist[int(ceil(length/2))] = flist[length -1];
length = int(floor(length/2) )+ 1;
}
}
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//free memory, if not it will leak lots of memory
// see: http://www.fftw.org/doc/Memory-Allocation.html
fftw_free(in1);
fftw_free(in2);
fftw_free(out1);
fftw_free(out2);
//fftw_cleanup(); // this should fix the memory leak if running this
method many times www.fftw.org/faq/section3.html#leaks
//renormalize the probabilityl
double totalprob;
totalprob = 0;
for(i = 0; i < flist[0].length(); i++){
totalprob += flist[0][i];
}
//std::cout << "totalprob "<< totalprob << "\n";
for(i = 0; i < flist[0].length(); i++){
flist[0][i] = flist[0][i] / totalprob;
}
// FFTW precision: you can increase the precision that FFTW uses see
// http://www.fftw.org/fftw3_doc/Precision.html#Precision
}
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